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PREFACE 
 
The project has been completed with financing from Realdania and the Danish Agency for 
Science Technology and Innovation as an industrial PhD in collaboration between the 
Benchmark Centre for the Danish Construction Sector (Byggeriets Evaluerings Center, BEC) 
and the Technical University of Denmark (DTU). The PhD started in August 2009 and finished 
in December 2012.  
My background as a civil engineer has provided me with the ability to rationalize on complex 
issues and analyze and/or test a hypothesis through applied science with the overall aim of 
concluding with some technical recommendations of improvements, changes, technical 
solutions, etc. As this PhD study progressed, I realized that my engineering disciplines were not 
sufficient for meeting the demands of conducting this PhD study.  
Accordingly, I primarily attended courses that were distant from my engineering background. 
Qualitative research techniques, discourse analysis, qualitative methods and methodology, and 
philosophy of science are just parts of my self-imposed “up-qualifications” as researcher.  
This journey has not been pain-free, and I must admit that my first encounter with social 
science was somewhat confusing and frustrating to me. But over time, and as social science 
revealed its possibilities and justifications for my study, I learned to appreciate this research 
area.  
I would like to thank a number of people, who in different ways have made it possible for me to 
finish this project. My supervisors, Kirsten Jørgensen, Stefan Christoffer Gottlieb, Peter 
Hesdorf, and Sten Bonke, deserve special mentioning: Kirsten for letting me pursue my 
academic interests and venture into new theoretical fields and research designs. Your caring 
support throughout the entire process has helped me to keep on the track, and without your 
always reliable support and encouragement when the tasks seemed most chaotic and 
unmanageable, I question whether this thesis would have been a reality. Stefan for being a good 
friend and providing me supervision far beyond what could be expected. I cannot thank you 
enough for always embracing me and my thesis in your busy schedule. Your critical feedback 
has been essential during my PhD process and for this end product. Peter for first of all inviting 
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me into the daily life at BEC. This study has been conducted for BEC, and without Peter, it 
would not have been a reality. I thank you especially for your encouragement to pursue my 
interests and define my study in ways I found to be most contributing to the work and interests 
of BEC. I hope that with this study I have done so. Sten for helping me along the way and for 
always giving support when needed.  
Beside from my supervisors, I would like to thank my colleagues at DTU Management 
Engineering. Especially, Jens Stissing Jensen I would like to thank for introducing me to 
institutional theory. I further thank you for always being willing to discuss my problems and 
find solutions to my frustrations.  
Finally, I thank my dear family for their support and encouragements—especially during the 
last hard time of the study. I particularly would like to thank my loving wife, Juliane, for 
managing everything at home and still encouraging me to always prioritize my PhD even 
though it meant spending most of my evenings at the office. Your ability to disregard your own 
needs and ability to take care of the home and our little son, Sigge, has amazed me. You are 
exceptional.  
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DANSK RESUMÉ 
 
Denne afhandling tager et teoretisk udgangspunkt i institutionel teori og omhandler 
institutionaliseringen af benchmarking i den danske byggebranche. Ved besvarelse af følgende 
tre forskningsspørgsmål, afdækker denne afhandling et studie af institutionaliseringen af 
benchmarking: 
- Hvordan og til hvilke formål er benchmarking blevet introduceret som løsning til 
politiske problemstillinger i den danske byggebranche? 
- Hvordan har politiske kampe og forhandlinger haft indflydelse på institutionaliseringen 
af benchmarking? 
- Hvordan har dette studie bidraget med anbefalinger til, hvordan nye strukturer kan 
institutionaliseres i den danske byggebranche? 
I metodekapitlet udfolder jeg, hvordan institutionel teori muliggør nye og vigtige undersøgelser 
til forståelse af institutionalisering af benchmarking. Jeg redegør for, hvordan teorivalget 
påvirker min analytiske tilgang til studiet, og yderligere hvordan institutionel teori kan bidrage 
med vigtig indsigter i forhold til dette studie. I metodekapitlet præsenteres tre modeller som 
anvendes i denne afhandling: “Three Pillars of Institutions,” “contradictions,” og “framings.” 
Yderligere vil kapitlet redegøre for de anvendte metoder til dataindsamlingen og de valg, som 
er foretaget i forhold til at analysere institutionaliseringsprocesser. 
Analysen folder sig ud over syv kapitler, startende med en redegørelse for det politiske 
grundlag, der var årsag til at benchmarking blev et politisk forslag til en fremtidig institution i 
den danske byggebranche. Det andet kapitel demonstrerer, hvordan benchmarking blev 
introduceret i slutningen af 1990’erne som en teknologi, der kunne adressere politiske 
fokusområder fra to udviklingsprogrammer fra slut-halvfemserne. I det tredje kapitel 
demonstreres, hvordan private aktører fra byggeriet forsøgte at tage kontrol over 
institutionalisering af benchmarking ved at etablere Byggeriets Evaluerings Center (BEC), som 
skulle udvikle og udbrede benchmarking til byggeriet. Det fjerde kapitel redegør for, hvordan 
benchmarking blev konkretiseret i form af et benchmarkingsystem og formuleret til at adressere 
flere politiske fokusområder i byggeriet. På denne måde blev BEC til en politisk arena, hvor 
mange lokale perspektiver og strategiske interesser skulle håndteres. Det femte kapitel 
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omhandler operationalisering af benchmarking, og viser hvordan konkretiseringen og 
implementering af benchmarking gav anledning til reaktioner fra aktører med forskellige og 
divergerende interesser i benchmarkinginitiativet. Politiske kampe opstod i takt med, at aktører 
udtrykte forskellige politiske interesser i institutionaliseringen af benchmarking. De politiske 
kampe, der bliver redegjort for i kapitel fem, konstituerede et stærkt politisk pres og påkrævede 
transformationer af institutionaliseringen, for at benchmarking kunne bevare institutionel 
legitimitet. Det politiske pres resulterede i radikale transformationer af institutionaliseringen af 
benchmarking. Denne transformation bliver der redegjort for i kapitel seks. Som resultat af 
transformationen fik private virksomheder i byggeriet forøget mulighed for at få indflydelse på 
den fremtidige institutionalisering. Derudover, og relateret til virksomhedernes indflydelse på 
institutionaliseringen, kom der konkurrenter til BEC på markedet. Denne konkurrence 
resulterede i implikationer i forhold til at forstå de instrumentelle formål og overordnede 
ambitioner for benchmarking. Det sidste analysekapitel afdækker, hvordan benchmarking 
bliver forstået og fortolket blandt praktikerne i byggeriet, der var blevet centrale aktører i 
institutionaliseringen. Dette kapitel viser, hvordan benchmarking som institution bliver 
integreret i praktikernes oplevede virkelighed og demonstrerer det samspil og fortolkninger, 
som benchmarking giver anledning til.  
Med udgangspunkt i de tre forskningsspørgsmål, diskuterer og konkluderer det sidste kapitel af 
afhandlingen på analysen. I kapitlet fremføres en forståelse af institutionaliseringsprocesser 
som værende højpolitiske og afhængig af aktørers politiske motivationer for at transformere de 
fremvoksende institutioner. Baseret på resultaterne fra analysen, konkludere jeg afhandlingen 
med anbefalinger til, hvordan man kan bygge og understøtte nye institutioner i den danske 
byggebranche. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
With a theoretical point of origin in contemporary institutional theory, this thesis is about the 
institutionalization of benchmarking in the Danish construction industry. By answering the 
following three research questions, the thesis embraces over an enquiry of the 
institutionalization of benchmarking: 
‐ How and for what purposes has benchmarking originally been introduced as a solution 
to political issues in the Danish construction industry?  
‐ How have political struggles and negotiations affected the institutionalization of 
benchmarking? 
‐ How has the study contributed with recommendations on how to institutionalize new 
structures in the Danish construction industry? 
In the methodology chapter, I outline how institutional theory facilitates new and important 
inquiries into understanding institutionalization of benchmarking. I account for how the choice 
of theory is influencing my analytical approach to conduct this study and how institutional 
theory is providing important insight in this study of benchmarking. In the methodology 
chapter, I present three analytical models that are applied in the study; “Three Pillars of 
Institutions,” “contradictions,” and “framings.” Further, the chapter accounts for the data 
collection methods used to conduct the empirical data collection and the appertaining choices 
that are made, based on the account for analyzing institutionalization processes.  
The analysis unfolds over seven chapters, starting with an exposition of the political foundation 
from which benchmarking originally arose as a political proposal for a future institution in the 
Danish construction industry. The second chapter demonstrates how benchmarking was 
introduced in the late 1990s as a technology addressing political focus areas from two 
development programs in the late 1990s. In the third chapter, it is demonstrated how private 
actors from the construction industry attempted to take control over the institutionalization of 
benchmarking by establishing an Evaluation Centre (Byggeriets Evaluerings Center, BEC) 
from which benchmarking was to be developed and disseminated to the construction industry. 
The fourth chapter demonstrates how benchmarking was concretized into a benchmarking 
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system and articulated to address several political focus areas for the construction industry. 
BEC accordingly became a political arena where many local perspectives and strategic interests 
had to be managed. The fifth chapter is about the operationalization of benchmarking and 
demonstrates how the concretizing and implementation of benchmarking gave rise to reactions 
from different actors with different and diverse interests in the benchmarking initiative. 
Political struggles emerged as actors expressed diverse political interests in the 
institutionalization of benchmarking. The political struggles accounted for in chapter five 
constituted a powerful political pressure and called for transformations of the 
institutionalization in order for benchmarking to attain institutional legitimacy. The political 
pressures ended up radically transforming the institutionalization of benchmarking. This 
transformation is accounted for in chapter six. As a result of the transformation, private 
construction companies were provided an opportunity to influence the future 
institutionalization. Additionally, and related to the construction companies’ influence on the 
institutionalization, competitors to BEC emerged. This competition entailed implications for 
how to perceive the instrumental purposes and overall objectives for benchmarking. Having the 
construction companies as important carriers of the institutionalization, the final chapter of the 
analysis uncovers how benchmarking is understood and interpreted among the practitioners in 
the construction industry. The chapter reveals how the benchmarking institution is incorporated 
in their experienced reality and demonstrates the interplay between and different interpretations 
among practitioners benchmarking gives rise to.  
With a point of departure in the three research questions, the final chapter discusses and 
concludes on the analysis. Here I advance an understanding of institutionalization processes as 
being highly political and reliant on actors’ political motivations to transform the rising 
institution. Based on the finding from the analysis, I conclude the thesis with recommendations 
for how to construct and carry institutions in the Danish construction industry. 
 
  
 5
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The research topic for this thesis is the development of a benchmarking initiative for the 
Danish construction industry and unfolds how benchmarking has been transforming since it 
was first introduced as a suggestion to improve productivity and quality in the Danish 
construction industry in a construction political Task Force in 2000. 
This chapter outlines the background from which this thesis rests and my motivations for 
conducting this PhD study. Further, I account for how my PhD journey has gone from having a 
managerial focus with an ambition to study the local organizational effects of benchmarking 
towards having a sectorial focus on the role of actors in the development and transformation of 
a benchmarking initiative for the Danish construction industry. I argue that in order to engage 
in studies of managerial aspects that are mostly concerned with the organizational effects and 
local practices that derive from benchmarking, it is a prerequisite to understand the context 
from which benchmarking unfolds and how its attains managerial legitimacy. 
Based on this focus for the study, I account for my aims and objectives and conclude the 
chapter with a short unfolding of the title and my research questions. 
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1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS FOR THE THESIS 
The Danish construction industry has been accused of being conservative and very traditional 
(By- og Boligministeriet, Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 2000; Thuesen, 2007). Lacking 
productivity development compared to other industries has over time led to a heavy political 
interest in constructing a construction policy that addressed these productivity issues. The 
societal economical loss caused by failures and defects in the construction industry has been 
assessed to make up 8–10% of the overall production costs (Apelgren et al., 2005), making 
failures and defect a central issue in the construction policy. With very different research 
objectives, these industrial disorders of the Danish construction industry have been a point of 
departure for many PhD studies over time (e.g., Simonsen, 2007; Gottlieb, 2010; Jensen, 2011), 
addressing different development initiatives that have been launched with the purpose of 
addressing the lacking productivity and quality. Likewise I started my industrial PhD study 
with an empirical point of departure in one of the political development initiatives that 
originated from these commonly accepted disorders of the construction industry. It was natural 
that due to my employment in Byggeriets Evaluerings Center (the Benchmark Centre for the 
Danish Construction Sector), who operated a benchmarking system that had been derived from 
political ambitions of increasing productivity and quality of the construction industry, that I 
was to have the benchmarking initiative as empirical field of research in some way. 
The benchmarking concept was introduced in 2000 as an element in a political task force report 
to increase quality and productivity in the Danish construction industry. It was clear that 
benchmarking was going to be a central part of the construction policy (Byggepolitisk Task 
Force, 2000). As a result of these initial political ambitions, benchmarking gained a foothold in 
the Danish construction industry throughout the past decade (Rasmussen, 2011).  
As described, I started my PhD study with the ambition of revealing the effects of the 
benchmarking initiative in a local context where benchmarking is used to derive organizational 
improvements. In the beginning of my PhD study, I read through historical documents and 
newspaper articles about the benchmarking initiative, and it became more and more evident 
that benchmarking was surrounded by many purposes and perceptions for how to achieve 
improvements. Further, it became obvious that the initiative had been radically transformed 
from its original design. As I read through the historical documents, it became obvious that the 
development of benchmarking had been influenced by both private and public actors and that 
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their interests in and interpretations of the initiative were not corresponding. This was not 
surprising, as construction political activities for several years had been developed in 
collaboration between public and private actors (Kristiansen et al., 2004; Gottlieb, 2010; 
Jensen, 2011). It did, however, lead me to reconsider my ambitions of studying benchmarking 
from a managerial perspective, as the changes during the development and implementation of 
benchmarking entailed that the normative expectations to the organizational effects and 
practices of benchmarking did not seem to be unambiguous. This made it difficult for me to 
extract a uniform interpretation of how benchmarking was considered to generate 
organizational improvements and which improvements were considered to derive from the 
benchmarking initiative. One of the central premises to pursuing my original ambitions of 
studying the effects of benchmarking through a managerial focus was thus being challenged, as 
one critical question arose:  
How could I study the organizational effects and practices of benchmarking in the Danish 
construction industry if the instrumental purposes and overall objectives for benchmarking are 
both changing and ambiguous? 
I recognized that benchmarking had been operating on a foundation of incoherent 
interpretations of its instrumental purposes and overall objectives, and I understood that a 
prerequisite for understanding how benchmarking was thought to generate improvements in the 
Danish construction industry was an unfolding of the development of benchmarking and the 
consequences of incoherent interpretations of the initiative. This caused me to disregard my 
original ambitions for the study, as the inevitable question of whether benchmarking “works” 
became secondary compared to an understanding of the prerequisites for and interpretations of 
how benchmarking is considered to generate organizational improvements.  
The historical insight in the development of the benchmarking initiative accordingly drove me 
to the following conclusion: Studies of benchmarking are not (or ought not to be) isolated to a 
managerial focus if the instrumental purposes and overall objectives are not uniform but are in 
fact being politically negotiated between actors with an interest in the determinations of these 
purposes and objectives. I searched for theoretical and methodological approaches in the 
benchmarking research to conduct a study of how benchmarking initiatives are shaped and 
politically negotiated over time but found that such issues were not addressed. This was 
paradoxical, as the literature acknowledged that the instrumental purposes and overall 
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objectives of benchmarking are prerequisites to get a hold on in order to assess the effects and 
practices of benchmarking in organizational contexts. In the following, I will account for how 
the prevalent benchmarking literature did not cope with inconsistencies of the instrumental 
purposes and overall objectives of benchmarking, as the literature appeared to be mainly based 
on normative expectations of how organizational improvements derived from benchmarking. 
One of the first benchmarking gurus was Robert C. Camp, who introduced benchmarking in 
1989 (Camp, 1989). Since 1989 the concept has been widely accepted as deriving 
organizational strategies leading to improvement of processes, higher productivity, and thus 
stronger market positions (Chen, 2005; Dawkins et al., 2007).  
The concept also gained a foothold in the construction industry, as several benchmarking 
initiatives rose in construction industries in different countries (e.g., The Benchmark Center for 
the Danish Construction Sector, Constructing Excellence, Construction Industry Institute 
Benchmarking and Metrics, EIB International Comparisons of Construction, Chile National 
Benchmarking System, Comparison of house-building productivity in Scandinavia). When I 
got an overview of these initiatives, I soon found that they reproduced the same above accepted 
perceptions of benchmarking as a technology to derive organizational improvements and did 
not address the theoretical or methodological discussions of how these improvements were 
derived in practice, nor did the initiatives reflect critical considerations of how to cope with 
political negotiations and changes of the instrumental purposes and overall objectives of 
benchmarking. This was not exclusive for the construction research community, as the general 
benchmarking literature was also reconstituting these normative expectations to benchmarking, 
mainly by contributing to the benchmarking literature with applications, case studies, and 
models showing these benefits of benchmarking (Rasmussen, 2011). This led me to my first 
conclusion: Studies of how benchmarking initiatives are developed and how they produce 
improvements in organizational contexts have been widely overlooked. (Luckily) I was not 
alone with this perception, as other researchers found that the research topics and definitions of 
benchmarking “are predominantly outcome orientated: they address the purpose of 
benchmarking, not in terms of its essence, but in terms of its potential contribution to 
organizational success” (Moriarty & Smallman, 2009: 488). Scrutinizing the benchmarking 
literature, I further found that benchmarking was not unambiguous, as the literature revealed 
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very different benchmarking approaches that were fundamentally different in their design and 
purposes (Rasmussen, 2010).  
The predominant benchmarking research are on a managerial focus with a stable and uniform 
interpretation of the instrumental purposes and overall objectives of benchmarking and do not 
consider or address the political dimension of benchmarking as sectorial development 
initiatives, where the core issue is to determine the instrumental purposes and overall objectives 
for benchmarking. There are significant differences between studies of benchmarking in a 
managerial perspective and studies of benchmarking that are developed to embrace an entire 
industrial sector as the field of research shifts from an organizational level, where 
benchmarking is understood as generating effects and practices through a rather stable rationale 
of its instrumental purposes and overall objectives, to a sectorial level, where benchmarking is 
understood as a having different instrumental purposes and overall objectives that are 
encompassing the interests of several actors and are being negotiated over time.  
I accordingly found the benchmarking research to be insufficient, as the organizational effects 
and practices of benchmarking are highly reliant of the preceding political negotiations between 
actors who have had a role in the development of the benchmarking initiative for the Danish 
construction industry. These political preconditions of the benchmarking initiative constitute 
the political negotiations as an empirical area of research to be far more relevant and legitimate 
than an organizational study on the effects and practices of a benchmarking initiative that is 
surrounded by inconsistent interpretations of its instrumental purposes and overall objectives. A 
thorough understanding of the Danish benchmarking initiative calls for a political dimension, 
where the study is about how the benchmarking initiative is politically negotiated and shaped, 
as it is these negotiations and shapings that constitute the foundation from which managerial 
studies of benchmarking find their empirical outset. To study benchmarking on a sectorial level 
require a political focus, where the shaping of the instrumental purposes and overall objectives 
of benchmarking are considered to be less stable and in the risk of transformations, as 
benchmarking is continuously being modified and is not necessarily unambiguously translated 
into uniform managerial strategies to derive organizational improvements. In organizations, 
managements can determine and pursue a managerial ambition for benchmarking, but when 
studying benchmarking as a sectorial development initiative for the Danish construction 
industry, it becomes less explicit for what purposes benchmarking is conducted. It might be a 
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political ambition that benchmarking is to be facilitated in an organizational level, but it is not a 
given outcome that a benchmarking initiative implemented in an entire industry will derive 
organizational improvements in local contexts and even less a given that the organizational 
practices and effects of benchmarking have a base in a common recognition of the instrumental 
purposes and overall objectives of benchmarking.  
Given that the benchmarking initiative is not uniform in its instrumental purposes and overall 
objectives for generating organizational improvements, the organizational effects and practices 
become of less importance than the political conditions under which benchmarking is 
negotiated and shaped. To understand and study benchmarking as a sectorial development 
initiative makes it relevant to consider benchmarking as something that is politically negotiated 
between different actors and central to understanding the game of politics that entails 
transformations of the instrumental purposes and overall objectives for benchmarking.  
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
With the above interest of orientating the thesis towards an unfolding of the development of 
benchmarking and the consequences of incoherent interpretations of the initiative, I designed 
my study in a way that could 1) account for how benchmarking has transformed from a 
politically constructed response to the lack of quality and productivity in the Danish 
construction industry to something that is radically different from the original design, 2) 
elucidate how and with what interests actors have engaged in the development of 
benchmarking and caused transformations of benchmarking that have influenced the prevalent 
objectives and interpretations of how benchmarking was intended to generate improvements of 
quality and productivity, and 3) account for how to navigate in a political environment where 
several actors are provided contributory influence in the development and implementation of 
construction political initiatives.  
In this way, this study embraces an exposition of how and why transformations of 
benchmarking have occurred over time in order to understand the premises for how the 
initiative became a legitimate development activity from which improvements of quality and 
productivity of the Danish construction industry could derive.  
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1.3 EXCLUSIONS 
The scope of the study does not extend to a study of whether benchmarking has actually had 
effects on the productivity and quality of the Danish construction industry. Nor does it go into 
an inquiry of the technicalities of benchmarking, these being statistical calculations, measures, 
etc. 
My empirical field of research is accordingly delimited to those topics that are relevant in 
revealing how benchmarking has been articulated and presented as a legitimate development 
initiative addressing the lack of quality and productivity in the Danish construction industry, 
topics that reflect how benchmarking has changed over time, and topics that reveal how actors 
attempt to attain influence on the development and implementation of benchmarking in the 
Danish construction industry. This delimitation of my study has facilitated a thorough analysis 
and exposition of how and why benchmarking has been changed due to political negotiations 
and due to an inclusion of private actors in the development and implementation of 
construction political initiatives. 
1.4 UNFOLDING OF THE TITLE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As a consequence of my objectives, I needed a theoretical framework that could help me 
elucidate how and why benchmarking originally occurred as a politically suggested 
development initiative and, additionally, the conditions that caused transformations of 
benchmarking. My theoretical inspiration was found in institutional theory, which provided 
opportunities to study how new structures (including schemas, rules, norms, routines, values, 
and beliefs) become established as authoritative guidelines for actors. My main motivation for 
choosing institutional theory is based on the high emphasis the theory places on actors and 
agency in the implementation of new structures. In this way, institutionalization became a 
central concept in my study, and very simplified it can be understood as “the process from 
which new structures attain legitimacy in an institutionalized field.” With the concept of 
institutionalization I was provided a theoretical basis for unfolding how development initiatives 
like benchmarking could be transformed or even rejected by actors in the quest for attaining 
institutional legitimacy.  
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The title “The institutionalization of benchmarking in the Danish construction industry” reflects 
my choice of theory and, simultaneously, my main objective of unfolding the 
institutionalization of the benchmarking initiative.  
Based on my aims and objectives I find the following research questions adequate for an 
overall ambition of conducting an enquiry of the institutionalization of benchmarking: 
‐ How and for what purposes has benchmarking originally been introduced as a solution 
to political issues in the Danish construction industry?  
‐ How have political struggles and negotiations affected the institutionalization of 
benchmarking? 
‐ How has the study contributed with recommendations on how to institutionalize new 
structures in the Danish construction industry? 
This first research question seeks to cover the institutional context from which benchmarking 
originated and how benchmarking was considered to be a legitimate construction political 
initiative in the Danish construction industry. The research question accordingly addresses how 
the institutional environment of the construction policy provided a foundation from which 
benchmarking should find institutional legitimacy.  
The second research question is about how the historical development of benchmarking has 
been influenced by actors’ engagement in political struggles and negotiations and their political 
interest in the institutionalization of benchmarking. 
The third research question is of a more perspectival nature and outlines how the 
institutionalization of benchmarking can contribute with general insight in how construction 
political development initiatives are shaped in negotiations between actors with contributory 
influence in the development of the construction industry. In this way, this research question 
discusses how the means-end relationships of rising institutions are transforming as a 
consequence of the interplay between institutionalization processes and politically motivated 
actors in the Danish construction industry. 
In this way, the three research questions have a high degree of overlap since the first question 
introduces the political premises for introducing benchmarking as a political development 
initiative for the Danish construction industry. The second question reveals how the 
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benchmarking initiative has been transformed as a consequence of the contemporary setup for 
developing and executing construction political activities. The third question illuminates the 
insights from the answers to the two other questions to facilitate a discussion of how 
benchmarking and other construction political initiatives can be constructed in ways that both 
take political ambitions and the inclusion of multiple actors in the development and 
implementation of political initiatives into account.  
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2 THEORY 
 
The objective of this chapter is to present the basis used to theoretically address and 
understand the development of benchmarking in the Danish construction industry.  
The choice of theory that derives from the field of “institutionalism” has been chosen for this 
study due to its ability to 1) explain the processes by which structures, including schemas, 
rules, norms, routines, values, and beliefs, become established as authoritative guidelines for 
social behavior; 2) contribute with an understanding of how new structures emerge and are 
adopted; and 3) explain how existing institutions and new structures are being shaped within a 
field through actors’ ability to influence their institutional environment. 
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2.1 INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
A brief and general review of the development of institutional theory is provided in order to 
illuminate how the more contemporary work applied to this study deviates from the earlier 
work on institutionalism.  
The study of institutions and their functioning and influences on society has a long history in 
organizational analysis since it is a recognized perception that organizations exist in an 
environment of institutions and that these institutions exert some degree of pressure on them. 
Although, far from all organizations are institutions and not all institutions are organizations; 
according to the below table, organizations are crucial in institutional theory since they have 
the quality to carry or challenge the institutions that constitute the institutional environments, 
“characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organizations 
must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy” (Scott, 2001:132).  
Prior to a continuation of the review of institutionalism, a broader conceptualization of 
institutions and institutionalization seems beneficial. Jepperson (1991) presented the following 
as representations of institutions. 
Institutions 
Marriage The handshake Academic tenure The corporation 
Sexism Insurance Presidency The motel 
The contract Formal organization The vacation The academic 
discipline 
Wage labor The army Attending college Voting 
Table 1: Examples of institutions. From Jepperson, 1991:144 
Even though these institutions seem very different, they share the commonalities of being 
“production systems,” “enabling sources,” “social programs,” or “performance scripts.” 
Jepperson (1991) provides an even more unifying conceptualization of institutions:  
“Institutions represent a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or 
property; institutionalization denotes the process of such attainment. By order or pattern 
I refer, as is conventional, to standardized interaction sequences. An institution is then a 
social pattern that reveals a particular reproduction process… Put in another way: 
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institutions are those social patterns that, when chronically reproduced, owe their 
survival to relatively self-activating social processes” (Jepperson, 1991:145). 
Institutions embody the shared meanings that are considered as natural and taken for granted 
within an organizational field. Commonly, institutions are described as any structures of social 
order which function as templates for the way we perceive our environment and how we act:  
 “Institutions are the humanly devised schemas, norms, and regulations that enable and 
constrain the behavior of social actors and make social life predictable and meaningful 
(North, 1990; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2001).” (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 
2006:866)  
Institutions specify and justify behaviors and can thus be viewed as performance scripts 
reflecting social structures and accepted interpretations of social life and, to some extent, 
structuring and repeating practices, deviations from which are counteracted by sanctions or are 
costly in some manner (Jepperson, 1991), thus institutions come across as natural and taken for 
granted—creating a mutually perceived reality. 
An often raised critique of institutional theory is that the theory is inherently static, but it seeks 
to explain institutions as political constructions, which on the other hand are very dynamic 
processes. Institutional theory is in this way criticized for attempting to explain differences 
among institutions, more that it attempts to explain the development of institutions. The 
contemporary institutional theory, however, addresses the dynamics of constructing new 
institutions and highly considers the political processes that occur as new structures are 
presented and implemented in organizational fields in attempts to generate changes. This 
process of structures becoming institutions is termed institutionalization.  
2.2 INSTITUTIONALIZATION  
The process by which behavior becomes institutionalized patterns of actions is central in 
understanding institutional change since the term refers to the process of embedding humanly 
devised structures: when they become taken for granted as a “natural” feature of social life and 
are constituent and of actors’ perceived rationality as well as explanatory to their behavior. For 
something to be institutionalized is thus to be regarded the ultimate achievement for actors with 
an interest in anchoring new behavior within a field.  
THEORY 
 
 
 
17
Berger and Luckmann (1966) introduce institutionalization as the processes by which humanly 
devised structures transcend their regulative function of socially ordering a field but even 
manifesting themselves as habituated natural activities among actors in the same institutional 
environment. When actors no longer consider their behavior as being partly controlled by an 
institution, because the institution becomes so taken for granted that acting in accordance with 
it is being regarded as rational behavior by those sharing the institution, the institution can be 
considered to be successfully institutionalized within the institutional environment. Actors are 
no longer experiencing the introduced institution as objective processes or structures. Rather it 
has become a meaning system, inscribed in a larger cultural framework.  
Regardless, a unifying acceptance among institutional theorists that institutions are phenomena 
that influence human behavior and social processes, and that they have pivotal influence on 
societal economic, political, and social developments, the historical development of 
institutionalism has resulted in a heterogeneously overall perception of institutional theory. In 
his review, Scott (2001) states:  
“The concepts of institution and institutionalization have been defined in diverse ways, 
with substantial variation among approaches. Thus, the beginning of wisdom in 
approaching institutional theory is to recognize that there is not one but several variants. 
Some versions are much more carefully defined and explicit about their definitions and 
referents, while others are less clear in conceptualization. Although there seems to be an 
underlying similarity in the various approaches, there is little agreement on specifics” 
(Scott, 1987: 493). 
Researchers of institutions have, however, not always addressed institutionalization as 
institutional theory originally had a rather normative conception of the interplay between 
institutions and actors. In the following, I will account for how institutional theory has 
transformed from rationalism towards aspects of cognitive and cultural explanations of 
institutions and their functions in order to understand how actors play a significant role in the 
forming of new institutions. 
2.3 INSTITUTIONALISM – RATIONALISM, ISOMORPHISM, AND ROLE OF ACTORS 
Initially, beginning from the late 1940s, institutional theory focused mainly on how institutions 
function to integrate organizations with other organizations in society and on explaining how 
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institutionalized structures affected organizations. Having a rationalist approach, this original 
“old” institutionalism perspective draws in the normative assumption of organizations as 
constrained and obligated by the norms and rules of institutions. In this perspective, individuals 
are acting independent of one another, and collective actions can be understood as the sum of 
individuals’ actions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991); institutions are considered to be limiting 
organizational behavior (Powell, 2007). The theoretical interest is on the influences institutions 
have on organizations in conforming their behavior, and the study of interest is phenomena 
such as universalistic rules, contracts, and authority (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008); adoption of 
socially approved templates; and the organizational resilience of institutional prescriptions 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006).  
In the 1970s a different approach to institutional analysis emerged, caused by an increasing 
necessity among scholars to develop a sociological approach to cope with the challenges in 
understanding and addressing institutions from a theoretical perspective (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991) and to understand how institutions affect society. More and more studies 
observed complexities and variety of organizational responses to institutional pressures and the 
important role of internal organizational practices in understanding institutions. It highlighted 
the necessity for institutionalists to rethink the notion of organizations as acting in a relatively 
homogeneous way on a common set of pressures (Powell, 2007), thus it prompted an 
introduction of the role of culture and cognition in institutional analysis from a micro 
perspective Zucker (1977), an emphasis on the taken for granted nature of institutions, and the 
role of cultural persistence as a measure of institutionalization. From a macro perspective, the 
notion of “isomorphism” became established as a conceptualization of the process occurring 
when organizations become uniform, viewed from a societal level, caused by their conforming 
of formal structures in respect to external pressures or requirements for attaining legitimacy 
(Mayer and Rowan, 1977). The theory of isomorphism was developed by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) and provides a theoretical understanding of why “organizations are becoming 
more homogeneous, and that elites often get their way, while at the same time enabling us to 
understand the irrationality, the frustration of power, and the lack of innovation that are so 
commonplace in organizational life” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:157). With their mimetic 
sources of isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell brought focus to what was so far regarded as 
mindless behavior in response to cultural rationalization (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). The 
theoretical approach and conceptualization of organizational conformity led to a movement in 
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bringing the study of interest from the societal level to the level of organizational fields, and 
proponents acknowledged that formal organizational structures were to be understood as 
reflections of the prevailing rationality. The new institutionalism breaks with the existing 
perceptions by rejecting rationality as an explanation for organizational structure and 
emphasizes that the success and survival of organizations are to be found in organizations’ 
quest for achieving legitimacy rather than efficiency (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).  Institutional 
theorists recognized that when studying stability, consensus and conformity of institutions was 
not sufficient in understanding the processes of how institutions are created, diffused, adopted, 
and adapted. 
“(…) [G]radually, the language began to shift from discussions of institutional “effects” 
to institutional “processes”; and theorists began to craft recursive models, recognizing 
“bottom-up” modes of influence, to supplement or replace prevailing top-down models 
(Scott 1995; 2001). (Scott, 2004) 
Where “old” institutionalism perceives institutions as the formal rules of behavior and treats 
them in correlation with the behavior of rational actors, the challenging theory loosens the 
concept of institutions as well as how they should be understood in relation to organizations 
and the behavior of individuals.  
“Institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting 
them; the institutions themselves shape these preferences and that power. Institutions are 
therefore constitutive of actors as well as vice versa. It is therefore not sufficient in this 
view to treat the preferences of individuals as given exogenously: they are affected by 
institutional arrangements, by prevailing norms, and by historically contingent discourse 
among people seeking to pursue their purposes and solve their self-defined problems” 
(Keohane 1988:382). 
The change of the conceptualization of institutions has led to an absent single agreed definition 
of what constitutes an institution. Scott (2001) perceives institutions as follows:  
“Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience. [They] 
are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together 
with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life […] 
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Institutions by definition connote stability but are subject to change processes, both 
incremental and discontinuous” (Scott, 2001:48).  
The concept of institutions is thus very wide, and practically any kind of behavioral pattern can 
be termed “institution,” thus suggesting that organizational structures and practices  
“[…] are often reflections or responses to the rules, beliefs, and conventions built into 
the wider environment” (Powell, 2007:1). 
Hence, institutions are the organizational structures and practices that are constituted by the 
formal as well as the informal conditions that frame and support individual and collective 
actions. Institutions do not just constrain actors’ behavior; they also establish the very criteria 
by which actors discover their preferences. Thus, scholars of the new institutionalism pay much 
more attention to the internal influences and the heterogeneity of organizational responses to 
institutional pressures, hence increasing the academic focus on the role of “agency” in 
institutionalization and acknowledging that institutionalization is a political process where 
success and final form depend on the relative power of the actors who strive to steer it 
(DiMaggio, 1988):  
“[W]hile recognizing that actors are institutionally constructed, it is essential to affirm 
their (varying) potential for reconstructing the rules, norms and beliefs that guide—but 
do not determine—their actions” (Scott, 2004:12)e. 
The rising awareness of the interrelations between actors and institutions has resulted in 
alternative theorizations of how to cope with institutional change. The focus is turned towards 
aspects of cognitive and cultural explanations of institutions and their functions in order to 
understand how changes in rules, normative systems, and cognitive beliefs reshape 
organizational fields and how these social structures are changing caused by the power 
exercised by “subjects.” In order to understand why some institutions persist and others erode 
or fall into disuse, institutionalists have found it vital to pay attention to the correlations 
between institutional change and intra-organizational dynamics within a field that emerge when 
shaping existing or creating new institutions.  
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2.4 ORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
The development of institutional theory has led to the following problematization of 
institutional change: 
 “If institutions are, by definition, firmly rooted in taken-for-granted rules, norms, and 
routines, and if those institutions are so powerful that organizations and individuals are 
apt to automatically conform to them, then how are new institutions created or existing 
ones changed over time?” (Seo and Creed, 2002:222) 
In understanding the dynamics and the strategic activities associated with institutional change, 
it is relevant to introduce the concept of organizational fields. This concept is central to 
institutional theory since it is a theoretical precondition that organizations are located within 
fields (Kondra and Hinings, 1998). Fields represent the intermediate level between 
organizations and society and are considered to be instrumental to processes by which socially 
constructed expectations and practices become disseminated and reproduced (Scott, 2001).  
The concept of fields has been developed in order for institutional theorists to cope with and 
account for the tensions and contradictions that emerge in the maintenance of existing or rising 
of new institutions within a specific group of organizations that share an interest in the 
institutional conditions. 
Powell describe how “[a]n organizational field is a community of disparate organizations, 
including producers, consumers, overseers, and advisors, that engage in common activities, 
subject to similar reputational and regulatory pressures”  (Powell, 2007:3). “Field” expresses 
those conditions under which the institutional environment shapes actors and their behavior 
(Zucker, 1988) and is constituted by organizations and professions that share common 
understandings of social orders or activities:  
 “The notion of field connotes the existence of a community of organizations that 
partakes of common meaning system, and whose participants interact more frequently 
and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott, 1994:207-8).  
In its capacity to embrace and represent differentiated, interdependent actors and institutions, 
fields are considered to reveal a recognized social structure and social life (DiMaggio and 
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Powell, 1983), and it is a theoretical conviction among institutionalists that it is within this 
intermediate level that the sources for institutional change are to be found.  
Early work on organizational fields concentrates attention on field level development and 
institutional change by mainly considering fields as domination systems that confine behavior, 
thus highly neglecting the role of actors and agency. Within this field perspective, studies at the 
field level consider institutions as being reflections of the prevailing field boundaries. But 
concurrently with the growing acknowledgement that actors and agency play vital roles in 
making up institutions and creating institutional change, a different field perspective has 
emerged. Observing that actors have power and interest in producing strategic activities that 
affect the process of institutional change, it has become increasingly interesting for scholars to 
consider micro processes as reflections of the field boundaries.  Fields are to be considered as 
contested centers of debate, “where competing interests negotiate the interpretation of what 
they each consider as key issues” (Powell, 2007:3), thus allowing strategic activities to emerge 
in the tensions and contradiction of the field itself.  
Powell (1991) provides the following characteristics of institutional change: 
“When change does occur […] it is likely to be episodic, highlighted by a brief period of 
crisis or critical intervention, and followed by a longer period of stability or path-
dependent development. Periods of deregulation, for example, are likely to be followed 
by an era of consolidation. Major changes often occur when legal or other rule-
maintaining boundaries are relaxed” (Powell, 1991:197). 
Institutional change is the focal point in contemporary institutional literature, and institutional 
contradictions are appointed as the driving forces of institutional change, resulting in the 
questioning of taken for granted elements of social structure and a replacement of other 
elements that previously were considered illegitimate, unthinkable, or impossible. This points 
out a central element in studying institutional change and simultaneously enhances the 
necessity to study institutionalization as a political process: The anchoring of new institutions 
requires that one or more previously taken for granted, “natural” features of social life are being 
altered, abandoned, and replaced by another. This has enhanced the academic interest in a so 
far underdeveloped phenomenon, deinstitutionalization, “the processes by which institutions 
weaken and disappear” (Scott, 2001:182). In a change perspective, deinstitutionalization finds 
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its legitimacy because “it is useful to place studies of deinstitutionalization in a broader context 
of institutional change, since the weakening and disappearance of one set of beliefs and 
practices is likely to be associated with the arrival of new beliefs and practices” (Scott, 
2001:184).  
The notion that institutional fields are centers of debate and consist of several, sometimes 
mutually, competing interests (Seo and Creed, 2002) that can be contested as actors interpreting 
beliefs from different perspectives, can result in an ascription of different meanings and 
perceptions of the institutions within the field. This entails the deconstruction of institutions as 
an important element in the study and understanding of institutional change since 
“institutionalization bears, if not the seeds of its own destruction, at least openings for 
substantial change” (DiMaggio 1991:287). But, these openings will not automatically lead to a 
breakdown in institutional norms since they require a response and interpretation by actors in 
order to provide the pressure needed to initiate institutional change. In order for new 
institutions to rise and take on the required degree of legitimacy, existing institutions must 
undergo a process of deconstruction and delegitimation by new or existing actors, providing the 
justification of introducing new norms and practices as an alternative to the existing institution.  
The contemporary notion of the interrelations between fields, actors, and change not only 
signifies that institutional change is a complex phenomenon inseparable from the cognitive and 
cultural aspects of institution but stresses the importance for scholars to study the existence and 
emergence of competing interests among actors, thus the conflicts and contradictions leading to 
institutional  change. Accordingly, when studying institutions, it is important to realize that 
while institutions constrain action, they also provide opportunity for agency and change.   
2.5 INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS – COPING WITH INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
The contemporary perspectives on institutional change have prompted the concept of 
“institutional logics,” originally introduced by Alford and Friedland (1985) for the purpose of 
describing the rationales behind ostensibly contradictory practices and beliefs inherent in 
institutions. They contend:  
“Each of the most important institutional orders of contemporary Western societies has a 
central logic—a set of material practices and symbolic constructions—which constitutes 
its organizing principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to 
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elaborate […] These institutional logics are symbolically grounded, organizationally 
structured, politically defended, and technically and materially constrained, and hence 
have specific historical limits” (Friedland and Alford, 1991:248-249). 
According to Friedland and Alford (1991), each institutional order can be considered to have an 
appertaining logic that contributes to individuals’ identity creation and that constrains both the 
means and ends of individual behavior and are constitutive of individuals, organizations, and 
society. They view institutional logics as embodied in practices, sustained and reproduced by 
cultural assumptions and political struggles, which constitute an institutional order of 
organizing principles that subsequently are adopted, adjusted, and elaborated by the field actors 
(Friedland and Alford, 1991). Accordingly, institutional logics define the order of a given field 
since they “define the norms, values and beliefs that structure the cognition of actors in 
organizations and provide a collective understanding of how strategic interests and decisions 
are formulated” (Thornton, 2002), thus establishing the foundation for what is considered as 
rational behavior within a given institutional logic. In this perspective, actors always organize 
in compliance with the given institutional logic they are embedded, albeit the accepted 
practices and symbols available are subjects to elaboration and adjustment, triggered by actors’ 
self-interest.  
Thornton and Ocasio (1999) defined institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical 
patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide 
meaning to their social reality” (804).  
“Institutions constrain not only the ends to which their behavior should be directed, but 
the means by which those ends are achieved. They provide individuals with 
vocabularies of motives and with a sense of self. They generate not only that which is 
valued, but the rules by which it is calibrated and distributed. Institutions set the limits 
on the very nature of rationality and, by implications, of individuality. Nonetheless, 
individuals, groups, and organizations try to use institutional orders to their own 
advantage” (Friedland and Alford, 1991:251). 
By addressing the interrelationships between individuals, organizations, and society, the 
institutional logic approach links the perspectives of institutions in a societal level (macro 
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level)—focusing on socially constructed institutional practices and rule structures—and those 
on a level of organizational fields (micro level)—focusing on individual agency and cognition, 
and socially constructed institutional practices and rule structures (Friedland and Alford, 1991).  
The approach heightens how cultural dimensions of institutions both enable and constrain 
social actions and can be regarded as a response to the problematic issue that actors often are 
subject to co-existing and sometime competing logics, which encourages different practices and 
beliefs that ultimately shape and elucidate the interest and behavior within a field, thus actors’ 
strategic activities and involvement in the political struggles of institutionalization.  
The concept of institutional logic has been particularly useful in helping researchers identify 
and explain both institutional continuity and change since logics provide the organizing 
principals of specific categories, beliefs, and motives that affect how actors conduct themselves 
and their environment (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Also, 
“[t]he notion of logics is immensely appealing. First, it proposes that external rituals and 
stimuli interact with internal mental structures to generate routine behavior. Second, it is 
consistent with the view that culture is fragmented among potentially inconsistent 
elements, without surrendering the notion of limited coherence, which thematization of 
clusters of rituals and schemata around institutions provides. Third, it provides a 
vocabulary for discussing cultural conflict as confrontation between inconsistent logics 
of action” (DiMaggio, 1997:277). 
The institutional logic approach influences the way to perceive and study institutional change. 
Firstly, since there are always several competing institutional logics with different rationalities 
in a field (Friedland and Alford, 1991), the emergence of conflicts and contradictions is 
intrinsic since change often originates from the conflicts and contradictions between different 
institutional logics. These contradictions can potentially achieve the capacity to challenge 
prevailing interpretations of rational behavior, caused by the reflexive interpretation by those 
who operate in them. Institutional logics are thus not only defining structures within a field but 
also revealing the potential for institutional change, as institutional logics structure the 
cognition of actors and provide a collective understanding of how strategic interests and 
decisions are formulated. Thus, it necessitates an understanding of how competing logics 
function in generating a less constrained institutional environment, thus openings for new or 
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previously institutional constrained actors to introduce new schemas, rules, or norms that 
potentially become institutionalized. 
Secondly, but inseparably linked to the abovementioned, since any identity within a field is a 
socially constructed product of the prevailing different (sometimes mutually incompatible) 
institutional logics they are exposed to, an appertaining consequence of actors’ elaboration and 
adjustment of institutional logics is an always impending risk that social identities within an 
organizational field become contested and unstable. In this way, actors become central in the 
study of institutional change due to their ability to carry out strategic activities by actively 
exploiting and initiating the incompatibilities and contradictions between the institutional logics 
of their field, and hereby producing “[…] new truths, new models by which they understand 
themselves and their societies, as well as new forms of behavior and material practices” 
(Friedland and Alford 1991:251). But is also produces a paradox since the actions of actors 
must be understood as located in an institutional context that both regulates behavior and 
simultaneously provides opportunity for agency and change.  
The heightened academic interest in the actors’ important and decisive roles in institutional 
change processes has approached institutional theory from the perspective of change and has 
been a driver in understanding institutional change differently. Holm (1995) states that  
“[…] neither underlying power structures nor overarching ideologies are the primary 
explanations. The core institutional insight is that of interaction between practices, 
interests, and ideas” (Holm, 1995:416). 
The focus of institutionalism on continuity, stability, and persistence of institutions has been 
replaced with a predominant interest in understanding institutional change by studying the field 
dynamics that call forth the creations, maintenances, transformations, or disruptions of 
institutions. The new focus on change has sprouted a necessity among scholars in 
understanding fields as political arenas where power relations are maintained or transformed 
(Clemens and Cook, 1999; Seo and Creed, 2002), directing an emphasis on studying processes 
of conflict and struggle within institutional fields in order to understand the role of actors.  
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2.6 ACTORS BECOMING SUBJECTS IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
In seeking to understand how stabilized meanings and practices become destabilized and 
replaced by new structures and simultaneously acknowledging that existing structures are 
considered both real and socially constructed, we need to look into the dynamics of change 
caused by the actions of actors. The literature on institutional agency thus emphasizes how 
change is generated due to the influence of actors when shaping social structures and 
institutions: Thus the contemporary theory of institutional change opens up for inquiry of how 
actors actively shape, create, or maintain institutions by strategically organizing their activities 
in favor of the logic(s) supporting their preferences. Having actors as the focal point for 
institutional change emphasizes the political aspect of institutionalization: Actors, “once they 
have become reflective and active change agents, mobilize both the other actors and the 
resources required to bring about social change” (Seo and Creed, 2002:231). Seo and Creed 
(2002) regard actors as active exploiters of social contradictions and explain how they actively 
utilize the institutional contradictions caused by the coexistence of incommensurable logics 
within the field to achieve their political objectives. The forming of new institutions and the 
rejection of existing are thus highly reliant on the deployment of actors’ capability to carry and 
produce institutional logics through new forms of behavior and material practices, hence 
making the occurrence and implementation of institutional change dependent on how actors 
engage their interest and interpretations of the challenging logic in the institutionalization 
process of change. Thus, actors are not to be studied as objects of institutional change processes 
but rather as carriers of institutionalization and triggers of change, and their actions are 
therefore to be viewed as important contributions in illuminating the political struggles for 
institutional change since these actions reveal the logics articulated with the purpose of 
challenging prevailing logics constituting the existing established order. 
But although actors have the capability to change or create institutions through strategic 
activities, studies of institutional change have to incorporate the role of interests and resources, 
as “new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources see in them an 
opportunity to realize interests that they value highly” (DiMaggio, 1988:14).  
 “Although actors can become reflective at any time, the likelihood of a shift in 
collective consciousness that can transform actors for passive participants in the 
reproduction of existing social patterns into mobilized change agents increases when 
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actors continually and collectively experience tensions arising from contradictions in a 
given sociohistorical context (Benson, 1977)” (Seo and Creed, 2002: 230). 
2.6.1 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
In distinguishing between regulative and constitutive rules, Scott (2001) argues that social life 
and social structures are highly influenced by rules, in principle, similar to those in games. 
Regulative rules are those defining the legitimate ways of acting in accordance to legislation, 
company politics, or societal norms and expectations. The constitutive rules, on the other hand, 
designate the capacities and roles of individuals using socially constructed identities. These 
social constructions provide individuals, groups, or organizations with certain qualities, 
expectations, and identities (e.g., parent, CEO, motorcycle club, labor union, or government). 
These terms are in themselves empowering or identifying for individuals, groups, and 
organizations, but they solely function as a consequence of the environmental acceptance of the 
identity, capacities, and qualities entitled to the titles. Thus, using games as exemplification, 
Scott (2001) argues that “[c]onstitutive rules construct the social object and events to which 
regulative rules are applied” (Scott, 2001: 64). In our social structure and social life, the 
constitutive rules are not as visible as those in games because they seem “natural,” are taken for 
granted, and stand unchallenged. But despite the vague visibility of constitutive rules in society, 
all actors “[…] depend for their existence on constitutive frameworks, which, although they 
arose in particular interaction contexts, have become reified in cultural rules that can be 
important as guidelines into new situations” (Scott, 2001:65). Further, Scott (2001) argues that 
“as constitutive rules are recognized, individual behavior is often seen to reflect external 
definitions rather than […] internal intentions” (Scott, 2001:65). In the notion of actors as 
social constructions lies the immanent perception that actions of actors are not reflections of 
human or organizational nature but a result of the constitutive rules framing social structure and 
social life and defining what interest actors may have, thus constituting and defining the 
legitimate space for their actions.  
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2.6.2 THE PARADOX OF EMBEDDED AGENCY 
Acknowledging that actors actively constitute social structures through their actions that are 
themselves socially constructed, and that actors simultaneously have the capacity to change and 
create new institutions, has posed a paradox for institutional theorists to resolve: “How can 
actors change institutions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the 
very institution they wish to change?” (Holm, 1995: 398). Scott (2001) supports this view by 
stating that “change poses a problem for institutional theorists, most of whom view institutions 
as the source of stability and order. If the nature of actors and their modes of acting are 
constituted and constrained by institutions, how can these actors change the very institutions in 
which they are embedded?” (Scott, 2001:181)  
Seo and Creed (2002) emphasize that the risk of only focusing on agency and interests is an 
insufficient conceptualization of actors as opportunistic and “unaffected by the institutional 
embeddedness that shapes both the means (power) and ends (interests) of those actors” (Seo 
and Creed, 2002:240). They propose to solve the theoretical paradox by addressing how the 
agency of embedded actors is not constrained by the institutional environment but rather is 
facilitated by a utilization of the institutional contradictions as platforms for initiating strategic 
activities that break with existing social structures in the creation of change. Thus, 
contradictions are both necessary elements as well as driving forces for the strategic activities 
of actors and “enable a shift in partially autonomous social actors’ collective mode to a 
reflective and active one” (Seo and Creed, 2002:231). According to this perspective, an 
understanding of change is to be found not by rejecting the idea that actors are more or less 
constrained by their institutional environment but rather by focusing on the political interplay 
between important actors and simultaneously acknowledging that actors have the capacity to 
act in ways that are inconsistent to the prescribed social structure—thus becoming reflective 
entrepreneurs who perform strategic activities by exploring and utilizing institutional 
contradictions within their field.  
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2.6.3 INSTITUTIONAL CONTRADICTIONS AS IMPETUS THAT DRIVES, ENABLES, AND 
CONSTRAINS INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Seo and Creed (2002) apply a dialectic perspective to illuminate how institutional change is 
inseparably linked to various inconsistencies and tensions within and between social systems, 
described as “institutional contradictions,” which “may not only trigger the shift in actors’ 
collective consciousness but also may provide alternative logics of action and psychological 
and physical resources to be mobilized, appropriated, and transposed in the process of 
institutional change” (Seo and Creed, 2002:231). Thus, they state that institutional changes are 
outcomes of actors’ dynamic interactions of contradictions and propose four sources of 
institutional contradictions as fundamental forces for creating and driving institutional change: 
LEGITIMACY THAT UNDERMINES FUNCTIONAL EFFICIENCY 
In order to attain successful institutional change, the efforts invested herein have to gain 
legitimacy from the institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). The aspect of legitimacy in change processes is complicated by the heterogeneous 
interests surrounding a given logic behind the change initiative. It is unlikely that change 
processes will be institutionalized unchallenged since change always faces a strong 
commitment to existing ways of doing things. Consequently, the more actors involved in the 
change process, the more diverse interests and resources are in risk of being mobilized in 
challenging the implementation of new structures since the interest of one actor may be 
threatening the interest of another. As a result, the importance of gaining legitimacy during the 
process of creating institutional change requires an ongoing negotiation and signing of political 
and personal compromises among important actors. Seo and Creed (2002) point out the 
contradiction in actors’ quest for legitimacy from their institutional environment is based on an 
ambition to gain the needed reputation, resources, and survival chances (Powell, 1991; Seo and 
Creed, 2002) rather than an ambition of gaining higher efficiency. Thus, Seo and Creed (2002) 
claim that inefficiency is a plausible outcome of conformity.  
ADAPTATION THAT UNDERMINES ADAPTABILITY 
Along with institutional isomorphism follows a process of organizational adaption. Seo and 
Creed (2002) point out the paradox in this adaption since “such adaptive moves make adopters 
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less able to adapt over the long run” (Seo and Creed, 2002:227). In this paradox lies the 
assumption that the adaptations made in order to accommodate isomorphism lead to new 
locked patterns of behaviors and perceptions of rationality, thus undermining future 
adaptability processes. In other words: adaptive moves make the actors less adaptable, thus 
more resistant to change. Seo and Creed (2002) put forward the contradiction in adaption by 
concluding 
“[A]lthough institutionalization is an adaptive process, once in place, institutions are 
likely to be both psychologically and economically locked in and, in a sense, isolated 
from or unresponsive to changes in their external environments. This unresponsiveness 
creates a space where contradictions between those institutions and their external 
environments develop and accumulate over time” (Seo and Creed, 2002:228). 
INTRAINSTITUTIONAL CONFORMITY THAT CREATES INTERINSTITUTIONAL INCOMPATIBILITIES 
The institutionalization generated through social interactions often takes place in local 
environments, thus reflecting the interests and translations these local institutional embedded 
actors produce in their seeking for legitimacy. Local interest thus creates translations and 
practices that might collide with other local actors’ interests, leading to misalignment and 
inconsistency between different levels or sectors (Seo and Creed, 2002), thus contradictions 
within the institution. Also, in the search for legitimacy and stability, actors incorporate 
different incompatible structural elements, practices, and procedures. Thus, this contradictory 
element of institutionalization aligns with the abovementioned theory of institutional logics 
proposed by Friedland and Alford (1991), suggesting that the logics utilized in the 
institutionalization conform actors behavior but simultaneously are available for them to 
elaborate, resulting in interinstitutional contradictions as a common part of social life. 
“In sum, individuals and organizations are increasingly exposed to multiple and 
contradictory, yet interconnected, institutional arrangements and prescriptions—all of 
which are the inevitable by-products of the ongoing social construction of those 
institutions. Conforming to certain institutional arrangements and the related taken-for-
granted behavioral expectations may create inconsistencies and, eventually, 
incompatibilities with behavioral expectations stemming from institutional arrangements 
at different levels or in different sectors of society as a whole. More important for our 
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task, developing a theory of human agency for institutional change, is the view that it is 
political processes that determine the appropriate relationships among contradictory 
institutions or which institutional logic should regulate particular social activities” (Seo 
and Creed, 2002:228-9).  
ISOMORPHISM THAT CONFLICTS WITH DIVERGENT INTERESTS 
The fourth and final contradiction force of institutionalization is characterized as a product “of 
political struggles among various participants who have divergent interest and asymmetric 
power” (Seo and Creed, 2002:229). In this perspective, institutionalization is a reflection of the 
preferences of the most powerful participants in the political struggle rather than a reflection of 
a mutually negotiated behavioral rationality.  
Seo and Creed point out the contradictory in this as 
“the fundamental misalignment between a particular form of social arrangement and the 
interests of diverse actors who enact, inhabit, and reproduce that social arrangement. 
Specifically, proponents view those actors whose ideas and interests are not adequately 
served by the existing social arrangements as potential change agents who, in some 
circumstances, become conscious of the institutional conditions that leave their needs 
unmet and take action to change the present order” (Seo and Creed, 2002:229).  
2.6.4 INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
The rising interest in actors’ influence on institutions acknowledges that actors are not passive 
but posses the resources and the power to maintain or transform the institutions that shape the 
world in which they are embedded. Actors, who deliberately adjust their actions and invest 
resources in accordance to their interpretations of and interests in the changing or creation of 
institutions, have originated the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship,” which has been 
given considerable attention in recent years as the conceptualization of those actors who choose 
to deploy resources as a support in the creation of institutions that serve their interest 
(DiMaggio, 1988). Thus, the concept joins institutional and entrepreneurial forces and seeks to 
provide understanding for how institutions become established, where “institutional 
entrepreneurs” refers to those actors who involve themselves in creating new institutions or 
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transform existing ones (Battilana et al., 2009). Institutional entrepreneurship introduces 
agency, interests, and power as the most important elements in understanding change in an 
institutional perspective. It emphasizes that institutions are shaped by actors who have interests 
in engaging in the political conflicts and struggles that emerge within their field in the 
generation of institutional change.   
Battilana et al. (2009) define institutional entrepreneurs as  
“change agents who, whether or not they initially intended to change their institutional 
environment, initiate, and actively participate in the implementation of, changes that 
diverge from existing institutions” (2009:70). 
2.6.5 PRACTICE, MUTUAL NEGOTIATION, AND POWER 
Exertion of successful institutional entrepreneurship requires that actors separate their actions 
from the considered rational behavior in accordance with the dominant institution logics in 
order to gain legitimacy for the logics introduced in association with the change process. Actors 
function as powerful “carriers” of change and their interpretations of the regulative, normative, 
and cultural-cognitive institutions around them shape the process of institutionalizing new 
rules, norms, or schemas, thus drawing attention to the interplay between actors, actions, and 
meanings in understanding the field dynamics of institutional change (Townley, 2002). 
Institutionalization is highly influenced by the initial and ongoing work done by institutional 
entrepreneurs in translating the change at the macro level to operationalized structures and 
practices that are to replace those on the micro level supporting the logic being challenged. In 
relation to the outcome of institutionalizing change, Lippi (2000) finds the activities on the 
micro level likely to be more important than those activities taking place at the macro level. 
Further, Lippi states:  
“For institutionalization to occur successfully and for adaptation to take place - never 
linearly, but always with a certain degree of unpredictability - change must pass through 
various levels (macro and micro) and must involve different types of actors 
(supranational, national, sub-national, local, etc.)” (Lippi, 2000:459).  
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These characteristics of institutionalization of change set up requirements for institutional 
entrepreneurship. Institutional entrepreneurs must be skilled actors who can interpret existing 
institutional contradiction and strategically introduce, translate, and operationalize change in 
order to gain sufficient approval and resources from diverse actors for support and acceptance 
of their contesting logics that portray an alternative rationality. In the preparation of their 
strategic activities, institutional entrepreneurs have to theorize change in ways that invite 
diverse actors to cooperate (Fligstein, 2001; Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002; Suddaby 
and Greenwood, 2005) in the mobilization of collective actions necessary to secure support for 
and acceptance of institutional change (Fligstein, 2001). 
Thus power in a contemporary institutional change perspective is not to be seen as a belonging 
to certain actors but rather as a product derived through interactions between multiple actors 
with an interest in destabilizing or changing existing logics by supporting competing logics. 
This continuous negotiation and mediation of power prompts more or less stabilized alliances 
of actors, whose coalitions of interests confer legitimacy on certain institutional arrangements 
as they conform their behavior and practices in accordance to the logics (Zucker, 1988). 
Accordingly, a weakening of such coalitions caused by inconsistency in behavior and practices 
or as a consequence of lacking resources invested in the contesting institutional logic enhances 
the propensity for new agency (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Zucker, 1988) as engaged 
actors see prospects for strengthening their interests, causing internal political struggles and 
competing interests within the institution under construction. Thus the institutionalization of 
change is largely shaped by the negotiations and compromises between various actors 
supporting the change. 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
Methodology is the philosophical foundation and rationale of enquiry from which I derive 
knowledge of the world and the rationalities of embedded social actors, which is a central 
element of the study of institutionalization.  
First, I briefly describe how benchmarking has been theoretically underexposed in 
institutionalization studies. Subsequently, I outline how institutional theory facilitates new and 
important inquiries into understanding institutionalization of benchmarking. I account for how 
my choice of theory influenced my analytical approach to conduct this study and how 
institutional theory provides important insight in this study of benchmarking. 
Afterwards I present three analytical models that will be applied in this study. These are 
“Three Pillars of Institutions,” “contradictions,” and “framings.” The presentation will be 
accompanied by an account of these models’ applicability in a study of institutionalization and 
their empirical and analytical consequences. 
The third part of the chapter accounts for the data collection methods used to conduct the 
empirical data collection and the appertaining choices that are made based on the account for 
analyzing institutionalization.  
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3.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY FOR STUDYING INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
Benchmarking is widely considered to be essential to organizational improvement processes 
(Chen, 2005; Dawkins et al., 2007). The current interpretation of benchmarking has a 
normative presupposition: that identifying organizational weaknesses and learning and 
adopting practices from others will improve performance. Simultaneously, it presupposes that 
any increase in performance is desirable and beneficial (Rasmussen, 2011).  
Literature on “benchmarking” reveals that “benchmarking” is perceived and operates in many 
different ways in various countries and contexts (e.g., Cox et al., 1997; Beatham et al., 2004; 
Haugbølle and Hansen, 2006; Triantafillou, 2007; El-Mashaleh et al., 2007). The distribution of 
research topics in “Benchmarking: An International Journal” in the period 1994–2008, 
indicates the lack of attention for these kinds of research questions: Only 4% of publications 
were conceptual (Anand and Kodali, 2008) and none addressed how benchmarking was 
introduced in different industries and had become a legitimate technology from which 
improvements could be derived.  
“I find the predominant research, perceptions and uses of benchmarking valued so 
strongly and uniformly that it may actually be abstaining researchers and practitioners 
from studying and questioning benchmarking objectively. I consider the existing 
benchmarking literature and research as being results of industry’s demand for 
straightforward guidance (Barrett & Barrett, 2003), which to a great extent ignores the 
fact that the area of function is a socially constructed world” (Rasmussen, 2011).  
As a result, the literature on benchmarking is highly theoretically underexposed, focusing on 
pragmatism and practice rather than the more sociological issues of implementing such 
concepts in an industry (e.g. Cox et al., 1997; Bowerman et al., 2002; Moriarty and Smallmann, 
2009).  
Institutional theory is relevant for this study, as it allows for an analysis that takes the 
coexistence of multiple interpretations of institutions into account and further addresses the 
political aspects of implementing new structures in an organizational field. Institutional theory 
accordingly provides a foundation that facilitates a study of the institutionalization of new 
structures that are envisioned to influence the institutional environments of the organizational 
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field. But this theoretical approach also entails some analytical, methodical, and empirical 
choices for conducting this study, which will be unfolded below. 
A study of institutionalization requires an analytical and empirical focus on actors and how 
they are active in the process of implementing new structures in existing institutional 
environments. This entails that the implementation and development of new structures are to be 
understood as consequences of actors’ interests in changing or breaking with existing templates 
for organizing within their institutional context (Battilana et al., 2009). This theoretical point of 
origin is essential for my analytical approach and choice of empirical data since this entails a 
extensive focus on “actors,” “agency,” and “political struggles of the new structures,” where 
actors are considered to have the ability to influence the structures that they are envisioned to 
be subjected to. Such interrelations between rising institutions and the potential influence of 
actors accordingly carry a potential for constant transformations, modifications, or even 
destruction of new structures that are in the process of institutionalization. This entails a 
methodological issue for studying institutionalization, as structures, yet not institutionalized, 
are to be considered unstable and contingent on actors’ investment of resources in supporting, 
influencing, or rejecting them as future institutions in the organizational field. 
The study of institutionalization thus entails that the macro and micro perspectives are highly 
intertwined, which affects the empirical and analytical approaches of this study.  
On one hand, institutionalization of new structures is to be analyzed and understood at a macro 
level, where new structures are aiming at constraining actors by displaying one or more 
templates for organizing in accordance with a dominating interpretation of “rationales of the 
rising institution.” At a macro level, new structures, yet not institutionalized, reflect the 
perceptions and political interests of those actors who have been most successful in gaining 
influence on the development of the new structures.  
On the other hand, new structures represented in the macro perspective are constantly under 
pressure caused by the autonomy of actors at a micro level and their capacity to and interests in 
influencing the institutional context that they are embedded (or prospected to be embedded). 
This entails a potential widespread diversity and instability of the structures at a micro level 
since any given actor with sufficient resources and interests in opposing an orientation of the 
institutionalization constitutes a potential threat of replacing or challenging the attempts to 
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generate stability and collective interpretation of the rising institution at the macro level. It is 
thus acknowledged that actors are not only carriers of new structures, but likewise they are 
important contributors to the forming, thus institutionalization, of these structures. 
Analytically, this entails that rising institutions must be understood as attempts to produce and 
promote “visions” that reflects the interests of those investing resources in the 
institutionalization, but simultaneously these visions constitute the foundations for political 
struggles as other actors may invest resources in influencing or rejecting the proposed 
structures. Therefore, study of institutionalization requires a parallel analysis at the micro level, 
revealing the underlying causes to political struggles of how to perceive the rising institution at 
a macro level. With this focus on understanding institutionalization at the micro level, the 
political struggles constitute central analytical objects for this study since these reveal three 
central elements that can influence the institutionalization: Firstly, they reveal the political, 
economical, or ideological interests actors have in the new structures. Secondly, they reveal the 
political influences actors possess in gaining influence on the institutionalization. And thirdly, 
they reveal how these actors facilitate their political influence in the negotiations between 
actors with diverse interests, which ultimately end up constituting the dominating perception of 
the structures at the macro level. 
The strength in analyzing institutionalization as a result of the political struggles and 
negotiations is that it allows me to understand institutionalization processes as carriers of 
several coexisting interpretations that are revealed as actors with different strategic and political 
interests express interest in the institutionalization of these structures. Accordingly, new 
structures are not represented by a single actor’s interests but instead as characterized as a 
compromise that takes the most influential actors’ interests into account. This means that I have 
to consider actors as carriers and triggers of institutional change, which makes their actions 
essential when seeking to understand institutionalization. I have accordingly constructed my 
analytical framework in a way that facilitates an analytical handling of several actors who 
concurrently influence institutionalization of new structures through ongoing political struggles 
and negotiations. In the following, I introduce “the three pillars of institutions,” “institutional 
contradictions,” and “framings” as my analytical framework to study my empirical field. 
Together these constitute a strong analytical foundation to understand how new structures 
achieve legitimacy, how they consist of contradictory interpretations that can be exploited in 
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political struggles, and finally how actors engage in such political struggles of the new 
structures by promoting alternative and/or challenging visions for the new structures. 
3.1.1 THE THREE PILLARS OF INSTITUTIONS – A MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING THE 
PREREQUISITES FOR INSTITUTIONS  
One central prerequisite for institutionalizing new structures is the achievement of institutional 
legitimacy. A model to understand how structures achieve institutional legitimacy is Scott’s 
(2001) “Three Pillars of Institutions.” Scott argues that regulative, normative, and cultural-
cognitive pillars each provide crucial, but somewhat divergent, conceptions of what is making 
up or supporting institutions. “The three elements form a continuum moving from the 
conscious to unconscious and from the legally enforced to the taken-for-granted (Hoffman 
1997:36)” (Scott, 2001:51). He states that, instead of integrating the three conceptions of 
institutions to one unifying concept, more insight will be achieved in understanding and 
indentifying the differentiated underlying assumptions, mechanisms, and indicators of each 
pillar. 
The regulative pillar mainly relies on and addresses the aspect all institutional theorists 
underscore: Institutions constrain and regularize behavior. With its main focus on how 
“regulatory processes involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect others’ conformity to 
them, and, as necessary, manipulate sanctions—reward or punishments—in an attempt to 
influence future behavior” (Scott, 2001:52), this pillar represents the legally enforced and 
conscious aspect of institutions. Having coercion, expedience, and instrumentality as the central 
ingredients, individuals and organizations are considered to behave instrumentally and 
expediently when conforming to rules and pursuing their self-interest (in relation to the 
involved incentive for compliance or punishment for disobedience). The notion that rules are 
considered to be carried out by force and/or by sanctions enforced either by interacting actors 
or by an outside actor (e.g., the state) relies on the perception that institutions can largely 
account for organizational behavior.  
The normative pillar places emphasis on “normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, 
evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life” (Scott, 2001:54). The role of values and 
norms are regarded as the primary drivers in creating expectations and obligations. Institutions 
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are considered to be comprised by the social obligations ascribed to the normative 
interpretations of roles, role expectations. DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) description of 
organizational isomorphism as the process by which organizations become more similar to one 
another can be seen as an enrollment to the normative pillar.  
The cultural-cognitive pillar builds on “the shared conceptions that constitutes the nature of 
social reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott, 2001:57). In this 
perspective, shared experiences and understandings of reality result in taken for granted ways 
of acting, and actions are a function of actors’ conception of their environment. Thus the “[…] 
cultural cognitive conception of institutions stresses the central role played by the socially 
mediated construction of a common framework of meaning” (Scott, 2001:58). In other words: 
Institutions rely on the meaning social actors attach to their actions, these meanings being 
socially created through communication and interaction among actors, resulting in legitimacy 
of institutionalized social practices on a cultural level, as actors construct common symbolic 
systems and shared meanings as a basis of stability in their social life. Accordingly, “[t]o 
understand or explain any action, the analyst must take into account not only the objective 
conditions but also the actor’s subjective interpretation of them” and simultaneously recognize 
“that internal interpretive processes are shaped by external frameworks” (Scott, 2001:57). The 
cultural-cognitive theorists deviate from normative theorists on how they conceive the 
establishment of social roles since they see social “roles arise as common understandings 
develop that particular actions are associated with particular actors” (Scott, 2001:58).  
 Pillar 
Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-grantedness 
Shared understanding 
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding expectations Constitutive schema 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules 
Laws 
Sanctions 
Certification 
Accreditation 
Common beliefs 
Shared logics of action 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Comprehensible 
Recognizable 
Culturally supported 
Figure 1: Scott (2001) 
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The three pillars accommodate an important common acknowledgement among all 
institutionalists: The regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillar does not work in 
isolation. For example, Scott describes of how federal programs secure local cooperation 
through “the use of authority, in which coercive power is legitimated by a normative 
framework that both supports and constrains the exercise of power” (Scott, 2001:53) and 
exemplifies how the regulative and normative pillar can be mutually reinforcing. Accordingly, 
pure regulation is inefficient, since it posits its function on authority, which is solely an 
effective coercive power because of its legitimacy—a legitimacy that include elements of 
regulatory, normative, and cognitive-cultural aspects of institutions in order to be thoroughly 
explained.  
According to Scott (2001), for any structure to gain institutional legitimacy, a well-functioning 
interplay between the three pillars is required. The model accordingly provides an analytical 
approach to unfold from which institutional pillars’ new structures find their legitimacy in an 
organizational field and whether they are successfully accepted as legitimate across all three 
pillars. In this way, the model is appropriate for this study as it can be used to analyze the 
institutionalization of new structures through the support they achieve from the organizational 
field within each of the three pillars. 
3.1.2 INSTITUTIONAL CONTRADICTIONS AS AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO 
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL STRUGGLES 
The three pillars of institutions constitutes an interesting analytical perspective of 
institutionalizing new structures, as these potentially can be the cause of political struggles 
actors engage in if they do not find the new structures to be reflecting their view of legitimate 
regulative, normative, or cultural-cognitive aspects of their institutional environment.  
I find the theory of “institutional contradictions” applicable in an analytical unfolding of how 
new structures cause potential contractions that can be exploited by actors to engage in political 
struggles.  
As pointed out earlier, a driving force in institutional change is institutional contradictions, 
which are exploited in the promotion of new structures when attempting to deinstitutionalize 
existing structures. The exploitation of contradictions within an institutional environment is 
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thus an important analytical element in understanding how new structures are propound as 
legitimate alternatives to existing institutional environments within an organizational field.  
But in the same way as actors can exploit contradictions within an institutional environment, 
they can equally exploit the contradictions within the new structures since “institutionalization 
bears, if not the seeds of its own destruction, at least openings for substantial change” 
(DiMaggio, 1991:287). This means that actors can strategically exploit the contradictions that 
exist within the new structures themselves in order to achieve influence on the 
institutionalization. Political struggles and the outcome of the political negotiations of new 
structures are thus highly reliant on actors’ capability to exploit such immanent contradictions 
within the institutionalization and their engagement and capability to formulate future visions 
that either support or break with the predominant perceptions.  
3.1.3 FRAMINGS – ACTORS’ SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NEW STRUCTURES 
The concept of “contradictions” provides an analytical possibility to unfold how new structures 
are subjected to multiple interpretations and interests of actors and thus are in constant risk of 
destabilization. “Contradictions” contribute to an understanding of how actors facilitate 
contradictory aspects within new structures as openings for political struggles where they can 
gain influence on the institutionalization. But in order to use contradictions as an analytical 
tool, I need to be able to identify when actors are exploiting contradictions.  
The concept of “framings” provides me with a way to do so by categorizing the different 
meanings that are ascribed to new structures. Framing will be used as a term for how actors 
attempt to develop and promote a vision that represents their political interests (Battilana et al., 
2009). A framing of new structures as a vision illuminates how these are ascribed meaning by 
different actors who seek to promote or hinder certain orientations of institutionalization of 
these structures. Accordingly, framings have similarities to the notion of institutional logics. 
But where logics often are associated with something that is commonly accepted in an 
institutional environment, framing is maybe best considered as a precursor to institutional 
logics, where actors attempt to politically organize and formulate their 
(alternative/contradicting) visions for the new structures but which do not necessarily constitute 
or result in an institutional logic accepted by the institutional environment.  
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Having framings as research objects will provide important information of how actors are 
seeking influence on institutionalization of new structures since framings reveal actors’ 
political motives and their visions of the new structures. Actors propounding framings for new 
structures do so by exploiting contradiction with the purpose of promoting and legitimizing a 
social construction of the structures that are in their political interests. Simultaneously, by 
exploiting contradictions within the institutionalization, they attempt to delegitimize other 
actors’ framing. Accordingly, the framings presented in this thesis are to be considered as the 
formulations of the political interests actors engage in political struggles with. The content of a 
political struggle is reflected by the framings at stake, and the outcome of the resulting political 
negotiations is thus to be considered as the compromise of the framings in play.  
In this way, the concept of framings helps managing and unfolding the political struggles 
between actors by revealing how contesting attempts to rhetorically construct visions for new 
structures have elements of conformity or conflicts embedded. But in order to structure the 
analytical application of framings, I take an outset in Battilana et al.’s (2009) methodical 
presentation of framings as consisting of a diagnostic framing, a prognostic framing, and a 
motivational framing. 
Through the diagnostic framing, strategically motivated actors point out the problem that they 
seek to resolve. They do so by problematizing existing arrangements and explicating the failing 
of these in order to assign blame. The framing is to be considered as the attempt to delegitimize 
existing arrangements, which is a necessary prerequisite in elevating the alternative 
arrangements that the actors are seeking to introduce through the prognostic framing. This 
framing illuminates what the actors consider as a better alternative and superior to those which 
are not in the interests of the actor introducing the framing. Through this framing, actors 
attempt to theorize their vision as a legitimate solution to the failings pointed to in the 
diagnostic framing in order for it to be appealing for potential allies to support. This is done 
more explicitly through the motivational framing. This framing is a strategic element in 
framing a vision since the formulation of the motivational framing reflects the considerations 
that are made in relation to gaining the needed support for the visions that are framed. This 
entails that the framing of a vision is complemented with sufficient compelling elements that 
make other actors interested in supporting the prognostic framing and thus simultaneously 
legitimating the diagnostic framing.  
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are at a micro level, where actors, agency, and political struggles constitute the most important 
elements in understanding institutionalization.  
I have presented my analytical framework consisting of the “Three Pillars of Institutions,” 
“contradictions,” and “framings” as being my analytical foundation to unfold how new 
structures are institutionalized in an organizational field.  
My research strategy implies that I, as researcher, take a position from which I can produce an 
inside view, where I analyze how new structures are perceived by actors within an institutional 
field. The inside view is particularly suitable in consideration of the heavy analytical weight I 
have chosen on the micro level, where I consider actors and agency as dominating influents on 
the institutionalization of benchmarking. This analytical position as researcher allows me to 
cope with the organizational field as consisting of different institutional environment and 
contradictions that facilitate and stimulate actors to act in different ways and with different 
motives. In this way, I write off the perception of actors as institutional “puppets” that base 
their actions on the institutional conditions they are embedded with. The inside view is thus to 
be understood as a phenomenological perspective that allows me to conduct my analysis with 
an outset in how actors perceive themselves and their reality.  
In some cases, it may be necessary to construct my analysis as a narrative of a commonly 
perceived reality among actors. This is mostly relevant in cases of historical accounts about the 
construction industry, where I consider that it either does not promote the objectives of this 
thesis to present the field from several actors’ perspectives or where it is not possible for me to 
get access to an inside view of the field. Further in my discussions, I deliberately choose to 
describe the field in a more self-perceived objectified manner, where I conclude and discuss the 
insight I have gained from the inside view.  
3.2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
This part of the chapter outlines my empirical design and data collection in respect to the 
research strategy for the study. The purpose of this section is to describe and account for my 
data collection methods and choices of empirical data to conduct a study of the 
institutionalization of benchmarking.  
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The first empirical challenge of the study was to identify empirical data from which I could 
reveal the establishment, original design, and initial interests of benchmarking the Danish 
construction industry. This required an insight into the historical background and social context 
from which benchmarking originated. Thus, the initial empirical emphasis was on the historical 
developments constituting the growing acceptance and support of benchmarking the Danish 
construction industry that could reveal how openings were exploited within the organizational 
field and provided a foundation for benchmarking in the Danish construction industry. An 
empirical interest in this part of the analysis accordingly was to identify how benchmarking 
became articulated as a provider of legitimate structures that could restructure institutional 
environments in the construction industry.  
The second empirical challenge was to decide which data was necessary to analyze the 
institutionalization of benchmarking. This required data that could reveal actors’ engagement in 
the institutionalization of benchmarking in the Danish construction industry and the framings 
they propounded and engaged in political struggles with. The empirical data was accordingly 
chosen with the aim of illuminating the rationales, interests, and resources actors actively made 
use of to gain influence on benchmarking. The empirical contribution of such analysis required:  
1) A mapping of the actors engaging in political struggles and the means with which they did 
so. 
2) Data illustrating transformations or conflicting interpretations of the conceptions of 
benchmarking in the institutional environment.  
Since a study of institutionalization is stretched over a longer period of time, I have found 
written texts and interviews to be most suited as sources of empirical data. 
3.2.1 CASE STUDIES 
This study is conducted as a case study of the institutionalization of benchmarking in the 
Danish construction industry. As institutionalization is a process that is not momentary but 
rather evolves over time, the case study must be considered as a whole and not isolated to 
specific events or period of times. The context in which benchmarking develops becomes of 
central importance, as it is these relations and interactions between the case and the 
environment that constitutes the totality of the case study (e.g., Flyvbjerg, 2011).  
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In his legitimation of case studies as reliable research method, Flyvbjerg (2011) systematically 
breaks down five widespread misunderstandings of case studies, these being: 1) general, 
theoretical knowledge is more valuable than concrete case knowledge; 2) one cannot generalize 
on the basis of an individual case, therefore the case study cannot contribute to scientific 
development: 3) the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, that is, in the first 
stage of a total research process, while other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing 
and theory building; 4) the case study contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency to 
confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions; and 5) it is often difficult to summarize and 
develop general propositions and theories on the basis of specific case studies.  
Flyvbjerg (2011) presents the following table that highlights the differences between case 
studies and statistical methods.  
 Case Studies Statistical Methods 
Strengths Depth Breadth 
 High conceptual validity Understanding how widespread 
phenomenon is across a population 
 Understanding of context and process Measures of correlation for populations of 
cases 
 Understanding of what causes a 
phenomenon, linking causes and 
outcomes 
Establishing of probabilistic levels for 
confidence 
 Fostering new hypotheses and new 
research questions 
 
Weaknesses Selection bias may overstate or 
understate relationships 
Conceptual stretching, by grouping together 
dissimilar cases to get larger samples 
 Weak understanding of occurrence in 
population of phenomena under study 
Weak understanding of context, process, 
and causal mechanisms 
 Statistical significance often unknown or 
unclear 
Correlation does not imply causation 
  Weak mechanisms for fostering new 
hypothesis 
Table 2: From Flyvbjerg (2011) p. 314. 
Flyvbjerg (2011) argues that when seeking to understand a phenomenon in any degree of 
thoroughness, case studies are central, as these can (contrary to statistical methods) provide the 
necessary depth, details, and completeness necessary to understand the contributory causes to 
the construction of the phenomenon and, further, how to cope with the phenomena 
prospectively.  
The case study, however, entails some implications, as the method calls for a constant iteration 
between the empirical insight in the field and the research question. This iteration is further 
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required as the empirical insight has to be converged onto a single theoretical framework 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). These implications accordingly greatly entail that research where a case 
study is applied as method respect that the researcher is permitting empirical insight to be a 
participatory contributor to the research study both in terms of its essence, theoretical 
framework, and overall purpose.   
Case studies involve multiple data collection methods that, together or isolated, provide the 
empirical evidence for a scientific unfolding of the phenomenon being studied. The key issue is 
to carefully select one or a combination of several collecting methods that ultimately constitute 
an empirical foundation for unfolding the phenomenon and define research questions and 
determine a suitable theoretical framework. I have chosen texts and interviews to be the two 
data collecting methods for this study. 
3.2.2 TEXTS 
Texts are useful for this study as they conserve historical information that cannot be 
reconstructed retrospectively as in the case with interviews. In this way, texts contain 
information that provides the possibility of unfolding an actual course of events within the 
given period of time they are written. Texts are to be considered as reflections of the political 
climate in a specific period of time since they are written with political objectives. What makes 
this type of empirical data useful is that it does not reflect or consider the subsequent outcomes 
or consequences of the political debates in which they are facilitated or intended to be 
facilitated, which is often the case with retrospective reconstructions of the past. A text is then 
to be analyzed as a description of reality, which is ascribed meaning by the author(s) at the time 
it is produced. Since texts are primary sources that contain no subsequent interpretations of the 
subject they address, texts have the quality of reflecting a historical picture at the time of 
prevailing interpretations of the actions, reactions, and grouping of interests. 
I base my selection of text on collecting written empirical data of either explicitly or implicitly 
concerned benchmarking. The data consist of material from different actors, indicating 
intension or interest in the benchmarking initiative and its institutionalization.  
The texts for this study have been identified through recommendations and references. The 
study only builds on material that is publicly available.  
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I have chosen the following written materials as empirical data for this study: 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES 
Much of the debate about benchmarking has occurred in newspapers, which is why these texts 
are an obvious choice to include as empirical data. Newspaper articles reveal the different 
interests and perceptions actors have had in benchmarking over time. In this way, this empirical 
foundation has constituted a large part of my empirical data, as such texts reveal the official 
positions and representations of interests of actors in the Danish construction industry. 
GOVERNMENTAL POLICY PAPERS, REPORTS, LAWS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
These texts revealed the governmental interests in benchmarking and the official regulative 
function that benchmarking was considered to address. 
HEARING STATEMENTS AND CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN AUTHORITIES AND OTHER ACTORS 
FROM THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
Such written material illuminated the responses that actors have had to the governmental 
ambitions of benchmarking and thus simultaneously revealed their interests and oppositions.  
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, PAPERS, AND REPORTS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN THE DANISH 
CONSTRUCTION SECTOR  
These texts have been included as empirical data, as they reveal the foundation from which 
benchmarking had been articulated as a legitimate development initiative for the Danish 
construction sector. Despite several requests to the authorities, it was not possible to obtain 
several governmental documents, correspondences between the ministries, and hearing 
statements for this study since it was not possible for the authorities to locate these documents. 
Therefore the empirical foundation has been limited to the written material that has been 
possible to find on the Internet and libraries, which luckily was of considerable quantity.  
VARIOUS MATERIAL FROM THE BENCHMARK CENTRE FOR THE DANISH CONSTRUCTION SECTOR 
My employment at the Benchmark Centre provided me a unique opportunity to identify how 
benchmarking had been communicated to the environment from this central actor. I have 
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located these documents through the centre’s database and chosen empirical data that was not 
already or sufficiently present in the newspaper articles.  
MINUTES FROM BOARD MEETINGS IN THE BENCHMARK CENTRE FOR THE DANISH CONSTRUCTION 
SECTOR  
These were not allowed to include in my thesis, but have supported and verified several 
hypotheses. 
 
3.2.3 INTERVIEWS 
Qualitative research interviewing (Kvale, 1996) has been chosen as a research method on the 
basis of its ability to generate data about personal insights, attachments, and interests through 
interaction between the researcher and the respondent. Interviewing can provide supplementary 
contributions to data collected through texts since the respondent gets an opportunity to 
illuminate and generate insight in events, thus going beyond data obtainable from written texts. 
The method allows the respondent to more or less freely address areas he or she finds relevant 
in relation to the topic and elaborate on why these topics are central to an understanding of the 
field of research. This particular feature of interviewing enables the researcher to both guide the 
interview in the direction that is related to the objective of the interview while simultaneously 
not restricting the respondent in his or her narrative or account of past actions. Thus the method 
ensures that the respondent stays on topic while creating a space for him or her to express 
personal interests and interpretations.  
My motive for choosing open interviews had a basis in the opportunity it provides the 
researcher to gain insight into why the respondent has these particular areas of interest in 
benchmarking and why he or she considered these as relevant for the study and the purpose of 
the interview.  
Since data on past events gathered through interviews are likely to contain contemporary 
reflections of personal interests and interpretations of the respondent at the time of the 
interview, such empirical data are to be considered and treated as retrospective constructions of 
past events—a rational account of past actions from a personal point of view. This entails that I 
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need to consider interview data as reflecting personal affiliations, involvement, and interests 
expressed at the time of the interview more than a truthful account of the past.  
The selection of interviewees was, at the beginning, done by scrutinizing the texts accounted 
for above, mainly newspaper articles, and identifying the persons who had appeared several 
times in the texts and had been active in the discussions about benchmarking. After each 
interview, I asked the respondent whether he or she could suggest other persons who could 
support or question certain viewpoints stated during the interview, which could be strengthened 
by further support or elaborations by others. In the same way, I asked for suggestions for new 
respondents that he or she would consider representing the opposite view of him- or herself 
regarding certain topics addressed during the interview. These suggestions pointed in the 
direction of new respondents for interviewing or functioned as validation of already chosen 
respondents. Thus the most central persons related to the development of the benchmarking 
system had been identified, either by snowballing or through review of text, and later narrowed 
down to fit within the scope of the empirical study. This procedure also entailed, several times, 
that I deselected potential respondents my interview list, as I found subjects sufficiently 
elaborated through other interviews. This allowed me to reconsider the list of possible 
interview persons and select those representing the topics that were still not fully unfolded or 
elaborated.  
Respondents:  
‐ Actors participating in strategic development of the benchmarking system 
‐ Actors who have been active in mobilizing and supporting the logics of the 
benchmarking system 
‐ Actors who have opposed/worked against the benchmarking system 
‐ Actors who actively seek to mobilize the benchmarking system in order to strengthen 
their institutional legitimacy, mobilizing and expanding the institutional logics of 
benchmarking 
‐ Actors who are subjected to benchmarking, these being companies from the 
construction industry, and constructing a rationality based on the rationales of 
benchmarking 
The list of the respondents is found in Appendix A. 
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OFFERING ANONYMIZATION AND REVIEW OF TRANSCRIPTION 
Early in my empirical data collection I realized that several central persons were reluctant to 
participate in an interview. Consequently, I feared that even if I managed to persuade people to 
be interviewed, I would run the risk that they would not speak freely about the subject I would 
like for them to address. When asked what their reluctance was based on, I got the impression 
that they were nervous about how their contribution to the study would be communicated. 
Since it would be difficult if not impossible to anonymize persons who had a central role in the 
development of the benchmarking system, I decided to offer an opportunity to read the 
transcription of the interview and rewrite or eliminate statements if necessary.  
Another issue emerged as I addressed actors from the private market. Several declined the 
interview, arguing that they were very interested in contributing to my study, however, they 
were not interested in being identified as an informant since this was considered to entail 
potential economic consequences for them. This advanced the idea of anonymization since 
these actors represented micro actors that were not necessarily directly involved in the political 
struggles of benchmarking. 
Prior to the interview I contacted the person by telephone, and informed him or her loosely 
about my study, and explained why I found an interview with the person relevant for my 
project. A common part of the conversation was to account for my employment at the 
Benchmark Centre and the Centre’s interest in conducting a research project that was not 
constrained by my employment. Afterwards I sent an email with the approved date for the 
interview and a dense project description as well. 
During the interview, in order to offer the most comforting surroundings for the interviewee, I 
preferred to conduct the interview at their chosen location. I started by summing up some of the 
formalities, for example, that the interview would take between one and two hours depending 
on the how much time they had available and the time needed to address the subjects of 
conversation. Next I introduced the tape recorder and went through the interviewee’s rights to 
be anonymous or read through and change in the transcription of the interview. I began the 
interview by briefly going through my project and my objectives with the interview as well as 
the topics I found relevant to address. I explained that the topics were not to be regarded as a 
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fixed structure for the interview but more as a guideline that I personally perceived as relevant 
to the interview.  
My overall approach was to express my questions or themes as problems for the interviewee to 
help me solve. Thus the interview was loosely structured based on my knowledge from 
previous interviews and texts and my own understanding of the development of benchmarking. 
I did not intervene much during most of the interview but allowed the interviewees to express 
their own interpretations of the problem as well as account for their experiences of the problem. 
With a main objective of collecting information of the respondent’s interests, perception, and 
interpretation of benchmarking and its development, I mainly asked open-ended questions that 
allowed the respondent to address the topics in a way that, as much as possible, reflected their 
interpretation of the topic. With the same objective, I often confronted the respondent with 
statements from which he or she could start the conversation. 
At the end of the interview, I became more active in addressing topics that I had sensed the 
respondent either had intentionally or unintentionally been less inclined to address during the 
interview. In this closing part of the interview, I took the opportunity to utilize the information 
that I had already acquired from the respondent to formulate questions using a counter 
argumentation of the claims or positions he or she had expressed.  
After the interview I more or less fully transcribed the interview and sent the transcription to 
those respondents that were not offered anonymization, who were then offered the opportunity 
to approve or correct the transcription.  
3.3 ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE  
One of my ambitions is to communicate the analysis with limited use of theoretical concepts. I 
have made this choice with the aim of communicating the findings in a way that does not 
discourage people with an interest in the topic from reading the thesis and gaining insight in the 
institutionalization of benchmarking. I have, however, made extensive use of the concepts of 
“framings” to organize the arguments. Further “contradictions” and “regulative, normative, and 
cultural structures” have been included in the analysis and discussions when relevant.  
I have furthermore chosen to analyze the institutionalization of benchmarking in a diachronic 
perspective. I am aware that this choice entails a risk of being prone to identifying framings 
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with the aim of revealing convergence in the development of benchmarking. I do, however, 
consider that the pitfalls of conducting my analysis diachronically do not compromise the 
objectives of this thesis. 
My analysis is structured in chapters, reflecting the main political struggles and negotiations 
that have created openings for introducing or changing the institutionalization of 
benchmarking. Each section consists of an exposition and analysis of how and which actors 
have been active in promoting benchmarking or expressed political interests by propounding 
framings.  
I have chosen to analyze the development of benchmarking with reference to what I, due to my 
three years of research and choice of theory and research strategy, have found to constitute the 
most dominating political struggles and negotiations. My analytical and empirical choices are 
made with an underlying ambition of elevating the analysis to a level that reveals which 
framings are at stake and how they have been facilitated in political struggles about 
benchmarking. I unfold these political struggles and negotiations through an exposition of the 
interplay between the actors and framings in play. I find this analytical choice rational since it 
provides 1) exemplifications of how actors through political struggles and negotiations have 
influenced the orientations of benchmarking and 2) insight into the institutionalization of 
benchmarking.  
All citations and quotations of texts and interviews brought in the analysis are my own 
translations. Interviews are available in the original language versions if required but will be 
destroyed as soon as assessment formalities have been completed. 
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4 ANALYSIS 
 
In the following I will briefly account for the content of the analysis. The analysis is divided 
into seven chapters.  
The analysis starts out with an exposition of the political foundation from which benchmarking 
originally arose as a political proposal for a future institution in the Danish construction 
industry. In this way, the first chapter uncovers how the institutional environment of the 
construction policy was changing in ways that should end up providing political support for a 
benchmarking initiative.  
The second chapter demonstrates how benchmarking was introduced in the late 1990s as a 
technology addressing political focus areas from two development programs in the late 1990s. 
It is argued that the expectations of benchmarking were many and that benchmarking was 
articulated very broadly and incoherently. As a result, benchmarking appeared as a solution to 
the wide range of political focus areas.  
In the third chapter it is demonstrated how private actors from the construction industry 
attempted to take control over the institutionalization of benchmarking by establishing an 
Evaluation Centre (Byggeriets Evaluerings Center, BEC) from which benchmarking was to be 
developed and disseminated to the construction industry.  
The fourth chapter demonstrates how benchmarking was concretized into a benchmarking 
system and articulated to address several political focus areas for the construction industry. 
BEC accordingly became a political arena where many local perspectives and strategic 
interests had to be managed. These conditions for developinging and concretizing 
benchmarking resulted in challenges for constructing a mutually accepted institutionalization 
of benchmarking.  
The fifth chapter is about the operationalization of benchmarking and demonstrates how the 
concretizing and implementation of benchmarking gave rise to reactions from different actors 
with different and diverse interests in the benchmarking initiative. Political struggles emerged 
as actors expressed diverse political interests in the institutionalization of benchmarking. The 
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political struggles accounted for in chapter five constituted a powerful political pressure and 
called for transformations of the institutionalization in order for benchmarking to attain 
institutional legitimacy.  
The political pressures ended up radically transforming the institutionalization of 
benchmarking. This transformation is accounted for in chapter six. As a result of the 
transformation, private construction companies were provided an opportunity to influence the 
future institutionalization. Additionally, and related to the construction companies’ influence 
on the institutionalization, competitors to BEC emerged. This competition entailed implications 
for how to perceive the instrumental purposes and overall objectives for benchmarking. 
Having the construction companies as important carriers of the institutionalization, the final 
chapter of the analysis uncovers how benchmarking is understood and interpreted among the 
practitioners in the construction industry. The chapter reveals how the benchmarking 
institution is incorporated in their experienced reality and demonstrates the interplay between 
and different interpretations among practitioners that benchmarking gives rise to.  
 
  
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
57
4.1 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW CONSTRUCTION POLITICAL FOCUS AREAS 
FOR THE DANISH CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
This chapter provides an understanding of the foundation from which benchmarking originally 
arose as a political proposal for a future institution in the Danish construction industry. In this 
way, the chapter uncovers how the institutional environment of the construction policy was 
changing in ways that should end up providing political support for a benchmarking initiative.  
Changes in the political climate starting in the late 1960s positioned quality and productivity 
high on the construction political agenda. During the 1980s the political development activities 
greatly addressed the lack of quality and productivity in the construction industry. In the 1990s 
a political reformulation of the construction industry occurred, which transformed the, at the 
time, prevalent conception of the construction industry as a sector that accomplished and 
accommodated societal needs. The political reformulation of the construction industry entailed 
a market-oriented construction policy that could cope with and strengthen the construction 
industry in an international competition. Two significant changes of the political climate 
occurred during the 1990s. The first change was an unprecedented inclusion of private actors 
in the development of construction political initiatives, as a closer collaboration between 
public and private actors was considered to be a prerequisite for generating sufficient changes 
in the construction industry. The second change was a consequence of the more market-
oriented construction policy and called for a transformation of the role that construction 
clients had been playing in the construction policy until then. The changed political climate 
called for clients, both private and public, to act as demanding consumers and, in this way, 
drive the development of the construction industry towards a market that accommodated the 
demands from the clients. The conception was that clients could provide the economic 
incentives to influence the development by placing demands on the quality of the buildings and, 
in this way, drive construction companies to adjust their products and processes for the 
purpose of strengthening capabilities, innovation, and competiveness within these requests 
from the clients. 
The lack of demand-driven development of the construction industry was accordingly a central 
diagnostic framing that had to be addressed, and clients needed to be better equipped to 
articulate their demands and choose the best collaborators. This requirement called for a 
prognostic framing that could strengthen and qualify clients in making demands that 
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potentially would increase productivity and international competiveness, as it was expected 
that the construction industry would be enhanced as contractors, architects, consulting 
engineers, and suppliers would accommodate the demands from those financing the building 
projects. Higher transparency of the products and services became a central political issue as 
it was through transparency that clients could both select their best collaborators and also 
drive the private companies to pursue the best performances of the construction industry.  
These two significant changes of the development of construction political initiatives provided 
a legitimate opening for introducing benchmarking in a prognostic framing, addressing the 
diagnostic framing of lack of transparency and the strengthening and qualification of clients as 
demanding consumers. 
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4.1.1 THE CONSTRUCTION POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE PERIOD FROM THE 1960S TO 
1990S 
From the late 1960s and up until the end of the 1990s the Ministry of Housing was the initiator 
of a recurring criticism of the construction industry and succeeded in establishing a common 
recognition of the construction industry as being insufficient in producing satisfactory quality 
and productivity. Driven by a governmental interest, this framing of the construction industry 
was produced and penetrated the construction policy.  
Starting from the late 1960s a persistent diagnostic framing of the Danish construction industry 
emerged, which criticized the large amount of building failures and defects reported from the 
erected buildings of the 1960s and 1970s. (By- og Boligstyrelsen and 
Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 2000). These failures and defects subsequently led to a 
comprehensive amount of building damages and repair work resulting in price-raising activities 
and, in the end, affecting the productivity and profit ratio of the construction industry (e.g., 
EBST, 2004).  
Despite the generally accepted criticism of the construction industry as underperforming on 
productivity and quality, it was also commonly recognized that the knowledge necessary to 
prevent most of the registered building defects and failures was present within the construction 
industry. In this way, the area of weakness was identified as lack of motivation for actors to 
engage in activities that could elevate the overall performance of the construction industry (By- 
og Boligstyrelsen and Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 2000). Actors within the construction industry 
were accordingly not considered to possess the incentives to break with the institutional 
environment in which they were embedded. Something needed to be done in order to establish 
a change of attitude since the efforts put into assuring good quality buildings was insufficient, 
and the lack of productivity and many defects was considered to counteract societal interests. 
The problematization of the construction industry gave rise to a prognostic framing that greatly 
influenced the institutional environment of the construction industry for many years, suggesting 
the need to facilitate state construction activities as a strategic element in achieving influence 
on the development of construction political areas of interests.  
This narrative has been presented many times during the years and must be considered to be 
highly institutionalized among scholars, practitioners, and regulators of the Danish construction 
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industry. But who propounded this criticism, and how was the construction industry 
problematized more specifically? And further: What did these initial articulations give rise to in 
the subsequent development activities of the construction industry? These questions are 
important for this thesis, in order to fully understand the premises from which benchmarking 
originated. It is essential to know that the institutional environment was affected by this 
persistent problematization of the construction industry and that it, much later, produced the 
political foundation for introducing benchmarking as a legitimate development initiative. 
The emerging critique was clearly stated in 1969 in “The construction report” (da. 
Byggerapporten). The report was ordered by the Minister of Housing based on the rising debate 
about the lack of productivity and efficiency in the construction industry and was produced by 
the independent company, Danish Building Information Centre (da. Byggecentrum). The 
Ministry of Housing required an intensive enquiry into the construction industry that identified 
the conditions that were causing inefficiency and cost increases. An appertaining expectation to 
the report was recommendations as to how the state could actively help in increasing the 
productivity of the construction industry (Byggecentrum, 1969).  
Supporting conclusions from the following years prompted the government to adopt Law no. 
228 of May 19, 1971, the “Law of State Construction” (da. Statsbyggeloven), which distinctly 
engaged the state in development activities in the construction industry that aimed at improving 
the performance and development of the construction industry. This was done by organizing 
the state’s comprehensive and continuous construction activities as strategic elements that 
introduced and tested new construction material and methods. As part of this ambition, the 
Danish government formed the Danish Building Development Council (da. Byggeriets 
Udviklingsråd, BUR) in 1971. By Law no. 229 of May 19, 1971, BUR was to attend to 
developing and coordinating the efforts put into research and development in order to enhance 
quality, productivity, and competiveness of the construction industry. In this way, BUR was to 
survey and improve the framework conditions for the constructions industry by providing 
propositions and launching initiatives that would improve:  
‐ Quality of buildings  
‐ Productivity and competitiveness at a national and international market 
‐ The organization of the construction process 
‐ An effective service of buildings 
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‐ Sustainability, comprising a limiting of the overall resource consumption of the 
construction sector 
‐ The quality of urban areas (§1, stk. 2) 
Through the 1980s BUR launched a series of pilot projects and initiated a broad range of 
enquiries and reports addressing the six focus areas above. Accordingly, the two focus areas—
“quality” and “productivity”—were incorporated in a parallel governmental agenda addressing 
the organization of building processes, service of building, sustainability, and urban areas 
(Gottlieb, 2010).  
In 1983 BUR restated that the efforts put into reducing building failures and defects in the 
Danish construction industry were insufficient (BUR, 1983). This diagnostic framing was 
further articulated and enhanced in 1986 by the circular of quality assurance as a part of the 
Quality Assurance and Liability Reform (da. Kvalitetssikringsreformen) from the Ministry of 
Housing. Based on these conclusions, the reform constituted a prognostic framing by 
demanding, standardizing, and formalizing quality expectations and documentation to 
companies participating in state or social housing building projects through a number of rules 
of quality assurance. The circular was loosely formulated by the following requirements aimed 
at securing that available technical and organizational knowledge was utilized: 
‐ Any party in a construction project must quality assure their activities.  
‐ During the construction process and in connection with the handing over process, an 
effective control of the overall quality must be completed.  
‐ Operation and maintenance of the building must take place according to a fixed 
schedule.  
‐ Five years after the handing over process, an inspection of the building must be 
accomplished. 
‐ Consultants, contractors, and suppliers are bound by a five-year period of liability of 
failures and defects, 
‐ An independent, non-profit, insurance institution, The Danish Building Defects Fund 
(da. Byggeskadefonden), must be initiated as an administrator of insurance against 
defects in all state financed or subsidized building activities (Byggestyrelsen, 1986). 
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Accordingly, the circular consisted of a number of overall stated objectives that were not 
followed up by specifications of the methods to achieve these, thus leaving a space for 
companies to design the specifications of quality assurance. In this way, the more practical 
aspects of the initiative in developing the formal procedures for controlling and documenting 
the quality of buildings were entrusted to the actors involved. The circular was a way to utilize 
governmental building activities to generate a foundation for initiating new behaviors and 
perceptions of quality in the construction industry. By applying the circular to all government-
financed building projects, the ambition was that it, over time, would spread to the private 
market, thus formalizing the procedures to determine and secure satisfactory quality.  Such 
facilitations of the governmental financially supported building projects were further 
strengthened in 1989 as the Ministry of Housing enacted a development quota entailing that a 
part of the governmental social housing scheme was reserved for experimental projects that 
could advance product or process development (Bertelsen and Nielsen, 1999).  
By initiating a number of analyses and reports documenting the inadequacies of the 
construction industry, the Ministry of Housing appeared as a central strategic actor in this 
preliminary articulation of the construction industry (Bonke and Levring, 1996; Bang et al., 
2001). By following up the diagnostic framing of the construction industry through concrete 
initiatives, such as BUR, the Law of State Construction, and the Quality Assurance and 
Liability Reform, and reserving resources and government-funded construction projects for 
experimental projects, the Ministry was a driving force in the initial attempts in formulating the 
strategic orientations to pursue in securing the future development of the construction industry. 
The notion of facilitating state construction as a lever for improving the construction industry 
and disseminating development activities highly influenced the politically initiated activities of 
the 1990s. 
4.1.2 RECONFIGURING THE CONSTRUCTION POLICY  
The construction policy of the 1980s can be understood as an attempt to gain a certain degree 
of legitimacy of the state building activities as driving forces in generating changes in the 
construction industry. The development activities of the 1980s were mainly based on an 
anticipation of overall improvement of the construction industry through development activities 
and peripheral regulation and involvement of private actors in state building projects. The 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
63
motivational framing accordingly reflected governmental interests in the construction industry 
more than it reflected motivational elements for private actors. Accordingly, up until the 1990s 
the launched political initiatives did not directly reflect a prognostic framing addressing the 
lacking motivation for actors within the construction industry to engage in the development 
activities and formulation of the construction policy since the development activities and 
construction policy only vaguely included actors from the private market in formulating an 
alternative vision for the construction industry to pursue. Thus the motivational framing of the 
1980s was highly reflective of a governmental interest in addressing the heavy criticism that 
was raised against the quality and productivity of the construction industry.  
The Ministry so far did not succeed in constructing a framing of the construction industry that 
motivated private actors to voluntarily carry out the development activities of state 
construction. This motivation must be perceived as a highly prioritized area for the Ministry of 
Housing since it was a prerequisite that the initiated activities in state and social housing 
building projects were disseminated to the private market in order to generate effects in the 
construction industry as a whole. But throughout the 1980s an acceptance of state construction 
as a driver for development had nevertheless gained some degree of acceptance among private 
actors and provided a foundation for destabilizing the institutional environment in a way that 
entailed support and interests for private actors to engage in future development activities and 
gain influence in the orientation of the development. 
New framings of the construction industry were created from the beginning of the 1990s, as 
private actors were included in the construction political development activities, and hence 
reformulating the framings of the 1980s.  
THE INCLUSION OF PRIVATE ACTORS 
By mobilizing private companies and professional associations in initiated construction 
political development activities in the 1990s, a large number of new actors were engaged in 
establishing change in the construction industry.  
Still with an aim of addressing the low productivity increase and large amount of building 
failures and defects, the inclusion of private actors, together with individual responses to the 
challenges that needed to be addressed, prompted a growing diagnostic framing of the 
construction industry as insufficient in competing on the international market.  
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The two reports, “The resource consumption and distribution in construction” (BUR, 1990) and 
the “Double Up” reports, from the early 1990s (F.R.I., 1990) pointed to coordinated sector 
development activities as solutions to generating higher competiveness on the international 
markets. These proposals constituted a prognostic framing that partly relied on the continuation 
of development activities but also emphasized a necessity to produce a coherent orientation of 
the development activities.  
A report from 1991 by the Danish Agency for Trade and Industry concluded that the Danish 
industry needed a new industrial policy paradigm in order to survive the competition within the 
European Community (Industri- og Handelsstyrelsen, 1991; Jensen, 2011). In the following 
years, 1992–1994, the Danish Agency for Trade and Industry produced “The Resource Area 
Analysis” (da. Ressourceområdeanalysen) triggered by the arguments in the 1991 report. The 
Resource Analysis Report divided the Danish industry into eight resource areas, representing 
90% of the Danish market (Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 1993). One of the resource areas 
(Bygge/Bolig) addressed the construction industry and characterized it as a central area that 
was counteracting overall national economic interests, thus bringing increased governmental 
focus to the development of the construction industry.   
The Resource Area Analysis Bygge/Bolig was produced by a broad consortium, including the 
Danish Building Research Institute, “Nellemann, Nielsen og Rauschenberger” (a consulting 
engineering company), The Danish Technological Institute, Copenhagen Business School (da. 
Handelshøjskolen), and a small industry consultant. Further, a reference group was associated 
to the consortium, comprised of all major organized interests within the industry 
(Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 1993:8).  
The analysis identified four main challenges that needed to be solved in order to improve the 
productivity and that were hindering the Danish construction industry’s ability to compete in an 
international market: 
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Table 3: Main challenges for international competition (Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 1993:13)  
 
The nomination of Bygge/Bolig as an important resource area for society entailed a strong 
focus on the development of the construction industry, as the construction industry to a greater 
extent than previously was considered to be of great economic importance due to its massive 
inclusion of Danish workforce and potential contribution to the national economy through 
productivity improvements. The Resource Area Analysis accordingly provided a new strong 
legitimate platform from which construction political development activities could be initiated 
(Gottlieb, 2010; Jensen, 2011). These changes of the political climate should show to have an 
important impact on the following initiated construction political development programs and 
orientated the already established critique on lacking quality and productivity increase towards 
an insufficient international competitiveness.  
The cooperation challenge 
The coordination between the companies in the construction part is based on a 
traditional trade-specific work division. Vertical integration in cross-project 
collaboration is necessary to obtain the required productivity-gains.  
The innovation challenge 
Strategic product and process development is highly limited within the 
construction part. The potential for innovation-initiatives and information-sharing 
between the construction part and the industry part are not exploited.   
The internationalization challenge 
The companies of the construction part lack competences and equity to meet the 
demands of the international market.   
The transition challenge 
The companies have to a too limited extent converted their actives and products to 
target the increasing market for refurbishment.  
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The lack of productivity that was hindering the construction industry from competing on an 
international market was articulated into a diagnostic framing, characterizing the construction 
industry as lacking productivity development compared to other industries. In this way, 
“industrialization” became a new political issue: 
“It is specifically characteristic of the resource area of Bygge/Bolig that production 
takes place in varying collaborative arrangements, with a new production site every 
time. It is furthermore characterized by one-piece order production, just as the 
productivity development has been lower than in the industry, and Bygge/Bolig has, 
despite a certain industrialization still strong traces of craftsmanship” 
(Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 1993:10). 
The quotation reveals how the construction political areas of interests changed from having a 
focus on attending to societal needs towards an overall concern of the construction industry’s 
inability to compete on an international market. The lacking productivity was closely linked to 
new focus areas, such as lacking industrialization, inexpedient organization of production, and 
a high degree of craftsmanship, which constituted the dominating diagnostic framing of the 
1990s: Deviations from general industrial productivity conditions caused the low productivity 
in the construction industry.  
The Resource Area Analysis suggested three development programs that were to be carried out 
in the following years: Project Refurbishment, Process and Product Development in 
Construction, and Project House. The initiation of the programs was the beginning of a close 
collaboration between the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and several 
private actors and professional associations from the construction industry. This inclusion of 
private actors in the development activities reflected a shift from the development activities of 
the 1980s, which was primarily conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Housing. The 
reformulation of lacking productivity in a new diagnostic framing was broadly supported by 
professional associations of the construction industry and appealed to a closer collaboration 
between public and private actors in the execution of the development programs and 
formulation of the future diagnostic and prognostic framings of the construction industry.  
PROJECT REFURBISHMENT 
Budget: 300 million DKK  
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In 1995 the Ministry of Housing initiated one of the biggest Danish development initiatives for 
the construction industry so far, involving more than 150 Danish construction companies and 
more than 600 individuals up until 1997. The program targeted refurbishment and covered 
around 100 renovation projects of different sizes within refurbishment and urban renewal. The 
main objectives were productivity improvements of the refurbishment market that could 
strengthen the Danish construction industry in an international competition on this market. The 
focus areas were: the processes of refurbishment, product development, international 
demonstration projects, and ecological urban projects. The pilot projects were highly 
experimental, and the focus on how to achieve improvements was very diverse (Jensen, 2011). 
While some projects were very technical and treated the development of building systems and 
components for the refurbishment market, other projects addressed the construction process by 
testing new forms of procurement and collaboration and new design and planning methods. 
Additionally, another category of projects was concerned with the utilization of ICT in 
refurbishment (EBST and Socialministeriet, 2004).  
PROCESS AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT IN CONSTRUCTION 
Budget: 50 million DKK 
This development program was managed by the Agency for Trade and Industry and proceeded 
from 1994 to 2001. The program was a clear demonstration of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry’s new engagement in construction political areas that was traditionally considered to 
be handled by the Ministry of Housing. The program was established at the request of BUR and 
F.R.I., as the program suggestions were based on the conclusions from both the Resource Area 
Analysis, the “Double Up” report from F.R.I. (F.R.I., 1990). and “The resource consumption 
and distribution in construction” report from (BUR, 1990) regarding the vague vertical 
integration in construction processes and in the construction sector in general. The program 
concluded on a holistic delivery and value chain as a solution to the inexpediencies of the 
traditional forms of collaboration and organizational structures (Clausen, 2002). Thus one aim 
was to increase the productivity through long-term collaboration and industrialization. 
Accordingly, four consortiums consisting of contractors, architects, engineers, and 
manufacturers were established and represented a relatively clear division of tasks for the 
development activities and testing in the program. During the period 33 pilot projects were 
carried out. The areas the four consortiums were addressing were the production of wood-based 
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tower blocks, the integration of architecture and industrial production, industrialization by 
modularizing the building into prefabricated elements, and finally, new processes in the 
planning and construction processes (Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 2001:23). 
PREPARING THE GROUND FOR PROJECT HOUSE AND BENCHMARKING 
It was clear that the initial diagnostic framing from the late 1960s up until the late 1980s of the 
construction industry as an industry with insufficient quality and productivity performance 
penetrated the following development initiatives. However, a new and broader motivational 
framing that included private actors in the development activities was constructed and should 
show to be highly strengthened as the political climate supported this collaboration between 
public and private actors.   
The first indication of this strengthening took place as the Minister of Housing formed “The 
Construction Political Forum” (da. Byggepolitisk Forum) with the main responsibility of 
strengthening the dialog between the professional associations in the construction industry and 
public actors in order to determine and develop political initiatives for the construction industry 
in an unprecedented, close public-private collaboration. It was an explicit ambition that the 
quality and productivity issues that were counteracting the international competiveness of the 
construction industry were to be solved in a joint collaboration between all actors of the 
construction industry. In the following years several new actors rearticulated the framings of 
the construction industry.  
The call for closer collaboration between public and private actors got extra momentum, as the 
Ministry of Housing was coerced to respond to a report of the National Audit of Denmark in 
1997. The report embraced an evaluation of the efficiency and productivity of state 
construction and included an investigation of the organization and handling of state 
construction projects. The National Audit identified several cases where governmental agencies 
did not fulfill the intentions of the Law of State Construction regarding economical 
responsibilities and the need and function assessments prior to the construction projects. The 
identification of agencies’ significant differences in the handling of construction projects led to 
a hefty critique of state clients and their consultants for a number of offences. The overall 
critique was directed at the Ministry of Housing, who was responsible for the regulations and 
managing the coordination of the state construction projects. The Ministry was accused of not 
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being active enough in securing an expedient organization and management of state the 
construction projects.  
“In summary the National Audit finds that it ought to be considered which construction 
and administrative tasks should be administered by the state, and how the handling of 
tasks in state construction projects should be organized” (Rigsrevisionen, 1997). 
“The National Audit concluded that the state administration of state construction does 
not accommodate the intensions of the Law of State Construction, and that parts of the 
governmental construction administration are not sufficiently efficient […] The control 
of the investigated projects were insufficient and the management tool were inadequate” 
(Rigsrevisionen, 1997). 
The report coerced the Ministry of Housing to respond to the criticism and later that year the 
ministry released “The 1997 governmental construction report” (da. Byggepolitisk 
Redegørelse) (Boligministeriet, 1997), which articulated the construction industry into a 
governmental program, “Denmark as pioneer country.” An important statement was that the 
initiatives were to provide more coherence and stability in the future development activities for 
the construction industry and that this was to be achieved through an increased collaboration 
between the actors of the construction industry. The inclusion of actors from the construction 
industry was accordingly established as a focal point in the preparation of the governmental 
construction policy. Additionally, the Ministry of Housing constructed a new prognostic 
framing that should show to be persistent in the following construction political development 
activities, as the report outlined that the future construction political development activities to a 
greater extent were to benefit the consumers. In this way, the report pointed at the consumers 
and the clients as key elements in driving the development of the construction industry towards 
a closer and more efficient collaboration and interplay between the public sector, the 
construction companies, and the clients. The conception was that consumers and clients could 
create the economic incentives to influence the development by placing demands on the quality 
of the product (the building) and, in this way, drive construction companies to organize their 
products and processes for the purpose of strengthening capabilities, innovation, and 
competiveness within these requests from the consumers and the clients. 
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“This will benefit the consumers in the form of better and cheaper construction prices, 
and it will benefit the companies who will improve their competitive performance. 
Additionally, the government considers that a new orientation of the framework 
conditions of the construction industry in the longer run will create the foundation for a 
more stable development of the activities in the construction sector” (Boligministeriet, 
1997). 
This idea of restructuring the construction industry by strengthening the consumers’ and 
clients’ positions was further supported by The Academy for Technical Sciences (da. 
Akademiet for de Tekniske Videnskaber) in 1997, in a report claiming “that consumers would 
increasingly regard housing as just another mass consumption product and the political system 
will seek increases in productivity and improved quality” (Kristiansen et al., 2005:504) 
Based on the Governmental Construction Report and addressing the hard criticism from the 
National Audit, the Ministry of Housing released an action plan in 1998 for the construction 
industry (By- og Boligministeriet, 1998), which included experiences from the two 
development programs, Project Refurbishment and Process and Product Development in 
Construction. The action plan called for clients, both private and public, to act as change agents 
and become the driving forces in the creation of changes within construction. This strategic 
utilization of clients was prompted by one of the identified barriers in Process and Product 
Development in Construction which concluded that there was a lack of demands for industrial 
solutions.  
“The client has a central role in the construction industry and can contribute to increased 
quality in the construction process in general by placing specific demands on products 
and services. The client should in other words act as ‘the critical and demanding 
consumer’” (By- og Boligministeriet, 1998:9). 
The diagnostic framing of the construction industry was thus shaped around the conception that 
the existing relations between clients and their collaborators were not expedient in terms of 
developing of the construction industry towards higher productivity. Transformations of these 
relations needed to be constructed in ways that could provide incentives for private companies 
to reorganize their products and services to meet the demands of clients.  
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This new political ambition of “development through demands” ended up influencing the 
Danish construction policy in many years, and, as the next chapter reveals, also provided 
openings for suggesting benchmarking as a political development initiative. 
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4.2 INTRODUCING BENCHMARKING AS A RESPONSE TO POLITICAL FOCUS AREAS 
The changes of the political climate during the 1980s and 1990s had constructed a necessity 
for formulating a prognostic framing that could both cope with the inexpedient relations 
between actors in the construction industry and could further accommodate the needs for 
strengthening clients in making demands to the construction companies. 
This chapter demonstrates how benchmarking was introduced in the late 1990s as a technology 
for addressing political focus areas from two new development programs in the late 1990s: the 
construction political task force and Project House. It will be argued that the expectations of 
benchmarking were many and that the prognostic framing of benchmarking became very broad 
and incoherent, as the technology was incorporated widely into the work of the two programs. 
As a result, benchmarking appeared as a solution to the wide range of diagnostic framings of 
the construction industry treated in the task force and in Project House. The broad and 
incoherent prognostic framing of benchmarking accordingly led to ambiguities and diverse 
interpretations of this new technology. 
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4.2.1 PROJECT HOUSE 
As the third proposed program in the Resource Area Analysis, Project House was initiated in a 
close collaboration between the Agency for Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Housing in 
1998. The program was scheduled for a ten-year period of time and intended to integrate the 
experiences of Project Refurbishment and Process and Product Development in Construction 
into clear and operational development activities. Thus Project House was an attempt to 
integrate and orientate the provisionary and rather scattered development activities of Project 
Refurbishment and Process and Product Development in Construction towards more 
operational and corresponding initiatives. Besides this objective, Project House further carried 
two ambitions from the past development programs and governmental reports. 
Firstly, Project House was to scrutinize the possibilities for increasing productivity through 
increased industrialization. Secondly, the program carried the conception of “development 
through clients’ demands” by pursuing an appropriate organization of the construction industry 
through a professionalization of clients in making demands that could entail products and 
services that to a higher degree complied to their demands (By- og Boligministeriet, 2001). It 
was a clear ambition that clients in the public, social housing, and private sectors were to 
undertake the development by: a) acting as professional purchasers; b) obtaining better 
knowledge about the inner and outer qualities and values of buildings; and c) undertaking 
management, steering, and control functions in relation to the other actors (By- og 
Boligministeriet, 2001:13). 
The initial preparations of the experimental projects that were planned to be executed in Project 
House were carried out in ten theme groups. Project House carried on the ambition of including 
private actors from the construction industry in the development activities, and the Ministry of 
Housing thus appointed clients, contractors and tradespersons, architects and consulting 
engineers, manufacturers of construction products, and professional associations from the 
construction industry to participate in the theme groups.  
The main objective of Project House was ambitious: “Double value for half the price.”  
“The program is intended to contribute to enhanced efficiency and simultaneously 
improve quality—technically as well as architectural. The overall aim for Project House 
is that in 10 years it is possible to complete building projects in the same standard as 
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successful projects of today. Additionally, the aim is that future building projects will 
more precisely accommodate the demands of clients, representing double value 
compared to the buildings erected today” (By- og Boligministeriet and 
Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 2000:140). 
Lacking knowledge about the correlations between the initiated development activities and the 
gain in productivity and quality was an issue that had emerged through the experiences from 
previously executed experimental projects. A future documentation of these correlations was 
considered as one of the main issues for achieving the requested improvements of the 
construction industry (By- og Boligministeriet, 2000a; Interview Bertelsen). This entailed that 
the objective of “double value for half the price” should prove to be a particularly important 
factor in introducing benchmarking since the objective required a so far unprecedented effort in 
documenting and assessing the effects of experimental projects. As a result, one of the theme 
groups, theme group 10, “Quality management of experimental projects,” was appointed to 
attend to documentation and evaluation of Project House experimental projects by providing 
the foundation for defining measures for the other nine theme groups and documenting the 
effects of these in the experimental projects.  
With this overall ambition of creating products that ensured quality management by 
documenting the effects of the initiated development activities and also facilitating the 
exchange of experiences and knowledge to the Danish construction industry, theme group 10 
was expected to develop three products: 
- Quality management of innovation in Project House 
- Data sheet and key performance indicator system for productivity 
- Quality management of experimental projects  
Unlike the other theme groups, theme group 10 was not granted resources for external 
consultancy. Accordingly, The Danish Building Research Institute (da. Statens 
Byggeforskningsinstitut, SBi) offered their support consisting of ad hoc assistance from senior 
researcher Niels Haldor Bertelsen from the research group Development of Productivity and 
Quality for Construction (da. Byggeriets Produktivitet- og Kvalitetsudvikling) established in 
1997. Based on a request from the Ministry of Housing, the research group was assigned the 
task of developing an evaluation model and providing quality standards for building projects. 
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The work was concluded by the report “Method for quality assessment of social housing 
building projects” (da. Metode til kvalitetsvurdering af alment boligbyggeri). Structural quality, 
sound technical quality, environmental reports, overall economy, and architecture were argued 
to be the most important factors in an assessment of the overall quality of the building (SBi, 
2001). The expected future application of the model was high and reflected a very concrete 
utilization of the model as a means to generate transparency of quality performance: 
“The model is intended to be included in the documentation and control of experimental 
projects in Project House. In the longer run, the intention is that clients, end users and 
participants in the building project will use the model as a more general tool for 
assessing and evaluating the standards and quality of buildings” (SBi, 2001:4). 
4.2.2 THE CONSTRUCTION POLITICAL TASK FORCE 
Concurrent with the initial preparations of the experimental projects in Project House, the 
Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Trade and Industry formed a political task force which 
in 2000 released a construction political Task Force report, “The future for construction—from 
tradition to innovation” (da. Byggeriets Fremtid—fra tradition til innovation) (By- og 
Boligministeriet and Erhvervsministeriet, 2000).  
The report was very critical of the construction industry and clarified that the government was 
prepared to play an active role in supporting and driving the change processes.  
Once again the construction industry was articulated as underperforming compared to the rest 
of the industry, and an increased societal economical gain of 6.5 billion kroner per year was 
estimated if the construction industry matched the growth of the additional industry areas. The 
main criticism concerned a description of the construction industry as a domestic marked where 
the malfunctioning and inexpedient competition conditions were appointed to counteract 
productivity increases registered in other parts of the industry. The low productivity and the 
highly needed transformation of the construction industry were to be solved through more 
rational interactions between the actors and an unlocking of the so called “lock-in situation” of 
the construction industry as a description for an inexpedient dead lock of actors causing 
inefficient production. In this way, the Task Force report restated the already established 
diagnostic framing of inexpedient relations between the actors of the construction industry, 
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characterizing it as a lock-in situation that generated undesirable competition conditions. The 
Task Force report underscored that changes were required and that the government was willing 
to be the driving force to achieve such changes. Accordingly, The Task Force report sketched 
four political focus areas, which ended up influencing the work in Project House and thus also 
the foundation from which benchmarking should be developed as a political solution to 
changing the competition condition and inexpedient dead lock of actors: 
- Governmental assist in unlocking the lock-in situation by providing framework 
conditions that provide incentives for actors to release themselves from the traditional 
deadlock.  
- Improvement of the competences of public construction clients and public facility 
managers. 
- Support initiatives that aim at improving the competitiveness of construction 
companies.  
- Targeted construction research and impartial evaluation of the capabilities of the 
construction sector. 
Twenty-eight proposals for how to address the four focus areas were provided and located in 
four different “packages”: a construction client package, a competition package, a collaboration 
package, and an innovation package.  
Several propositions in the Task Force report supported a clear strategic orientation towards 
increased evaluation and documentations, which was considered to be attended to through 
benchmarking: 
“There is a need for systematic external control of the development and for an impartial 
evaluation under and after the construction project. Such an evaluation has the objective 
of assessing the effects of the development activities and will furthermore produce a 
qualified foundation for prioritizing future experimental projects. An effective and 
impartial evaluation will additionally promote a more targeted and relevant 
dissemination of results for the interested parties. An effective evaluation must rely on a 
common set of rules securing: 
‐ Measurable success criteria for experimental projects are outlined from the 
beginning of a building project 
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‐ Continuous follow-up on indicators 
‐ Impartial evaluation of quality and resource consumption 
‐ Results are documented and communicated openly to the target group” (By- og 
Boligministeriet and Erhvervsministeriet, 2000:153). 
The Task Force report is a central historical document for this study since benchmarking was 
assigned in many of the political proposals. It was not the first time benchmarking was brought 
up as a governmental proposal, as benchmarking was already previously mentioned in the 
governmental construction report from 1997. But benchmarking had not previously succeeded 
in penetrating construction political and development activities to the extent as put forward in 
the Task Force report.  
Benchmarking was considered to be a central element of the future knowledge system of the 
construction industry, which was a part of the innovation package. Benchmarking was 
articulated into a prognostic framing that could address four main inexpediencies of the 
existing knowledge system in the construction industry, which was considered to counteract the 
construction industry’s competiveness on the international market: 1) inadequate coordination 
of the efforts put into R&D; 2) lacking incentives for private actors to engage in R&D 
activities; 3) the market’s insufficiency in receiving and exploiting new knowledge; and 4) a 
lacking coherence between the knowledge production and the market-requested knowledge. 
(By- og Boligminsteriet and Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 2000). It was simultaneously 
recognized that improvements of the knowledge system required a transversal incorporation of 
benchmarking in proposals for the three other packages. Thus the Task Force report constructed 
a prognostic framing of benchmarking that could address the broad range of diagnostic 
framings of the construction industry represented by all four packages.   
Why these parallel presentations of the Task Force report and Project House?  
This presentation of the course of events is relevant because the two programs ended up being 
highly intertwined and influenced the development and articulation of benchmarking for two 
reasons. Firstly, it was a clear ambition that the recommendations from the Task Force report 
were to be implemented in the work of Project House since the future development of the 
construction industry would reflect the recommendations from Project House (By- og 
Boligministeriet, 2000a). Accordingly, the products, including benchmarking, developed in 
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Project House reflected the political proposals of the Task Force report. Secondly, 
benchmarking was further influenced by another combination of circumstances: SBi assisted 
the Ministry of Housing in producing the Task Force report and influenced several aspects of 
the benchmarking proposition through three main suggestions: 1) establishing a framework for 
a benchmarking system for the Danish construction industry; 2) the establishment of an 
Evaluation Centre; and 3) that the centre was managed by a balanced grouping of providers, 
customers, and researchers.  
In relation to benchmarking, the Task Force report suggested two initiatives that were 
considered to strengthen the knowledge system in the construction industry and simultaneously 
influence the work in Project House.  
“The first initiative is a development of a national action plan for focusing the efforts 
put into construction research. The second initiative is to be discussed with the private 
market, and is about an establishment of an Evaluation Centre for Construction (da. 
Byggeriets Evaluerings Center) with the task of coordinating, evaluating and 
disseminating knowledge from experimental projects, and additionally in charge of 
gathering experiences and key performance indicators for the purpose of constructing a 
commonly recognized benchmarking system” (By- og Boligministeriet and 
Erhvervsministeriet, 2000:137). 
The proposal, “A national action plan for construction research and communication” outlined a 
governmental ambition of focusing the efforts put into R&D towards more coordinated 
strategic development activities and a systematic assessment of the investments put into these 
activities. The proposal stated that the government would appoint a committee responsible for a 
national action plan for construction R&D, including a strategy for how to disseminate research 
to private actors. The committee would consist of representatives from the Ministry of 
Housing, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Environment and Energy, and 
it was expected that their recommendations included input from The Public Research 
Committee for Urban Areas and Construction (da. Det Offentlige Forskningsudvalg), The 
Council for Technological Service (da. Rådet for Teknologisk Service), BUR, representatives 
from R&D institutions, construction companies and professional associations, and finally, key 
foreign persons and institutions. One of the tasks for the committee was to “Strengthen 
international research collaboration, i.e. related to benchmarking” (Ibid.:152) 
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The second proposal, “Considerations of establishing an Evaluation Center” had the purposes 
of: 
- Coordinating and evaluating experimental and urban renewal projects 
- Gathering experiences and KPIs from new building projects and refurbishment projects 
for the purpose of constructing and establishing a recognized benchmarking system 
- Disseminating knowledge from experimental projects, urban renewal projects, 
benchmarking, good construction practices, etc. (Ibid.:152) 
With these areas of responsibility, the centre was propounded as a central actor in the future 
coordination, gathering, and dissemination of knowledge in the construction industry, and thus 
also marked out to be in a strong political position in the future development of the construction 
industry. The Evaluation Centre was articulated into several focus areas presented in the Task 
Force report, thus constituting the centre and benchmarking as focal points in the effectuation 
of the proposals in the Task Force report. This is particularly revealed in an overview of the 
tasks to be managed by the Evaluation Centre:  
- Development of tool to assess the completion of public/private collaborations, cf. 
proposition 2.1 
- The establishment of a robust frame of reference for comparing price and quality in 
publically funded housing projects and private housing projects, cf. proposition 3.4 
- Gathering of KPIs and establishing a benchmarking system for building quality and 
building defects, cf. proposition 4.3 
- Administrating Users Information of Construction Products (da. Byggeriets 
Brugerinformation), which will be in charge of comparisons of prices between similar 
products and additionally price and quality comparisons of comparable products, cf. 
proposition 5.1 
- Coordinating, evaluating, and disseminating knowledge about experimental projects, 
applying flexible and cross-disciplinary types of organization, cf. proposition 7.2 
- Benchmarking of KPIs about the building project (e.g., R&D investments, price 
comparisons etc.), cf. table 8.2 
- Developing measuring methods and visions for construction, cf. chapter 9 
- Disseminating experiences about refurbishment projects and benchmarking of urban 
renewal projects and services of engineering consultants, cf. chapter 10 (Ibid.:155) 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
80
The overview clearly shows how the benchmarking concept embraced a wide range of strategic 
orientations presented in the Task Force report, which were not aiming at one coherent overall 
governmental strategy for the development of the construction industry.  
The Task Force report underscored the political importance of benchmarking and the 
Evaluation Centre in the future development activities of the construction industry. The 
momentum of benchmarking should be found through the public and public-supported 
experimental projects, through systematic project evaluation and reporting, along with a 
demand from clients for an electronic exchange of experiences. The broad incorporation of 
benchmarking in the propositions, however, resulted in widespread instrumental purposes and a 
lack of overall ambition for benchmarking.  
As a way to attend to and manage the political importance of the centre and benchmarking, the 
Task Force adopted the suggestion from SBi, stating that it was a central prerequisite for the 
future benchmarking initiative and the Evaluation Centre that a broad range of stakeholders in 
cooperation engaged in the development of the initiatives. Accordingly, the Task Force report 
pointed out that an establishment of the Evaluation Centre was to take place in close 
collaboration with actors from the construction industry and to be managed by a board of 
directors representing companies, professional associations, and clients (By- og 
Boligministeriet, Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen, 2000). The centre was further suggested to 
include participators and existing networks in Project House.  
This inclusion of multiple actors in the development of benchmarking and establishment of the 
centre was based on the following rationale:  
“It is critical that private actors in the construction industry are interested [in the 
initiative] and are willing to contribute with a significant share of the financing of the 
centre’s activities. Half of the operation expenses are expected to be covered by private 
funds, membership fees from private companies, etc.” (Ibid.:153).  
4.2.3 IMPLEMENTING THE TASK FORCE PROPOSITIONS IN PROJECT HOUSE 
Due to the SBi assistance in producing the Task Force report, theme group 10, with Bertelsen 
from SBi providing ad hoc assistance, had a particular interest in the propositions for 
benchmarking and the Evaluation Centre, which they considered could realize the ambitions of 
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the group: Ensuring quality management of initiated development activities and facilitating 
exchange of experiences and knowledge in the Danish construction industry (By- og 
Boligministeriet, 2000a). 
Scrutinizing the Task Force report, the theme group found that the proposed Evaluation Centre 
consisted of an aggregation of the requirements for documentations, assessments, evaluation, 
and knowledge disseminations prompted throughout the Task Force report, resulting in a 
blurred conception of the center’s responsibilities and purposes (Ibid.). 
Inspired by the Task Force report, theme group 10 contributed to a cross-functional evaluation 
of the work conducted in Project House, with the purpose of enabling the theme groups to 
follow up on and control the quality of their work. This resulted in a wide incorporation of 
benchmarking in the considerations and products of Project House, which will briefly be gone 
through in the following. 
THE INCORPORATION OF BENCHMARKING IN DIFFERENT THEME GROUPS IN PROJECT HOUSE  
Theme group 1, “Houses with double value for end users,” presented the product 
“Benchmarking—towards an informative label,” as a tool for measuring value. The ambition 
was to confront professional clients with the end users’ value assessments of the building and, 
in this way, provide the knowledge foundation for clients to organize their activities in relation 
to the value expectations of the end users. Additionally, end users would be better qualified in 
clarifying their demands and defining value and in this way be better prepared to go into more 
specific and innovative solution discussions with the professional construction client (By- og 
Boligministeriet, 2000b).  
Theme group 4, “Industrial processes,” did not specifically describe how benchmarking could 
be incorporated in the suggested products of the group, but nevertheless, the group advocated 
the type of benchmarking implemented in the UK (By- og Boligministeriet, 2000c). This 
benchmarking initiative was considered to generate organizational improvements through 
construction companies’ voluntary engagement in a collaborative benchmarking comparison. 
The initiative was launched in the late 1990s and with support from the professional 
associations from the construction industry and with financial support from the UK 
government. With this inspiration from the benchmarking initiative in the UK construction 
industry, theme group 4 presented benchmarking as a means to engage in collaboration with 
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other companies with the purposes of sharing and comparing processes with the aim of 
identifying problem areas and “best practices.” Such comparison was ultimately to be used to 
extract ideas and inspiration for how the participating companies could improve their services 
and products with the purpose of achieving superior performance.  
Theme group 6, “Collaboration between companies and on the construction site,” viewed 
benchmarking as an effective tool to document and assess the effects of experimental projects. 
The group developed indicators where several were aiming at measuring collaboration in 
construction projects.  
“It is necessary to identify a number of indicators, in order to trace the effects of the new 
collaboration models in and outside Project House. Once chosen, the indicators will be 
used for benchmarking for the following four purposes: 
1. A tool for the client to select collaboration partners 
2. Consultants and contractors can use the indicators for comparisons with other 
companies 
3. Allies can use indicators internal between collaboration partners to measure the 
developments on completed project, thus compare efficiencies 
4. Overall comparisons between different building projects  
The indicators will enable the client to compare expenses, time consumption, quality, 
service, etc., across projects, in order to monitor where to receive a defined quality for 
the lowest price” (By- og Boligministeriet, 2000d:27). 
Theme group 6 accordingly presented benchmarking in a prognostic framing that was not 
isolated to a voluntary engagement in benchmarking with the purpose of identifying problem 
areas and pursuing best practices. Benchmarking was also considered to be utilized as a 
technology that could qualify clients in assessments of construction companies that were 
bidding on a building project. Further, a more societal utilization of benchmarking was 
presented, as benchmarking was considered to provide a statistical foundation for comparing 
performances and products across different building projects. 
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Theme group 4, “Industrial processes,” and theme group 8, “Frame work conditions,” both 
suggested that indicators and benchmarking should be included as elements in a “haven” for 
public and private clients, in which clients could exchange knowledge and use benchmarking in 
improving and qualifying their specification requirements. This reflected an accommodation of 
the political interests in strengthening clients’ abilities to make demands to their collaborators 
but also formulated the instrumental purposes and objectives of benchmarking in ways that 
separated from the other theme groups’ conceptions of benchmarking. 
“In Project House KPIs must be gathered from different types of buildings from which 
comparisons can be conducted. Retrospective inquiries of salaries, materials and costs of 
completed building process are to provide the basis for comparisons. The benchmarking 
will subsequently be used in the haven for clients to qualify their demands” (By- og 
Boligministeriet, 2000e:9).  
“The client will accordingly be provided a basis to an assessment of future projects in 
relation to a number of benchmarking measures from similar projects, thus securing the 
basis for the client construct a specification of demands providing a product of highest 
quality to the lowest cost […] The building process will be monitored by a continuous 
production of indicators and KPIs which will be presented to the client by external 
consultants. In this way clients will be able to secure the quality during the building 
process” (By- og Boligministeriet, 2000e:33). 
The four theme groups suggested very different applications of benchmarking, which were very 
different in both instrumental purposes and objectives. The preliminary construction of 
benchmarking in Project House accordingly embraced many different focus areas to be 
addressed, and three rather fundamentally different prognostic framings of benchmarking 
coexisted in this early stage.  
BENCHMARKING AS A SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Firstly, benchmarking was perceived as a means to gain insight into performance areas of the 
construction industry that had previously been inaccessible. This purpose reflected ambitions, 
also present in the Task Force report, of utilizing benchmarking as a mean to gather 
information of the construction industry at an overall level, from which knowledge could be 
extracted. In this way benchmarking was envisioned to play a central role in creating 
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transparency of the prices, products, services, and quality performances of the construction 
industry, and hereby providing better possibilities for clients to qualify their demands to the 
construction companies. This ambition of transparency must be perceived to be of societal 
interest since a fulfillment of such purpose would accommodate the governmental ambitions of 
positioning the clients as central actors to drive the construction industry towards increased 
productivity and better quality performance through their demands. In the following, this 
prognostic framing of benchmarking will be referred to as a “‘socially constructive technology” 
since benchmarking in this framing provides a basis to fulfill purposes that are of societal 
interest.  
BENCHMARKING AS NORMALIZING GOVERNING TECHNOLOGY 
Secondly, benchmarking was perceived as a tool for clients to use to select the best companies 
based on their performance and in this way use benchmarking to monitor where to receive the 
best correlation between price and quality.  
The effect of benchmarking thus became based on the regulative power of clients produced by 
transparency combined with economical threats or sanctions consisting of deselections caused 
by insufficient performance capabilities. An appertaining expectation was that companies 
eventually would conform to the “marked standards” produced through benchmarking since the 
consequences of ignoring it were severe: 
“[C]lients will deselect the worst performing companies, which will be forced to change 
or leave the market” (By- og Boligministeriet and Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, 2000:153). 
This purpose reflected an—at the time—increasingly prevailing conceptualization of 
benchmarking in the public sector. E.g., the Ministry of Finance released a report on 
benchmarking in 2000 that clearly reflected a high governmental interest in benchmarking 
(Finansministeriet, 2000). The report provided methods, tools, and experiences with 
benchmarking within the context of the public sector. The inspiration of implementing 
benchmarking in the public sector came from the dissemination of the technology in the private 
sector. However, the implementation of benchmarking in the public sector entailed a 
reformulation of benchmarking on several central areas. By regarding benchmarking as a 
judgment tool for clients, the expectations were that benchmarking would cause the private 
market to conform to the performance criteria outlined through benchmarking. Triantafillou 
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(2007) describes this frame of benchmarking as a “normalizing governing technology” as 
benchmarking produces “a standard” through comparisons, which actors use as basis for 
organizing their actions and decisions. In this way, benchmarking has highly regulative 
implications when considered as a tool for the clients to create incentives through sanctions in 
the construction industry, as benchmarking indicators become synonymous with the ambitions 
of success set up by the clients, thus activating private construction companies1 to seek 
equivalent ambitions.  
Thus benchmarking facilitates “the self-governing capacities of individuals and/or 
organizations through the production of normalizing knowledge on the activity targeted by 
governing” (Triantafillou, 2007:836) and turns individuals and organizations into “acting 
subjects with a responsibility for the governing of a particular field or set of activities” 
(Triantafillou, 2007: 836).  
Benchmarking as normalizing governing technology relies on the constraining and regularizing 
of actors’ behavior by establishing standards as an attempt to influence future actions, driven 
by the sanctions related to actors’ capability to conform to appertaining performance 
expectations. The sanctions consist of an advantage for private companies when complying 
with performance expectations determined by clients and simultaneously a disadvantage in case 
of underperformance. Thus benchmarking is to be considered as a means to make the private 
companies behave instrumentally and expediently when conforming to explicit performance 
expectations provided through clients’ normalizing comparison of their performances.  
BENCHMARKING AS REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY 
Thirdly, exemplified by the interests in the UK benchmarking program, benchmarking was 
perceived as a way to identify “best practices” and learn how to improve services and products 
through benchmarking activities. Through an identification and illustration of “best practices,” 
development-oriented companies will be provided an opportunity to and increased interest in 
improving products and service. Eventually other companies will be motivated to follow in 
order to be competitive. This prognostic framing of benchmarking is built on trust, 
collaboration, and a mutual benefit to participants over a period of time and aims at gaining 
                                                 
1 The term “private construction companies” embraces the full range of private companies within the construction 
industry; contractors, consulting engineers, and architects.  
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
86
competitive advantage by means of continuous improvement of processes learned from the 
successful practices of others (Watson, 1993; Camp, 1995). This prognostic framing was the 
original type of benchmarking introduced in the 1990s and relies on companies’ self-imposed 
motivation to adjust their products and services.  
This prognostic framing theoretically rejects the application of benchmarking in judgments or 
sanctions since benchmarking is considered a technology highly reliant on willingness to share 
knowledge.  
“Benchmarking is used to improve performance by understanding the methods and 
practices required to achieve world-class performance levels. Benchmarking’s primary 
objective is to understand those practices that will provide a competitive advantage; 
target setting is secondary” (Camp, 1995:15). 
Benchmarking is thus to be considered as a “reflective development technology” that focuses 
on process improvements rather than the end product (Bowerman et al., 2002)—in this case, 
quality of service and products. In this view, benchmarking is not to be regarded as a 
prescriptive request to conformity but as voluntary reflective re-organization of processes that 
stipulate that companies actively and with self-interests engage in changing their products and 
services towards superior performance.  
“Best practice benchmarking is not simply competitor analysis, espionage or theft from 
rival companies. It aims not simply to measuring the organization against the best in 
class and adopting their methods but on understandings of how to achieve superior 
performance by improving methods, practices and processes learnt from others (Watson, 
1993; Zairi, 1997; Beatham et al., 2004; Moriarty and Smallman, 2009).” (Rasmussen, 
2010) 
Benchmarking accordingly presents an external framework consisting of alternative methods, 
processes, and practices from which participators are provided a foundation to reformulate their 
subjective interpretation of expedient products and services and, in this way, destabilize or 
dismiss other previously taken-for-granted perceptions that may have counteracted 
performance ambitions. Ultimately, actors in the private market will independently generate 
changes as their reflective interpretation of “best practices” incites them to pursue performance 
improvement and, accordingly, competiveness and increase of economical profit.   
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 Prognostic framing 
Benchmarking as socially 
constructive technology 
Benchmarking as 
normalizing governing 
technology 
Benchmarking as reflective 
development technology 
Response to 
diagnostic framing 
Lacking transparency and 
knowledge of the 
performance of the 
construction industry 
Inexpedient competition on 
price; clients are not utilizing 
their influences in developing 
the construction industry 
Companies are not 
sufficiently motivated 
initiating changes of the 
product and services 
Institutional pillar Normative Regulative Cultural-cognitive 
Utilization Judgment and decision-
oriented 
Judgment-oriented Improvement-oriented 
Expected benefits Provides basis for political 
decisions, explicit success 
criteria, target setting and 
overall performance 
development  
Provides basis for selection of 
companies, regulates, 
controls, monitors  
Provides learning of best 
practices, mutual benefits to 
participants, continuous 
improvement of processes 
Table 4: Overview of the three prognostic framings of benchmarking  
These three prognostic framings of benchmarking can be perceived as early attempts to 
formulate benchmarking in ways that addressed a wide range of the diagnostic framings of the 
construction industry identified during the 1990s. But this coexistence of rather obviously 
different prognostic framings did not cause any concerns at this time and demonstrates how 
benchmarking was conceived as a relatively unproblematic technology capable of working 
across the diagnostic framings and integrating diverse documentation, evaluation, and 
assessment requests of the theme groups in Project House and the political focus areas of the 
Task Force report. 
In an interview with Niels Haldor Bertelsen, SBi, reasons to this coexistence of prognostic 
framings of benchmarking in Project House were described.  
The main focus of theme group 10 at this state of Project House was to get the technicalities of 
benchmarking clarified. Thus neither the specific content of a benchmarking system nor the 
instrumental purposes of benchmarking were clear or to be determined at this early state. 
Benchmarking was still at a state of development where implications or limitations were not yet 
relevant (Interview, Niels Haldor Bertelsen).  
Further, Bertelsen explained that benchmarking was only to be considered as indirect 
contributors to achieving the ambition of “double value for half the price,” as the benchmarking 
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was not to be considered autonomous but as a supporter and documentation of the development 
activities of Project House (Interview, Niels Haldor Bertelsen). 
As a result of these relatively loose premises for developing benchmarking, the Task Force 
report and Project House presented benchmarking as a multifaceted technology embracing the 
overall requirements for assessments, evaluations, documentations and knowledge 
disseminations, and accordingly resulting in ambiguous interpretations of the benchmarking 
concept. The initial prognostic framings of benchmarking left an ambiguity of interpretations of 
partly the objectives of benchmarking and the interrelation between benchmarking and its 
overall societal influence and partly about the future strategies of how to develop, 
communicate, and operationalize benchmarking.  
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4.3 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EVALUATION CENTRE 
The previous chapter uncovered the introduction of benchmarking in the late 1990s and the 
political ambitions for the Evaluation Centre. Benchmarking appeared as a solution to the wide 
range of diagnostic framings of the construction industry, and the Evaluation Centre were 
considered to be of great importance in the future construction political activities.  
The Evaluation Centre however gave rise to political struggles between different actors with 
strategic interests in attaining ownership of the centre and, accordingly, its benchmarking 
activities. During 2001 alliances emerged between private actors as these organized their 
activities in negotiations and consolidations of interests in the centre and benchmarking. 
Several private actors expressed political interests in the establishment of an Evaluation Centre 
and development of benchmarking. Private resources were accordingly invested in forming the 
Evaluation Centre and the configuring of benchmarking. The introduction of benchmarking in 
the late 1990s had produced a political arena from which diverse strategic political interests in 
benchmarking emerged among private actors.  
This chapter demonstrates who and which interests and political considerations laid the 
foundation for establishing the Evaluation Centre, through which benchmarking was to be 
developed and find legitimacy as a development initiative. It will be illuminated how the 
established Evaluation Centre adopted multiple suggestions from the Task Force report and 
Project House, thus once again articulating the centre as a carrier of inconsistencies and 
contradictory purposes for and perceptions of benchmarking.  
The chapter will further illuminate how ministerial changes due to a political shift from left to 
right in 2001 caused pivotal changes in the configuration of the construction policy throughout 
the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. In this way, the premises from which the development of 
benchmarking took place will be uncovered in the following. 
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4.3.1 THE EVALUATION CENTRE AS POLITICAL AREA OF INTEREST 
The first political struggle that could potentially influence and reconfigure the preliminary, but 
yet unclear, prognostic framings of benchmarking was not directly related to benchmarking but 
instead related to the establishment of the suggested Evaluation Centre. A number of political 
announcements in 2000 and 2001 reflected an emerging political interest in measuring the 
performance of the construction industry in order to steer the competitive parameters from 
price to quality (Interview, Niels Haldor Bertelsen). This indicated that, despite the unclarity of 
the area of responsibility of the centre and the lack of coherence of its affiliated activities, the 
proposal was still considered sufficiently attractive for different actors to engage in. The Task 
Force report and Project House accordingly had succeeded in introducing the Evaluation Centre 
as an important initiative for the future development activities of the construction industry. 
Despite—or maybe because of—the rather diverse and loose formulation of benchmarking, it 
was evident that the Evaluation Centre was to be an influential actor in the future construction 
political development and to be a central place from which the future benchmarking activities 
were to be defined and depart from.  
The prospect of establishing the Evaluation Centre was highly plausible, as the Minister of 
Housing, in a press release, had the following reflections about the Task Force report under the 
headline “We must have the Evaluation Centre for Construction”:  
“The Task Force proposal of establishing an Evaluation Centre is probably the proposal 
that has gained the most support from the professional associations in the construction 
industry. I also find this centre to be a central element in the development of the 
construction industry. First of all it is crucial that the experimental building projects that 
are initiated in Project House are evaluated through overall and consistent instructions. 
This is considered to be one of the centre’s tasks. 
But furthermore benchmarking has become a buzzword in construction, and we must 
secure a central gathering of experiences and KPIs. Only in this way can we achieve a 
higher degree of transparency, which I consider essential in order to increase 
competition in the construction industry”  (Lotte Bundsgaard, Byggeri.dk, 2001).  
With this statement, Bundsgaard expressed two central political considerations: firstly, that the 
Evaluation Centre was to be assigned a great responsibility and a to be considered a central 
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element in attaining success of the future construction political development activities. 
Secondly, the minister articulated benchmarking into a clear prognostic framing that addressed 
the inexpedient competition in the construction industry by generating transparency of the 
performances in the experimental building projects of Project House.  
In February 2001 SBi was presented as an obvious candidate for managing the activities of the 
Evaluation Centre due to its many years of research and engagement in developing evaluation 
models and documentations requirements for the construciton industry. The new director of 
SBi, Lone Møller Sørensen, had a background in two large, private Danish companies, Velux 
and Rockwool, and was aware of the lack of knowledge distribution of research to private 
companies in the construction industry (Berlingske Tidende, 2001). In a press release, Sørensen 
explicitly showed an interest in the Evaluation Centre and included it in her recommendations 
for a better coordination of the dessimination of research to the constrution industry. 
“I believe that the challenge is to organize better interplay between the existing 
knowledge institutions, rather than establishing new ones as some people have 
suggested […] SBi should take on the responsibility of acting as promoter of this 
process. E.g., the construction political report suggested an establishment of an 
Evaluation Centre. This centre could profitably be located at an independent sector 
research institution such as SBi” (Lone Møller, Berlingske Tidende, 2001). 
In this way, the Evaluation Centre became articulated into a strategic ambition of coordinating 
the production, dissemination, and integration of knowledge, which simultaneously reflected 
the political influence the centre was envisioned to have. By declaring interests in the 
ownership of the centre, SBi was highly contributing to an increasing awareness of the 
prospective realization of the initiative. 
4.3.2 PRIVATE ACTORS ENGAGE IN ESTABLISHING “BYGGERIETS EVALUERINGS 
CENTER” 
A reaction to the prospect of locating the Evaluation Centre at SBi emerged as three private 
actors announced that they had joined forces and initiated the establishment of a Byggeriet 
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Evaluerings Center, BEC (en. Evaluation Centre for Construction2). The three actors were 
Danske Entreprenører (en. the Association of Danish Constractors), F.R.I. (en. the Association 
for of Consulting Engineers), and RealDanmark Fonden (later and in the following, 
“Realdania”’)3. The foundation was a new and financially very powerful actor in the 
construction industry with assets of 20 billion kroner. The strategic objective of the foundation 
was (and is still today) to develop and support the built environment. The major part of the 
financing came from Realdania, who engaged in the initiative by funding 6 million kroner to 
the establishment of the centre. This was, at the time, the largest amount funded by Realdania. 
The managing director of Realdania, Flemming Borreskov, expressed the foundation’s 
motivation for financing BEC, which simultaneously expressed Realdania’s political interests 
in both benchmarking and the construction industry as a whole: 
“We are financing the establishment, and the new scenario is that the centre is going to 
be managed and financed jointly by private parties from the construction industry and 
the state. The centre is going to be a gathering place for all actors in the construction 
industry, where the public and private business communities can exchange viewpoints. 
Some of the work in the centre is conducted in network groups, and BEC is going to 
lead the development of the construction industry. We [Realdania] wish to generate 
development and changes by means of flagship projects, meaning that such prominent 
projects will set for courses that reveal different and new directions” (Flemming 
Borreskov, Berlingske Tidende (2001d). 
But which motivational framing consolidated these private actors to engage in this initiative? 
And as important: Which prognostic framings could the alliance be a reaction to?  
Officially, the initiators articulated the establishment of BEC as the construction industry’s 
reaction to the productivity and quality critisim during the past eight years. But interviews with 
serveral actors (Curt Liliegreen, Christian Lerche, Michael H. Nielsen, Jørgen Nue Møller) 
revealed an additional incentive for private actors to engage in the establishment of BEC.  
“Not everyone in the construction industry was interested in the centre. But if it was to 
be established then we would like to have a say in the development. As I remember it, 
                                                 
2 Byggeriets Evaluerings Center has chosen “The Benchmark Centre for the Danish Construction Sector” as the 
English translation.  
3 Danish names are used prospectively in the analysis. 
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this was a discussion that Danske Entreprenører and particularly F.R.I. had at the time. 
The discussion spread and more associations were invited to join the initiative by the 
original initiators who announced at a press conference at Gammel Dok that the 
construction industry had decided to engage in the establishment of the centre” 
(Interview Curt Liliegreen). 
The Task Force report, Project House, and SBi’s interest in the centre had apparently given rise 
to political discussions about whether private actors ought to engage in the centre and influence 
the development. Asked about the potential risks of a ministerial establishment of BEC, 
Liliegreen responded: 
 “The risk would be that it would be enforced in the private market as a public control 
measure more than it would be a knowledge centre to which actors from the 
construction industry could feel a sense of ownership and engage in it. You could risk 
that it would be more monitoring than development.” (Interview, Curt Liliegreen). 
This concern was paradoxically also stated in an interview with Niels Haldor Bertelsen from 
SBi: 
“Very early we decided that the philosophy of benchmarking was: rather one 
controllable parameter than 50 theoretical developed parameters. […] It is better to have 
one parameter and manage that well than it is to have many and only manage the theory. 
The idea was that benchmarking should provide development. We do not use 
benchmarking to exercise control but to manage the development activities” (Interview, 
Niels Haldor Bertelsen). 
The rising fear among the private actors of being subjected to a ministerially developed control 
system is likely to have its roots in the political announcements pointing in the direction of 
changing the competion through measurements of other competitive parameters than price and 
in this way using benchmarking to steer the competition from price to quality. 
This concern was also stated by Liliegreen in a press release: 
“After the hard criticism from the government the Danish construction industry could 
have resigned and let the political system take action. This would be tantamount to a 
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typical social democratic model with authorization of certain contracting companies, 
control and regulation systems” (Curt Liliegreen, Erhvervsbladet, 2002). 
Through my interviews with actors involved in BEC, it was clear that the development of a 
benchmarking system was one of the primary drivers of the private actors to get involved in the 
centre. According to the interviewees, it was evident that the Agency for Trade and Industry 
was intent on establishing a benchmarking system and disseminating the system by regulatory 
means through executive orders for state construction projects (Interview, Curt Lilegreen, 
Michael H. Nielsen, Jørgen Nue Møller, Christian Lerche, and Jesper Rasmussen). A motive 
for professional associations to establish the centre on private hands was to be found in the 
opportunity to attain influence on the design of the benchmarking system in a manner that 
would accommodate the needs on the market and suit the members of the professional 
associations in the construction industry (Interview, Gunde Odgaard, Curt Liliegreen).  
The motivational framing that was supported by the private actors can accordingly be 
summarized to 1) assessment of the appertaining consequences of having a ministerially 
controlled centre and developed benchmarking system; 2) strategic interests in influencing the 
establishment of the centre and benchmarking system; and 3) show a private initiative that 
reflected an accomondation to the critique from the Task Force report by showing 
responsibility and engagement in the future development agenda.  
The formulation of diagnostic framings of the construction industry that the centre was to 
address through its activities and the corresponding prognostic framings of benchmarking were 
still to be constructed.  
The initial formulation of these framings was attempted in a serie of press releases (Ritzaus 
Bureau, 2001; Berlingske Tidende, 2001a; Berlingske Tidende, 2001b; B.T., 2001; Berlingske 
Tidende, 2001c; Erhvervsbladet, 2001), showing that the initial considerations of the 
responsibilities of BEC had similarities to the responsibilities of the Evaluation Centre 
suggested in the Task Force report and also that BEC was to function as a focal point in the 
development of the construction industry.  
“The centre must in an independently and trustworthy manner attend to the following 
responsibilities: 
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‐ Coordinating, evaluating and desseminating knowledge about experimental 
projects 
‐ Develop and operate a benchmarking system consisting of KPIs for the 
construction process and the end product 
‐ Develop methods of measurements and objectives for the construction industry 
to pursue 
‐ Function as a gathering place for theme groups from Project House” 
(Erhvervsbladet, 2001) 
This was a multifarious ambition to be handled by BEC and yet there was a strategy to be 
determined to address these responsibilities. The three first responsibilities highly reflected the 
diagnostic framings that benchmarking was to address. The specific activities of BEC should be 
determined by a board of directors that broadly represented the entire construction industry. 
The first constellation of board members consisted of representatives from the Ministry of 
Housing, BAT-kartellet (an association attending to employee interests in construction), 
Byggematerialeindustrien (a trade association for producers, suppliers, distributors, and 
contractors in the construction industry), Byggeriets Arbejdsgivere (an employer’s association 
in construction), Danske Entreprenører, Bygherreforeningen (an association for professional 
clients), Ministry of Trade and Industry, F.R.I., Realdania, P.A.R. (later Danske Ark, The 
Danish Association of Architectural Firms) (BEC, 2002a). 
Of specific interest to this study, a prognostic framing of benchmarking was revealed, as a clear 
focus area was to develop a benchmarking system that could facilitate comparisons of quality 
and prices in relation to different construction processes and types of collaboration. By 
documenting and analyzing the performance of construction projects by means of 
benchmarking, BEC was to improve quality and increase productivity in the construction 
industry. The Ministry of Housing committed financially to the initiative by defraying the 
expenses for the facilities of the centre (BEC, 2002a). 
4.3.3 BEC AS POLITICAL ARENA 
The objectives clearly indicate that the board of directors had serious ambitions ascribed to 
BEC and positioned the centre as a central place for future development activities related to 
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benchmarking, evaluation, and documentation. Accordingly, BEC was quickly considered as a 
political asset, and board members of BEC were provided political power to influence and 
shape the activities of the centre by advancing interests in their preferences. The powerful role 
of the BEC and attractiveness of being included in the board of directors was demonstrated two 
weeks after the announcement of the establishment. The first official criticism of the initiative 
came from the professional associations, Håndværksrådet (en. The Danish Federation of Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises) and Dansk VVS (now “Tekniq,” a Danish association for 
installation companies), which were not included in the board of directors (Erhvervsbladet, 
2001a) and thus not included as parts of the “new focal point” of the construction industry.  
“It seems like the big contractors lead the field and get a centre reflecting their requests.  
There is a risk that the good intensions from the Task Force report will not be realized, 
and that the collaboration, which is critical in order to improve the construction industry, 
will not be unfolded in the new centre, since the big contractors favor their own 
interests” (Lars Jørgen Nielsen, Erhvervsbladet, 2001a) 
The managing director of Dansk VVS, Flemming Preisler, was unsatisfied with the missing 
representation of the mechanical and electrical contractors.  
“I and many of my members wonder why we are not invited to participate in BEC. The 
initiators of BEC have a one-sided focus on building envelope. The technical is a very 
important part of a new building” (Flemming Preisler, Erhvervsbladet, 2001a). 
A view shared with the El-installatørernes Landsforening (en. National Association for 
Electrical Contractors), who criticized the composition of the board of directors to reflect a low 
priority of the technical aspects of buildings.  
A senior economist from Danske Entreprenører, Curt Liliegreen, rejected the critique: 
“We have representatives from the employers and from the employees. We have 
representatives from the producers and from the consumers, also the regulators and 
knowledge centers are represented. There are many associations in the construction 
industry and we cannot include all” (Curt Liliegreen, Erhvervsbladet, 2001a). 
These reactions are included to demonstrate the political influence that BEC was considered to 
have. It also reflected a maybe even more controversial topic: Who represented the construction 
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industry in the political debates? This new ambition of constructing communities of public and 
private actors that in mutual agreement could discuss and decide the construction political 
development of the construction industry simultaneously reflected whose interests were to be 
taken into account.   
The critique from the professional associations prompted the board members of BEC to 
respond. In March 2003 a seat was open at the board, caused by a merging between the two 
trade organizations, Danske Entreprenører and BYG, since both associations were board 
members in BEC prior to the merging. Accordingly, Tekniq, which was the new trade 
association after a merging between Dansk VVS and El-installatørernes Landsforening, was 
included in the board of directors.  
4.3.4 APPOINTING THE MANAGING DIRECTOR 
One important issue was still to be attended to: Who was to hold the chief executive position of 
the centre? This decision should show to be of high importance, as the managing director ended 
up having great influence on the future development of a benchmarking system as well as the 
prognostic framings of benchmarking. 
Half a year after the announcement of establishing BEC as a private initiative, the board 
members appointed Curt Liliegreen managing director of the centre. Through his more than 20 
years in Danske Entreprenører, Liliegreen had been heavily involved in the political 
discussions of the framework conditions of the construction industry.  
Soon after his nomination, Liliegreen sketched the background and the visions for the centre in 
a press release, in which Liliegreen revealed ambitious expectations. The press release made it 
clear that BEC was going to be an effectuation of the Evaluation Centre suggested in the Task 
Force report and Project House and in this way cemented that the centre was to be a powerful 
actor in the future construction political development agenda. However, it was also made clear 
that the tasks of BEC were going to be established in a balancing between public and private 
interests.  
“It is not a coincidence that there are similarities between the responsibilities of the 
centre and the topics in Project House and the Task Force report. BEC is a logical result 
of the discussions in the construction sector in the recent years.  
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In the Task Force report an establishment of an Evaluation Centre was suggested, but 
with different tasks of the centre, that is now realized. The Task Force report did not 
consider that the centre was to be a private initiative, but F.R.I. and Danske 
Entreprenører felt that it was important that the construction industry accepted 
responsibilities for this task. This was important for the credibility of the industry, but 
was also important for the credibility of the centre” (BEC, 2002b).  
Liliegreen pointed out that BEC was an example of actors in the construction industry going 
together despite their diverse interest with the main objective of initiating change that would 
benefit the industry as a whole.  
“The establishment of the centre expresses that it was necessary to gather the different 
actors from the construction industry in this mutual initiative in order to close the gap 
between the traditional contradicting interests in the construction industry and secure 
joint collaboration in the future” (BEC, 2002b). 
The large contribution of Realdania was emphasized as an opportunity for the construction 
industry to take matters in their own hands since BEC was not heavily reliant on financial 
support from the state (BEC, 2002b). This clearly demonstrated how Realdania was considered 
to be of high importance to the centre and also facilitator for the joint responsibility between 
private and public actors in construction development initiatives due to their financial capacity 
to invest in such initiatives. This financial support of Realdania was considered to be of high 
importance to facilitate the establishment of BEC since this enabled private actors to attain 
influence on the political activities of the centre and BEC not to be imbalanced in favor of 
specific political ambitions (BEC, 2002b). 
The politically independent role of BEC and the balancing between the board members’ 
sometimes diverse political interests gave rise to potential political struggles when determining 
BEC’s areas of responsibilities and benchmarking activities. A report from October 2002 
presented some reflections of these potential difficulties in handling the many interests in the 
board. It was emphasized that BEC was reliant on a common recognition of the centre as a 
legitimate development place for a future benchmarking system and its function as knowledge 
centre. The following two quotations reveal a high awareness of the potential political struggles 
that could be rendered by implementing a benchmarking system in the construction industry: 
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“BEC is established by representatives from the entire construction industry and is 
meant to benefit them all. The centre must be independent of private interests, these 
being company groups, professional associations, companies or the state. Because of 
this all actors must accept that the work of the centre does not necessarily reflect private 
interests. This is the price for securing solidarity and the integrity of the centre” (BEC, 
2002:19). 
And further,  
“The centre will not yield in case of a conflict between the quality of data and political 
or other interests of parties in the construction industry. By supporting this philosophy 
the board of directors send out the political statement that the centre must have a reliable 
professional content and not to function as a ‘laundering’ of the construction industry on 
an incorrect foundation” (BEC, 2002:19).  
The establishment of BEC as a private initiative revealed how private actors and the managing 
director attempted to legitimize the centre as an ambiguous proposal that accommodated the 
request in the Task Force report and Project House. It was clear that the initiators recognized 
that, in order for BEC to be a legitimate alternative to a governmental initiative, it was a 
prerequisite that the ambitions of the centre were high and were accepted by the authorities.  
The successful establishment of BEC was additionally a concrete example of a widespread 
governmental acceptance of the influential power that private actors were provided in forming 
the future construction policy in a close collaboration between the authorities and private 
actors. 
4.3.5 THE CLOSURE OF MINISTRY OF HOUSING 
In November a central shift in the configuration of the governmental construction policy took 
place, which influenced the conditions from which the policy was made and also changed the 
institutional enviroment from which the development activities had previously been derived. 
The change further legitimized BEC and the inclusion of private actors in developing the 
construction industry. 
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As a result of a political shift from left to right in November 2001, the Ministry of Housing was 
abolished as part of a larger reorganization of the ministries. The political responsibilities of 
public and publicly-funded construction projects were placed in an agency named Danish 
Enterprise and Housing Authority (da. Erhvervs- og Boligstyrelsen – later Erhvers- og 
Byggesstyrelsen, EBST) under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. This ministerial 
reorganizaiton had a great impact on the the construction policy, traditionally known from the 
Ministry of Housing as EBST, and was a merge between the Agency for Trade and Industry 
and the Ministry of Housing. The closure of the Ministry of Housing entailed that the 
construction policy was to be formulated primarily by the far more market- and competition-
oriented Agency for Trade and Industry that already in the 1990s had revealed an interest in the 
industrialization and productivity development of the industry as a whole. 
This entailed that the construction  industry was not to the same extent as during the time of the 
Ministry of Housing to be percieved as an independent industry that was separated from the 
rest of the industry. 
Anders Kretzschmar became the director of the new EBST. Kretzschmar had previosly been 
called in to support the Ministry of Housing in the larger socio-economic issues and analysis 
and governmental projects addressing the productivity and quality of the construction industry. 
In this connection, Kretzschmar was not, surprisingly, highly involved in the production of the 
Task Force report and in pointing out the low productivity and inexpediencies of a domestic 
market production.  
The productivity issue was yet again given much governmental attention in the release of the 
report, “The Will for Growth” (da. Vækst med Vilje), where the posibilites for productivity 
gains in the constrution industry were considered to be of great significance (Regeringen, 
2002). The report restated the ambition of utilizing the considerable construction activity of the 
public sector to initiate change in the construction industry. The clients were yet again 
determined to be driving this change by acting as demanding consumers: 
“By making demands about new types of organizations and product development the 
public sector can in its position as client facilitate the productivity development in the 
construction industry” (Regeringen, 2002:62). 
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This statement illuminates a continuation of the governmental ambition of positioning clients as 
change agents and driving forces in generating changes in the construction industry by making 
demands to the companies. Opposed to previous statements, these political ambitions were, 
however, not isolated to be initiated in experimental building projects in construction political 
development programs as Project House but in the public and publically-funded building 
activities as a whole. 
THE ABOLITION OF BUR AND PROJECT HOUSE 
An ambition in the new government platform, “Growth, welfare and change” was to 
reprioritize the state resources by, among other things, minimizing the numbers of state-funded 
councils. In this connection, the government abolished BUR with the argument that, in a 
prioritization of governmental resources, BUR’s functions could be performed by SBi, Forum 
for construction policy, and BEC4.  
Further, the government abolished the state funding to research concerning social housing and 
experimental projects5. A discontinuance of Project House was a consequence of these cost 
cuts, and accordingly, a cancellation of the high ambition of conducting experimental projects 
and testing the products of the theme groups under the auspices of Project House.  
DELEGATION OF THE CONFIGURATION OF CONSTRUCTION POLITICAL ISSUES TO PRIVATE ACTORS 
In line with earlier construction political announcements, the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
Bent Bendtsen, advocated for a joint responsibility between the private actors in the 
construction industry and the government in improving the competiveness in an international 
market. Reciting productivity results from the Task Force report, Bendtsen enhanced the 
societal importance of improving quality and productivity by engaging the actors in 
construction in a mutual interest in the future development agenda.  
The development of the construction industry was thus, to a higher extent than previously, 
placed in the hands of the private actors of the construction industry (see also Kristiansen et al., 
2006).  
                                                 
4 http://www.byggecentrum.dk/nc/bygnet-nyhederne/nyhed/browse/2/article/nu-er-det-officielt-bur-nedlaegges/ 
accessed 03-06-2012  
5 https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=91358&exp=1 accessed 03-06-2012 
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“It is of the government’s opinion that there is no longer need for a independent council 
for this area [Bygge/bolig], i.e., because of the many proposals to advance the 
development of the construction industry, which are produced in a close collaboration 
with the professional associations in Project House. Future counselling can be fulfilled 
by comparable agencies like SBi, BEC, and Byggepolitisk Forum.”6   
Bendsten emphazied BEC as a positive example of a resposible action from the construction 
industry:  
“Luckily we have already seen the first initiative from the private parties. BEC will open 
in a few weeks. The centre will become the construction industry’s own quality control 
primarily financed by the private parties. This is a good and positive step on the road to 
collaboration and increased efficiency” (Bent Bendtsen, Dansk VVS, 2002). 
BEC rapidly responded to this assignment of responsibility:  
“This forum [BEC] has become twice as important after the closure of the Ministry of 
Housing and BUR, because we truly need dialog in the building sector. […] The 
thoughts are that the centre is to continue the network in Project House, by reviving 
some of the theme groups. In this way it is possible to bring together a number of 
resource persons from the construction industry that during Project House proved to be 
valuable” (BEC, 2002c). 
This was an opportunity for BEC to occupy a central political position in the construction 
industry that had now been weakened as Project House and BUR no longer existed. BEC 
accordingly exploited the deinstitutionalization of the existing construction political 
environment, and through this legitimized the centre’s political position in future construction 
political development processes. 
The political importance of BEC in the construction industry was underscored at the formal 
presentation of BEC at the first annual meeting in October 2002. The political interest in the 
centre was revealed as 166 persons—representing architects, consulting engineers, contractors, 
clients, research centres, and government officers attended the meeting. At the meeting, BEC 
                                                 
6 https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=91358&exp=1 accessed 03-06-2012 
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presented a provisional disposition to a benchmarking system. The aim was to develop a 
operational benchmarking system within one year (BEC, 2002d). 
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4.4 CONCRETIZING THE PROGNOSTIC FRAMING OF BENCHMARKING  
The last chapter revealed how different actors had political motives for engaging in the 
establishment of BEC, and also the changes that occurred in the construction political climate 
during the early 2000s.  
This chapter demonstrates how benchmarking was concretized into a benchmarking system and 
articulated to address several diagnostic framings of the construction industry.  
It will be argued that the incoherent prognostic framings of benchmarking and the inclusion of 
the many different actors which have diverse interests in the benchmarking initiative 
constituted BEC as a political arena where many local perspectives and strategic interests had 
to be managed. These conditions for developinging and concretizing benchmarking resulted in 
challenges aimed at constructing a mutually accepted prognostic framing of benchmarking. 
Accordingly, the broad motivational framing that could meet the many interests represented in 
the board of BEC resulted in a benchmarking system that relied on heterogeneous prognostic 
framings of benchmarking.  
The development of benchmarking and articulation of prognostic framings became further 
influenced by two new factors: 1) the political influence of the managing director Curt 
Liliegreen and his interests and ambitions for BEC and benchmarking, and 2) political 
interests in the benchmarking initiative propounded by the new government, which ended up 
affecting the prognostic framing of benchmarking as well as the development of the 
benchmarking system. 
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4.4.1 ESTABLISHING THE BENCHMARKING SYSTEM  
Concurrent with the formal establishment of BEC, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
initial work of developing the benchmarking system took place. The new managing director, 
Liliegreen, became a central actor in this development: 
“I was actually given free reins to develop this system, which I presented to the board of 
directors in February 2002. It was called “Ideas and action” and was part of the strategic 
plan for the centre. […] In this document was a description of the benchmarking system. 
You can call it a rough sketch. It got an undisputed positive welcome of the board” 
(Interview, Liliegreen).  
Liliegreen’s inspiration to the benchmarking system came from his work in Project House. In 
one of the summaries of the initial work in Project House (By- og Boligministeriet, 2001a), 
Liliegreen introduced his recommendations for a benchmarking system under the title 
“Transparency through evaluation,” based on the challenging task of assessing the development 
activities of Project House.  
“How can we verify that the objectives of a construction project are achieved? How do 
we secure that the participating actors in the project gain insight into the reaped 
experiences? [Answer:] By means of statistics! More precisely: a system consisting of 
key performance indicators which allows comparisons between the different building 
projects—also called a benchmarking system” (By- og Boligministeriet, 2001a:13). 
Liliegreen was inspired by the UK program, “Movement for Innovation,” and pointed to the 
seven main operational KPIs and 38 underlying indicators as suggestions for a future 
benchmarking system. The seven KPIs were:  
‐ Time (7 indicators) 
‐ Costs (8 indicators) 
‐ Quality (3 indicators) 
‐ Client satisfaction (3 indicators) 
‐ Changes requested by the client (2 indicators) 
‐ Profit performance (11 indicators) 
‐ Safety (4 indicators) (By- og Boligministeriet, 2001a). 
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Liliegreen, however, pointed to some differences between the UK system and the system that 
he was intent on developing: 
“It is implicitly presupposed that the system will compare construction projects. […] 
This is similar to the system in UK […] There is, however, one central difference 
between the system that is presented here and the English model. Movement for 
Innovation only benchmarks experimental projects. The Danish model facilitates 
benchmarking of all kinds of projects (BEC, 2002:11).    
In October 2002 BEC released a report called “The Benchmarking System for Construction” 
(da. Byggeriets Nøgletalssystem), that outlined the preliminary thoughts about BEC’s position 
in the construction industry and the areas that were to be addressed through the benchmarking 
system. This report was specifically interesting, as it propounded the foundation from which 
the benchmarking system was developed and also reflected the political position that the centre 
was considered to possess—two factors that had great influence in the future. 
“BEC will be a change agent in the construction sector. Through analyses, statistics and 
collaborations with actors from the sector, the centre will enhance a culture where 
benchmarking is used by the actors in the construction industry to base their demands to 
building products and professional building processes. Evaluation will secure 
transparency of the building product and hereby lead to healthy competition. 
[Benchmarking] will provide analytical foundation for studies of the productivity of the 
sector and contribute to solutions to the problems of the sector (Ibid.:19) 
Besides illuminating the influential position that BEC was considered to have, the report further 
revealed the first unambiguous diagnostic framing of the construction industry as having 
inexpedient competition conditions. This diagnosis accordingly entailed a prognostic framing 
of benchmarking as a technology that could provide a new “culture for statistics.” Further, 
Liliegreen revealed another instrumental purpose for benchmarking, which was of sectorial 
interest: The utilization of benchmarking to provide insight into the productivity development 
of the construction industry as a whole. The latter prognostic framing was in this way linked to 
the perception of benchmarking as a socially constructive technology, from which political 
solutions to the productivity issue of the construction industry could be qualified. The different 
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objectives of benchmarking suggested in the report accordingly led to multifarious instrumental 
purposes: 
‐ Benchmarking helps companies to identify weaknesses  
‐ Benchmarking generates best practices of the construction industry 
‐ Benchmarking creates transparency 
‐ Benchmarking generates knowledge about the performance development of the 
construction industry 
One thing was clear in Liliegreen’s preliminary proposal: The first version of the system was to 
be designed for measuring contractors. The long-term ambition was to include all actors in the 
construction industry in the benchmarking system: clients, consulting engineers, architects, and 
contractors. But the initial work was on developing a benchmarking system for contractors, and 
the KPIs that were considered to be most important for the development of the construction 
industry were:  
‐ Productivity  
‐ Profit performance 
‐ Compliance with time schedule 
‐ Compliance with budgets 
‐ Building failures and defects 
‐ User value 
‐ The client experience of the construction process 
‐ Architecture 
‐ Work environment 
‐ Environment (BEC, 2002:6)   
The report reflected a desire for constructing a motivational framing that embraced the interests 
of all stakeholders. This can be exemplified, as the report outlined how the benchmarking 
system could benefit a wide range of actors in different ways:  
Benchmarking helps clients and consumers, who wish to: 
‐ identify collaborators 
‐ measure their professionalism through the process and product performance 
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‐ know best practices in the sector to qualify the demand specifications for future 
building projects  
Benchmarking helps contractors, tradesmen, architects, and consulting engineers and others, 
who wish to: 
‐ market their competences through the system 
‐ analyze potential collaborators’ competences 
‐ use the system to analyze the efficiency of different management tools and 
collaboration models 
Benchmarking helps politicians, who wish to: 
‐ assess the development of the productivity of the sector 
‐ monitor the development of specific areas, such as work environment among leading 
companies 
‐ measure the efficiency of political tools and initiatives 
Benchmarking helps universities, who wish to: 
‐ identify best practices in the sector 
‐ gain statistics on a scientific basis in order to test hypothesis of building processes 
Benchmarking helps media and the public, who wish to: 
‐ follow the development of efficiency and quality in construction over time 
‐ follow certain large building and construction projects that invoke public attention 
Benchmarking helps professional organizations, such as trade unions, who wish to:  
‐ know best practices in the area of work environment (BEC, 2002:6) 
The broad motivational framing that considered a wide range of interests resulted in many 
different objectives that needed to be attended to by the future benchmarking system. The 
motivational framing accordingly required a concretizing of benchmarking that embraced 
several prognostic framings in order to accommodate the demands of all stakeholders. As it 
will be demonstrated, benchmarking became articulated into and concretized around all three 
prognostic framings presented in chapter 2 in the analysis.  
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BENCHMARKING AS A NORMALIZING GOVERNING TECHNOLOGY 
Firstly, benchmarking, through analysis and statistical coalitions, was expected to provide 
transparency of the performance in the construction industry, from which actors were 
facilitated to gain insight into the performance of building products and building processes. 
This objective for the benchmarking system reflected the previously mentioned prognostic 
framing of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology, which is based on an 
underlying expectation that the private market, with time, would conform to certain standards 
of products and processes, as clients and consumers became more qualified to make demands 
of their bidders.  
This prognostic framing of benchmarking reflected an interest in documenting different 
performance results of the end product, and the objective was clear: 
“These measures will generate transparency on the market in regards to the building as a 
product with different product qualities. This will contribute to a change in the 
competitive situation from competition on price to a multilateral competition” (BEC, 
2002:13). 
BENCHMARKING AS A SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Secondly, the BEC revealed an ambition for the benchmarking initiative that had been an 
ambition in Project House and in the Task Force report but had not been very explicit in the 
preliminary announcements from BEC to that point: Benchmarking was expected to contribute 
with analyses of the construction industry that were of societal interest. This ambition 
accordingly carried on the prognostic framing of benchmarking as a socially constructive 
technology.  
These analyses of the overall development of the construction industry were of great interest to 
Liliegreen (Interview, Curt Liliegreen, Jesper Rasmussen, and Michael H. Nielsen).  
“Beside the benchmarking system we are preparing the ground for the centre to conduct 
a broad spectrum of analysis areas regarding the conjunctures and market condition of 
the construction sector” (BEC, 2002d). 
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BEC was accordingly presented as not only a developer and operator of a benchmarking 
system, but likewise as a centre that conducted analyses of more societal interests. In this way, 
BEC attempted to widen the political ambitions for both the centre and the benchmarking 
initiative by positioning the centre as a legitimate and important provider of analyses of the 
construction industry as a whole. In this way, BEC attempted to undertake a political area of 
responsibility that had up until then been initiated and managed by the government. 
The differences between the two prognostic framings of benchmarking became clear, as the 
concretization in the benchmarking system called for a division of KPIs:  
“It will be proposed that KPIs are divided into two main categories: A) KPIs of 
significant interest for the individual parties in the construction process (e.g., the clients) 
and B) KPIs of a more general societal interest” (BEC, 2002b). 
BENCHMARKING AS A REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY 
The report “The Benchmarking System for Construction” revealed a third prognostic framing 
of benchmarking. This carried the benchmarking ambitions also presented in the Task Force 
report and Project House: “Benchmarking is a tool for companies to ‘learn best practices’” 
(BEC, 2002:14). This utilization of benchmarking characterized benchmarking as “process 
benchmarking,” providing a possibility for construction companies to gain insight into the 
processes that could lead them to superior performances. It was envisioned that companies 
profitably could establish “benchmarking clubs” in which they could exchange information and 
experiences.  
“[The establishment of benchmarking clubs] will bring about a greater interest in the 
system among companies” (BEC, 2002:14). 
The benchmarking system was accordingly presented in a prognostic framing that could 
facilitate a process where underperforming companies could learn how to achieve the same 
productivity as the best performing companies. This accordingly resembled the prognostic 
framing of benchmarking as a reflective development technology, which drew on the ambitions 
of facilitating best practices through detailed analysis and studies of the correlation between 
factors such as “efficiency of construction projects,” “the organization of the project,” 
“tendering characteristics,” “level of prefabrication,” “salary systems,” “geographical location,” 
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etc. (BEC, 2002). The system should facilitate construction companies in comparing 
themselves against competitors. This could provide the companies an indication of their market 
position and enable them to compare the performance across a number of construction projects. 
Whereas the two other prognostic framings reflected motivational framings that considered 
benefits for clients, politicians, and society, this prognostic framing considered the interests of 
private companies.  
“The stakeholders of this process evaluation are to a great extent those who are directly 
involved in the construction project: producers (like contractors and consulting 
engineers), the labor force and the client. The measures can be used to identify problems 
in the production and to derive best practices” (BEC, 2002:13). 
In this way, benchmarking was presented as a technology that enclosed interests of the full 
range of stakeholders in very different ways.  
As demonstrated, the coexistence of three rather different prognostic framings of benchmarking 
that had been present in both the Task Force report and Project House was carried on in the 
development of benchmarking under the auspices of BEC. These diversities of how to perceive 
the instrumental purposes and overall objectives of benchmarking were, however, not 
perceived as potentially contradictory or problematic but, on the contrary, were considered to 
be converging and interrelated in order to meet the overall expectation of attaining higher 
productivity: 
“Benchmarking identifies which problem areas are to be attended to and where learning 
from competitors is beneficial. Simultaneously, benchmarking generates transparency of 
the market. The measures produced by benchmarking can be published on a sectorial 
level and provide a detailed picture of the development of the overall performance of the 
industry” (BEC, 2002:5).  
Despite the rather detailed exposition of measures and definitions in the report, “The 
Benchmarking System for Construction,” it was stated that this preliminary suggestion to the 
benchmarking system was to be perceived as final:   
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“The [proposed] system must be discussed with the theme groups in BEC. After this 
discussion the system will be tested on a pilot project before it is ready for a more 
general deployment” (BEC, 2002:3). 
Thus, the report was to be considered a preliminary proposal for the concretizing of 
benchmarking and provided a sketch of the benchmarking system that reflected some 
introductory ideas and ambitions for benchmarking. The final version of the system was to be 
developed by the theme group “key performance indicators” consisting of practitioners from 
the construction industry.  
“It is important for us that practitioners from the sector put their fingerprints on this 
project. BEC has from the beginning been thought to be the construction industry’s 
centre and to manage the issues [of the industry] on the premises of companies. […] 
Above all benchmarking is a management tool and expresses the values in companies’ 
management. By participating in benchmarking, companies signal that they desire to 
serve their clients and become more efficient in managing their resources. This signal 
ought to be valued for any company management” (BEC, 2002:7).   
This statement reveals how BEC considered the support from the construction industry to be of 
great importance. By formulating a vision for benchmarking that could embrace both interests 
of private and public actors, BEC attempted to form benchmarking as a whole that, in its 
totality, could increase the productivity development of the construction industry. 
4.4.2 THE GOVERNMENT ENGAGES IN THE BENCHMARKING INITIATIVE 
An influential factor in the development of the benchmarking system was the release of a 
governmental report, “The state as construction client – growth and efficiency improvement of 
the construction industry” (da. Staten som bygherre – vækst og effektivisering i byggeriet) 
(Regeringen, 2003). As previous, the report concluded that the productivity development in the 
construction industry was unsatisfactory. With a particular interest in benchmarking, the report 
pointed at professionalizing state clients by creating better framework conditions and 
improving their qualifications, in order to facilitate their new role as change agents to influence 
the traditional distribution of roles and the lock-in situation. This was by no means reflective of 
a new governmental orientation of the construction policy. The new and important issue was 
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that, for the first time, benchmarking was directly articulated into the construction policy as a 
means to qualify clients in making demands to the companies in the construction industry. 
The report considered benchmarking to be a central element in changing the competition 
condition in the construction industry that was accused of being too narrowly focused on price 
and not sufficiently including quality as a competitive parameter. In line with BEC, the 
government found that the inexpedient competition was caused by a lack of transparency 
between price and quality, resulting in dysfunctional market forces. Benchmarking was 
articulated in a prognostic framing that could address this problem.  The prognostic framing 
was highly similar to the one of benchmarking as normalizing governing technology, 
qualifying clients in their selections of construction companies:  
“It is important to establish some consistent methods that documents experience from 
previous building projects, in order to provide clients a tool for selecting collaborators. 
In this way the clients have the possibility to take both price and quality into 
consideration” (Regeringen, 2003:13). 
With this objective, the government propounded two concrete initiatives for state building 
projects that could facilitate a more qualified selection of companies in the prequalification 
phase of state building projects. Firstly, contractors were required to hand in KPIs from 
previous projects in the prequalification that could be used by clients to assess their 
performance capabilities. Secondly, benchmarking of contractors participating in state building 
projects was to be mandatory (Regeringen, 2003). 
What makes these initiatives interesting was not the aim of using benchmarking as a selection 
tool for clients, as this had already been suggested in the Task Force report and implied by 
BEC. The interesting part is, on the other hand, that the governmental report was the first 
demonstration of a single and coherent prognostic framing of benchmarking that did not 
explicitly reflect a broad motivational framing. The expected outcome of benchmarking was 
isolated to an ambition of generating transparency of companies’ performances for the purpose 
of utilizing benchmarking in clients’ prequalification of contractors. The government was clear 
that this utilization of benchmarking relied on a carrot-and-stick approach:  
“Assessment of previously accomplished building projects, including KPIs from bidding 
companies, is a good tool for clients to select the best companies in the prequalification. 
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Such demands will benefit professional and efficient companies, whereas unprofessional 
actors are in a weaker position when the competition is relying on these quality 
parameters” (Regeringen, 2003:43). 
Not surprisingly, BEC was incorporated in the governmental vision for more transparency of 
the market by demanding KPIs on state building projects. It was clearly stated that the 
benchmarking system developed by BEC was to be used in this initiative.  
“BEC is developing a benchmarking system that can be used by clients and companies. 
The governmental system for gathering KPIs will be developed in collaboration with 
BEC” (Regeringen, 2003:43). 
It was further explicitly stated that state clients were expected to be highly involved and 
contributing to the development of the governmental benchmarking system and that the 
political manifestation of the initiative would be an executive order committing state clients to 
demand KPIs from bidding construction companies.  
With these legal requirements for benchmarking in state building activities, the government 
accordingly became an influential actor in the articulation of benchmarking as a means to 
provide a better foundation for clients to formulate demands and increase their qualifications in 
selecting collaborators based on their performance criteria. The governmental enforced 
utilization of benchmarking in state building projects accordingly entailed a strengthening of 
the prognostic framings of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology, as the 
governmental ambitions for benchmarking relied on changing the competition conditions 
through potential sanctions (deselection of bidders) and thus providing incentives for the 
market to adjust their products and processes in an accommodation to the performance criteria 
of clients.  
In January 2004 the executive order became effective. The governmental demand stated that 
state building projects exceeding DKK 5 million were to be evaluated by the benchmarking 
system developed by BEC. Further, it was a demand that from July 1, 2005, contractors had to 
hand in track records from benchmarking projects in order to bid on state building projects. The 
executive order entailed that contractors needed to hurry in order to bid on state building 
projects since a building project typically extended over at last one year (Erhvervsbladet, 2004; 
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Erhvervsbladet, 2004b). This regulative enforced implementation of the benchmarking system 
consisted of 14 KPIs and 40 supplementing data  about the building project.   
From the perspective of EBST (en. the Danish Enterprise and Housing Authority), the 
executive order had three purposes. Firstly, it provided a selection tool for clients that was a 
central element in the political ambition of strengthening the qualifications of clients and 
changing the competitive focus on price towards quality performance. Secondly, the executive 
order was to secure that the system would be disseminated to the private companies partly by 
prescribing benchmarking on state projects and partly by demanding KPIs from previous 
projects. Thirdly, the executive order was to generate an earning basis for BEC. It was evident 
from the beginning that the system had to rely on governmental demands that prescribed public 
clients to use the system. Without a governmental requirement for benchmarking, the BEC 
would have difficulties in disseminating the benchmarking system to the industry (Interview, 
Christian Lerche; Curt Liliegreen; Jørgen Nue Møller; Michael H. Nielsen; Peter Hesdorf). 
This was, from the beginning, a clear criterion for the dissemination of the system and likewise 
an important element in creating legitimacy for the centre, which otherwise would be highly 
challenged if the system were not realized on a larger scale.  
“[The success of the benchmarking system] required that it was rooted in an executive 
order or a law. There was no other way. Nobody thought that it could be realized in any 
other way. But it is important to remember that this all happened at a time where 
everybody believed in the idea of state clients as change agents, which was really ‘hot’ 
at that time” (Interview, Christian Lerche).  
In this way, EBST did not contribute directly to the establishment of the centre or to the 
development of the system, but the agency did indeed contribute indirectly by providing an 
earning base for the centre consisting of state projects and the necessity for contractors to attain 
KPIs in order to bid on state building projects.   
The strong interdependence between the two actors, BEC and EBST, was manifested by the 
executive orders. As a consequence, a strong argumentation for disseminating the system to the 
private market was constructed by providing this regulative incentive for contractors to engage 
in benchmarking. The basis for the future institutionalization of the benchmarking system was 
accordingly based on a coercive production and utilization of benchmarking, which BEC in the 
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It was an appertaining expectation that the private market would follow and request 
benchmarking of private building projects. 
“Private companies will be pressured to be open about their grades. The pressure will be 
generated partly by the company stakeholders, who have an interest in a good market 
position and partly by clients who want to be certain that they choose the best 
contractors” (Liliegreen, Ingeniøren, 2003) 
“The benefits are clear: Those who meet the demands will get preferential position in 
the competitive biddings in Danish state building projects […] This type of 
benchmarking is about making bad companies good. We do not wish to flunk anyone. 
The system will be used to make everybody better: clients, contractors and medium-
sized craft firms” (Liliegreen, Berlingske.dk, 2003). 
At the annual meeting it was emphasized that the system was based on the premises of the 
construction industry and BEC had more than 100 persons and a large number of trade 
associations involved in the development of the system (Berlingske Tidende, 2003; 
Berlingske.dk, 2003). 
“It has been of highest priority for us to develop a system in a close dialog with actors 
from the construction industry. It is vital that this system is not perceived as an extra 
administrative burden. The acceptance from the industry is crucial. The benchmarking 
system is a part of a political development towards more dialog and understanding 
between the government and the private market as well as between the different parties 
in the construction industry” (Liliegreen, Berlingske.dk, 2003). 
Despite BEC’s clear enrollment in the governmental prognostic framing of benchmarking, the 
executive order was not without implications for the other ambitions propounded by Liliegreen:  
“The executive order was presented to the board of directors in May 2003. At that time 
it was not clear to us that it requested that benchmarking was to be conducted on 
contracts [instead of building projects]. The information we got was that the future 
executive order entailed that benchmarking would be demanded on state building 
projects and that bidders should have KPIs for their performance. It was also announced 
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that bidders should hand in KPIs from previous completed projects” (Interview, 
Liliegreen). 
This had practical consequences for purposes of using benchmarking to extract knowledge on a 
project level. One consequence was that in order for companies to bid on state projects they 
needed to obtain KPIs from contracts that in most cases were not subject to the legal 
requirements. These KPIs accordingly did not include entire projects since they potentially only 
covered one of many contracts of the project.  
“As a consequence you do not have sufficiently information about the totality of the 
project, and accordingly you must question what kind of knowledge you are able to 
extract. If all you have is a contract on masonry you simultaneously spoil some of the 
knowledge about this contract, since the performance on the contract level are affected 
by the overall time schedule, the project design, the client, consulting engineer, etc.” 
(Interview, Liliegreen)  
The governmental involvement in benchmarking gave rise to a contradictory aspect of the 
preliminary prognostic framings, as the executive orders’ requirement for conducting 
benchmarking on contracts accordingly entailed consequences for Liliegreen’s ambition of 
using benchmarking to extract knowledge about the correlations between the overall 
performances of building projects and the processes used during the execution of the project. 
These correlations were considered to be a prerequisite in using benchmarking as reflective 
development technology, as the extraction of best practices and identification of problem areas 
was highly reliant on the correlation between the overall project performance, project 
characteristics, and the processes applied in the project. Accordingly, the governmental 
intrusion in the design of the benchmarking system was the first concrete example of how the 
institutionalization of benchmarking was being complicated as one clear political interest was 
counteracting other instrumental purposes and objectives for the benchmarking initiative. These 
contradictory interests in the institutionalization of benchmarking became clear, as Liliegreen 
outlined the consequences of the executive orders: 
“I had to sacrifice some of my ambitions with the system. The system was partly linked 
up to the Lean concept. Some of the things I would like to register about time flows and 
time consumptions, barriers and hurdles had to be taken out in order to have a 
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reasonable reporting burden. So the system which was originally intended to include the 
newest development trends in construction was reduced a great deal as a consequence of 
the executive order” (Interview, Liliegreen). 
“Now I was not only to translate the English system into a real system. I was to 
construct a far more complex system in order to gather data on the contract level…This 
also entailed that the system consisting of 102 KPIs needed to be divided” (Interview, 
Liliegreen). 
Accordingly, the executive orders resulted in several modifications of the preliminary 
benchmarking system.  
The modified benchmarking system was presented in October 2003 at BEC’s annual meeting. 
As indicated by Liliegreen in the above quotation, a main change was that the system was now 
divided into two packages: 1) A basic package consisting of 14 KPIs about appliance to time 
schedule, defects, work environment, profit performance, efficiency, price, and client 
satisfaction. This package accordingly accommodated the governmental interest in 
benchmarking as normalizing governing technology, as the package fulfilled the requirements 
of the executive order, and simultaneously kept the report burden down to a minimum, which 
was a governmental requirement (Berlingske.dk, 2003).  
What does the basic package of the benchmarking system consist of? 
The basic package focuses especially on eight areas of importance: 
Focus area for the KPI Number of 
KPIs 
Time – compliance with time schedule 
‐ Deviation from planned and actual execution time 
‐ Deviation from planned and actual execution time until completion of 
registered building defects 
‐ Execution time 
3 
Quality – building defects 
‐ Repair of defects in the first year after the handing over process 
‐ Registered amount of defects in the handing over process 
‐ These defects are categorized according to their severity 
2 
 
Work accidents 
‐ Accident frequency  1 
Profit performance 
‐ Contribution ratio 
‐ Contribution ratio per work hour 
‐ Contribution ratio per kroner in salary 
3 
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Effectiveness 
‐ Work hours per m2 
‐ Productivity of labor, meaning value increase compared to the labor 
efforts 
2 
Price 
‐ Changes in the project price during execution 
‐ Price level in kroner per m2 
2 
Customer satisfaction 
‐ Measurements of the client’s priorities 
‐ Measurements of the client’s satisfaction on individual areas 
The measures are added up to one KPI 
1 
Architecture Yet not 
applicable  
Total sum of KPIs 14 
Table 5: Overview of the content of the basic package (from BEC, 2003) 
2) An extended package consisting of an additional 28 KPIs which offered a more 
comprehensive evaluation of the building project—e.g., for research-related purposes 
(Interview, Liliegreen).  
The extended package accommodated the ambitions of using benchmarking as a reflective 
development technology, as this package was presented as a tool for companies to identify 
“best practice” (Berlingske.dk, 2003). However, having an extended package that was not 
mandatory in state building projects accordingly entailed that the dissemination of this package 
relied on companies’ self-imposed motivation to engage in this extended benchmarking 
initiative. The extended package never obtained the interest among construction companies, 
and accordingly, the benchmarking system quickly became synonymous with the basic 
package. 
The division of  KPIs into two packages was a political compromise that was made in order to 
both meet the requirements of the executive orders and to maintain the prognostic framing of 
benchmarking as reflective development technology, from which companies could identify 
weaknesses and improve performances on a voluntarily basis. The ambition of propounding 
benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology that should be disseminated by 
regulatory means entailed that Liliegreen needed to cut off a large amount of the mandatory 
reporting burden, as the government either did not share the ambitions of utilizing 
benchmarking as a reflective development technology or considered that the reporting burden 
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in the preliminary proposal developed by BEC was too heavy to be mandatory in all state 
building projects.  
The dissemination strategy of the benchmarking initiative became increasingly identical with 
the regulatory interests that EBST prepared the ground for. In this way, Liliegreen 
demonstrated that BEC was in alignment with the perception of benchmarking as a normalizing 
governing technology that could change the construction industry through demands from 
clients. This entailed that the instrumental purposes and overall objectives of benchmarking in 
these years became synonymous with generating transparency and changing the competition 
conditions of the construction industry: 
“The lacking transparency of the market result in discount buildings caused by the 
inexpedient competition on price exclusively” (Liliegreen, Berlingske Tidende, 2003).  
 “The benchmarking system is not only a track record but a system that facilitates an 
overall improvement of the construction sector. Companies are provided an opportunity 
to look into competitors’ performance, but the information will be anonymized. This 
will generate a much more qualified competition” (Liliegreen, Berlingske Tidende, 
2003).  
The calculated and explicitly strategic orientation towards an increasing strengthening of 
benchmarking as normalizing governing technology became evident, as Liliegreen, on several 
occasions, expressed the instrumental purposes and objectives of benchmarking in the media. 
The first example of the increased focus on transparency, change of the competition and 
utilization of benchmarking in clients’ selection of contractors in the prequalification, emerged 
as Liliegreen commented on the first conducted evaluation of a contracting company, John 
Josefsen Aps.  
“The fact that it is a small contract shows that the benchmarking system is not only 
designed for large contracting companies. The small- and medium-sized companies are 
also provided the opportunity to increase their market competiveness by obtaining a 
track record. They will automatically do so because the track record will constitute the 
tool that the sensible client will make use of when he selects the contractors to work for 
him” (Liliegreen, 123).  
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In an article about work environment and work accidents, Liliegreen crystallized the 
normalizing effect that was expected to be generated by the system: 
“How have the companies reacted to the grade book that they are forced to hand in and 
which is also published to clients when they wish to do state building projects? 
[Answer:] Contactors, clients and other companies have been positive, because actors in 
the construction industry have a common interest in bringing down the number of 
accidents. Simultaneously, it is important that the state lead the way and motivates 
construction companies to get a better working environment. For this we use the grade 
book as carrot for companies so they can understand that a good working environment 
pay off” (Liliegreen, JydskeVestkysten, 2005). 
In September 2004 a newspaper did a profile of the managing director of BEC that contained 
several statements from Liliegreen that supported this prognostic framing of benchmarking as a 
transparency generating selection tool that could provide incentives to change the competition 
conditions of the construction industry:  
“The companies that either cheat or act neglectfully will obviously not get good KPIs. 
As a consequence it will be hard for them to win building projects for the state. This is 
the consequence, and I am fine with it. In order to improve the construction industry, we 
need to get rid of these unserious companies—the cowboys of construction—who stiffly 
compete on the price at the expense of everything else” (Liliegreen, Erhvervsbladet, 
2004e). 
The normalizing effects of benchmarking and incentive to change the competition were further 
outlined by Liliegreen in another newspaper article: 
“Our registration and measuring of different areas will entail that these areas are brought 
into focus and that inexpediencies will be corrected. It is both in the end user’s and the 
construction sector’s interest that this evaluation takes place. In order for the companies 
to sell their products, they have to hand them in without building failures of defects. 
And when they are made aware of their problems, they are provided the opportunity to 
correct them” (Liliegreen, 142). 
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The prognostic framing that was being highly promoted by both BEC and EBST was based on 
a central prerequisite: Clients had to use track records in their selection of contractors in the 
prequalification process in order to generate any normalizing effects. Only by creating a 
widespread perception among contractors of the interrelation between insufficient track records 
and competitive position in prequalifications would it be possible to effectuate the desired 
normalizing effects of benchmarking. Clients’ acceptance and acknowledgement of utilizing 
benchmarking as a selection tool in the prequalification of contractors was accordingly a 
prerequisite for changing the focus on price by including quality as competitive parameter were 
preconditions for the system to motivate contractors to accommodate their behavior in 
correspondence to achieving good performance results. This further necessitated that clients 
were equally interested and qualified in changing their hitherto traditional practices in the 
prequalification, which were partly to be generated by the demands to clients in the 
governmental report’ “The State as Construction Client” (da. Staten som Bygherre) 
(Regeringen, 2003).  
During BEC’s initial attempts to disseminate the perception of benchmarking as a normalizing 
governing technology, EBST actively incorporated and supported the strategic orientation in 
the agency’s construction political ambitions by enhancing BEC as a central and vital actor in 
providing the requested transparency of construction companies’ quality performances. This 
support is exemplified below in a newspaper article where the vice director of EBST stated: 
“The competition in the construction industry has been highly focused on price, and the 
quality has not always been clear to the client. The competition does not work as in 
other trades, as companies with a bad quality performance are not naturally excluded 
from the market. The use of KPIs and track records will change this, since these are 
good standards of reference of the construction companies. The gathering of KPIs is 
therefore central in the government’s construction policy” (Henning Steensig, 
JyllandsPosten, 2005) 
Despite that the imposed regulatory dissemination of benchmarking resulted in challenges in 
managing and advancing the use of benchmarking as a reflective development technology, 
Liliegreen did not reject the utilization of the system to derive best practices: 
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“It is pivotal for me that the benchmarking system identifies of companies’ weaknesses, 
identify the causes to these and thus provide companies the foundation to subsequently 
work on improvements. This has to be done by the companies in order to compete on 
these conditions” (Liliegreen, Erhvervsbladet, 2004e). 
The statement reveals how BEC was not either ready to or interested in generating one unifying 
and coherent strategic orientation for the development and dissemination of benchmarking, by 
focusing only on benchmarking as normalizing governing technology. This motivation for 
maintaining the prognostic framing of benchmarking as a reflective development technology 
was likely a consequence of the continuing political balancing of interests that took place in 
BEC. The abolishment of the prognostic framing of benchmarking as normalizing governing 
technology was not unproblematic, as several board members had attained support to engage in 
BEC by advocating the benefits their member companies could gain from the benchmarking 
initiative. This is demonstrated in the below quotation from the managing director of Dansk 
Byggeri:  
“We have succeeded in developing a simple and readily available system which can 
generate the requisite results without many difficulties. But the KPIs produced by BEC 
are not only to benefit clients. They are to an equal extend to benefit companies as a tool 
for learning about their strengths and weaknesses” (Jens Klarskov, Berlingske.dk, 2003). 
Half a year after the effectuation of the executive order 350 building projects was registered at 
BEC representing more than 4% of the national sum of contracts. The benchmarking system 
was appointed a success in the press, and Liliegreen pointed at the executive orders as a 
contributory cause for companies to register projects for evaluation (Erhvervsbladet, 2004d). 
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4.5 BENCHMARKING BECOMING AN INFLUENTIAL ACTOR IN THE POLITICAL 
DEBATE 
The previous chapter demonstrated how benchmarking was concretized into a benchmarking 
system and articulated to address several diagnostic framings of the construction industry.  
This chapter is about the operationalization of benchmarking. It will be revealed how the 
concretizing and implementation of benchmarking gave rise to reactions from different actors 
with different and diverse interests in the benchmarking initiative. In this way, it will be argued 
that during the implementation of benchmarking in the construction industry, political 
struggles emerged as actors expressed political interests in different prognostic framings and 
simultaneously attempted to delegitimize prognostic framings that they were not supportive of.   
The chapter accordingly reveals how some actors considered a lack of a balanced handling of 
interests in the institutionalization of benchmarking and thus did not consider themselves 
sufficiently included in the prevalent motivational framing. As a result, actors invested 
resources in attempts to shape the institutionalization of benchmarking. During its 
implementation, benchmarking induced a political arena that entailed political struggles 
between different actors. It will be demonstrated how new actors became politically engaged in 
the institutionalization and attempted to influence the prognostic framings of benchmarking. 
The institutionalization of benchmarking became highly dependent on the content and 
resources put into these political struggles. Throughout this chapter, it will be demonstrated 
how three political struggles emerged and challenged or reconfigured the diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational framings.  
The first political struggle took place as a professional association for social housing clients 
and the Ministry of Social Affairs reacted to the prospect of including social housing building 
projects in the regulative dissemination of benchmarking through executive orders. The result 
of these struggles was a strengthening of benchmarking as a normalizing governing 
technology. 
The second political struggle emerged as contractors interpreted the potential consequences of 
the system and accordingly opposed the propounded strategic orientation of the 
institutionalization of benchmarking. The political struggle resulted in political debates in 
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BEC, as the professional associations carried the critique of their members into the discussions 
of the board of BEC.   
A third political struggle threatening the justification for benchmarking’s legitimate existence 
emerged as consulting engineers and architects were prospected to be subjected to the 
benchmarking initiative. Again private construction companies were facilitating their political 
influence by bringing their requirements and criticism into the board of BEC through their 
respective professional associations.  
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4.5.1 BENCHMARKING SOCIAL HOUSING BUILDING PROJECTS 
In 2007 an executive order for implementing the benchmarking system in the social housing 
sector became effective. The process of disseminating the benchmarking system to this part of 
the public construction activities had implications for the preliminary configuration of 
framings. The inclusion of social housing prompted actors from this sector to challenge certain 
objectives and contents of the benchmarking system in attempts to adjust the 
institutionalization to accommodate demands for benchmarking the social housing sector.  
The traditional dissemination strategy of construction political initiatives from the previous 
Ministry of Housing was to implement a political initiative by dividing the dissemination into 
three phases. First, initiatives were enforced in state construction. As the initiative was tested 
and implemented, the next step was to disseminate the initiative to social housing. The 
inclusion of the social housing sector was considered to be an important factor in penetrating 
the market since the volume of these projects exceeded the activities in state construction 
multiple times. The third and last step was the inclusion of the private market, as these actors 
voluntarily would engage in the initiative. The implementation of the initiative in state and 
social housing projects was thought to have the effect of making the private sector familiar with 
the initiative and revealing potential benefits of the initiative for companies. The rationale was 
that it eventually would penetrate as a common practice and thus spread to private construction 
projects on a more voluntary basis (Interview, Jørgen Nue Møller; Ib Steen Olsen; Karsten 
Gullach; Jesper Rasmussen; and Peter Hesdorf). The traditional dissemination strategy 
accordingly reflected a political ambition of generating changes in the construction industry by 
starting up with a regulative dissemination strategy of new structures that eventually would 
penetrate as both normative and cultural-cognitive guidelines for rational behavior in the 
construction industry.  
After the effectuation of the executive order, a process started in EBST with the initial 
consideration of implementing the system in the social housing sector. But as a consequence of 
a ministerial reorganization, social housing was moved away from EBST and placed in the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. Consequently, the construction political decisions that involved both 
state and social housing building projects had to be arranged in a collaboration between the two 
ministries.  
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Due to the traditional dissemination strategy of construction political initiatives, it was evident 
that the benchmarking system, at some point, was thought to embrace the social housing sector 
(SBi, 2005). But the above-mentioned traditional model for disseminating construction political 
initiatives was threatened as the Ministry of Social Affairs was not to the same extent as was 
previously politically obliged to carry on implemented political initiatives in state building 
projects to the social housing sector. But in spite of the more politically independent role of the 
social housing sector in the construction policy, the Ministry of Social Affairs was willing to 
implement the benchmarking system. According to Jesper Rasmussen (Interview), former vice 
director of EBST, this political choice was by no means obvious but should be ascribed a 
personal and historical interest in maintaining the traditional model for disseminating political 
initiatives to the construction industry.  
A close collaboration and verbal agreements prior to the moving of the social housing policy 
entailed that the director of the construction committee in the Ministry of Social Affairs, Frank 
Bundgaard, chose to implement the system in the social housing sector (Interview, Jesper 
Rasmussen). But the implementation was not without implications. Gert Nielsen, who was 
managing director of the powerful and politically influential BL (National Housing 
Association), embracing nearly all social housing organizations in Denmark, resisted an 
implementation of the existing benchmarking system in the social housing sector (Interview, 
Jesper Rasmussen).  
 “It was evident that there were opposite perceptions of whether the system implemented 
in state construction would provide value for the social housing sector. Accordingly, a 
negotiation process between Curt Liliegreen and Gert Nielsen from BL took place” 
(Interview, Karsten Gullach).  
Accordingly, supported by Nykredits Fond and initiated by BL and a large number of clients 
from the social housing sector, a development of a benchmarking system specifically 
addressing the social housing sector took place in the beginning of 2004 and was carried out by 
SBi. The suggested system was concluded in the report, “Benchmarking system for social 
housing building projects” (da. Nøgletalssystem for boligbebyggelser) (SBi, 2005), which was 
a politically motivated response to the benchmarking system implemented in state construction.  
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“The social housing sector agrees on the intention to strengthen the quality and 
efficiency in construction and also wishes to participate in developing a well-
functioning evaluation system” (SBi, 2005:8).  
The proposed system had five main objectives:  
‐ The system should accommodate the needs of the social housing clients, facility 
managers, and end users of the building. 
‐ It should provide an assessment of the quality of the building. 
‐ The system should be based on total openness and transparency in a digitalized form, 
which could be presented on the Internet.   
‐ 70% of the registration requirements should be reused from existing registers. 
‐ The administrative burden for social housing organizations and private parties from the 
construction industry was not to be increased by the implementation of the system. 
(SBi, 2005:5) 
The motivation for these actors to engage in a development of a benchmarking system for the 
social housing sector was illuminated by the below-mentioned quotation: 
“Total transparency is a central element in [the proposed benchmarking system]. This 
entails that all data, benchmarking and conclusions that inform about best practices will 
be public available. This will be further strengthened by an active utilization of the KPIs 
and an establishment of a public available website. Another central element in the 
system is reuse of information from existing registration systems, since the majority of 
the information in the proposed system are information from existing registers. This will 
reduce the costs for gathering information to the system” (SBi, 2005:5). 
This quotation illuminates the motivational framing that prompted the actors to develop a 
system for the social housing sector. The motivational framing was based on the social housing 
sector’s historical ambition of total transparency of the data reported into the social housing 
reporting system, BOSSINF. BOSSINF was an administrative reporting system that had been 
used for several years by clients of social housing building projects to report project 
information. With the proposed benchmarking system, BL and the Ministry of Social Affairs 
advocated a prognostic framing of benchmarking that to a greater extent than previously 
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supported transparency, whereas BEC was more cautious about making company specific data 
public available. 
Further, the response from BL and the Ministry of Housing revealed how actors from the social 
housing sector were interested in reusing data that was already reported into BOSSINF, and 
with the proposed benchmarking system, the actors sought to reduce the reporting burden of the 
benchmarking system by incorporating data from BOSSINF into the benchmarking system. 
This represented an interest in reducing the administrative burden of the benchmarking system 
used in state construction and potentially threatened the ambitions of utilizing benchmarking to 
conduct in-depth analyses of societal interests, as the suggested benchmarking system would 
entail inconsistency of data used to gain insight into the correlations between productivity, 
building project characteristics, performances, or other. If the social housing sector succeeded 
in establishing a benchmarking system that relied on data from BOSSINF, it would minimize 
the possibilities to conduct analyses across state and social housing building projects, as the 
data from these would not be identical. The inclusion of the social housing sector could 
accordingly threaten the utilization of benchmarking as a socially constructive technology, as 
overall analyses of the construction industry relied on consistent data from building projects.  
In December 2005 the Ministry of Social Affairs sent out a preliminary proposal for an 
executive order that incorporated benchmarking in the future social housing building projects7. 
It was evident that the proposal had several similarities with the proposed system in the SBi 
report. The proposal caused BEC and several board members of BEC to raise three points of 
criticism that they considered to counteract their interests in BEC and the institutionalization of 
benchmarking.  
Firstly, one of the bones of contention was the prospect of incorporating the benchmarking 
system in the existing registration system, BOSSINF, which was a clear request for 
implementing benchmarking in the social housing sector: 
“It is no secret that we want a very efficient system. We already have an administrative 
control system for public funded construction, so it is just a matter of putting some extra 
data into the system. The system practically already exists” (Frank Bundgaard, 
Erhvervsbladet, 2006a). 
                                                 
7 Hearing statement available from: https://bdkv2.borger.dk/Lovgivning/Hoeringsportalen/Sider/Soeg.aspx/ 
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BOSSINF was considered a ministerially supported competitor to BEC entailing unfair 
competition on the market for benchmarking building projects (hearing statement BEC and 
hearing statement ByggematerialeIndustrien, Danske Ark, Dansk Byggeri and F.R.I.8). The 
proposal for the executive order prepared the ground for social housing clients to report data 
into BOSSINF, which were subsequently published by The Danish Building Defects Fund (da. 
Byggeskadefonden). This constellation of the reporting and publication process was considered 
to constitute a competing benchmarking operator, as the functions of BEC were thus obviated 
in benchmarking social housing building projects.  
“We are surprised to ascertain that the Ministry of Social Affairs prepares the ground for 
a governmental investment in expanding BOSSINF so that this system cost free for 
companies can generate KPIs. This will result in a potential fatal competition for BEC, 
which we have established by request of the government. […] This will entail that it is 
unlikely that contractors or small handcraft companies voluntarily choose BEC to 
benchmark private projects or project for municipalities for payment. Today the non-
governmental supported projects represent 80% of the projects benchmarked by BEC. In 
this way BEC can end up being economical affected by the proposal from the Ministry 
of Social Affairs” (Appendix B – in Danish). 
These reactions forced the Ministry of Social Affairs to respond: 
“We do not design a competing system. On contrary we seek to make the two things 
interact. The system we suggest does not produce track records. Therefore the system 
will not offer a free service of this product” (Frank Bundgaard, Jyllands-Posten, 2006). 
Supported by the professional associations, the second point of criticism was raised in BEC’s 
hearing statement to the proposed executive order. An explicit ambition in the executive order 
was high parallelism between the executive order for benchmarking state building projects and 
the executive order for benchmarking social housing building projects—but with respect for the 
special conditions relating to social housing building projects. BOSSINF were to be expanded 
so the system consisted of the data necessary to generate the needed KPIs (hearing statement 
BEC). The definitions of the KPIs were to be identical or compatible with those collected in 
state building projects (hearing statement BEC; hearing statement ByggematerialeIndustrien, 
                                                 
8 Hearing statement available from: https://bdkv2.borger.dk/Lovgivning/Hoeringsportalen/Sider/Soeg.aspx/ 
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Danske Ark, Dansk Byggeri and F.R.I.). But in BEC’s hearing statement a concern of this 
ambition was put forward: Although the definitions of the KPIs were identical, the system 
would not generate the KPIs on the same premises as conducted by BEC since the calculations 
relied on a number of individual choices that were not defined in the executive orders. 
Consequently, the benchmarking conducted by BEC and the benchmarking conducted by the 
social housing sector triggered a discussion of whether the implementation of the 
benchmarking system would result in two separate systems that did not produce comparable 
KPIs, and accordingly generated challenges in maintaining a consistent benchmarking process 
(hearing statement BEC).   
This critique was also in the press, as Christian Lerche from Danske Ark stated: 
“We highly support that KPIs are used widely in the construction industry, and we 
therefore have an interest in disseminating the use of KPIs. But we are also strongly 
opposing multiple designs of benchmarking systems in a small country like Denmark” 
(Christian Lerche, Erhvervsbladet, 2006a). 
The suggested process of gathering data in social housing also deviated from the one in state 
construction, as it was proposed that clients reported the information to BOSSINF and 
accordingly had to request all of the information to the benchmarking system from the 
contractors and subcontractors affiliated with the project. This reporting procedure was 
considered to generate potential consequences for the validity of the data reported to the 
system:  
“It can affect the reporting process when the contractor knows that all information is 
presented to the client. In the worst case scenario, the respondent can choose to report 
incorrect information, because he does not wish that the client is provided detailed 
knowledge about the company’s internal conditions. This scenario is avoided when 
using an impartial evaluator” (BEC hearing statement). 
Accordingly, the benchmarking system faced a utilization challenge, as the suggested system 
for social housing building projects was considered to influence a central precondition for any 
of the three prognostic framings of benchmarking: comparisons of data. Such comparisons rely 
on accuracy and consistency of the handling and calculation of data. 
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The third point of criticism was about the publication of the KPIs. The Ministry of Social 
Affairs was very intent on publishing the benchmarking results, which was conventional in the 
social housing sector. This issue was controversial as several actors from the private market 
opposed the idea of a publicly available database consisting of company-specific information 
from their member companies (Interview, Karsten Gullach).  
“BEC ascertains that all information in BOSSINF is publicly available, thus the 
considerations of confidentiality in the system for state construction will not be 
maintained in the benchmarking scheme for social housing” (hearing statement BEC). 
The prospect of publishing KPIs on The Danish Building Defects Fund’s web page accordingly 
entailed a concern of providing confidentiality of companies’ individual conditions and 
company-specific information (hearing statement BEC). Total transparency of all reported 
information in the benchmarking system was partly requested by the social housing sector as 
BL advocated for making the most possible knowledge about public funds available to the 
public. But total transparency was simultaneously requested in order to strengthen the 
utilization of benchmarking as a selection tool for clients, as this was considered essential for 
providing the best foundation for clients to use the benchmarking system for selecting 
contractors (SBi, 2005). This prerequisite thus entailed a contradictory aspect of benchmarking, 
as confidentiality considerations in the benchmarking system for state construction was made in 
order to secure that companies had sufficient incentives to engage in benchmarking on a 
voluntary basis. Total transparency was accordingly considered to obstructing companies’ 
voluntary engagement in conducting benchmarking. 
After the critical hearing statements, the Ministry of Social Affairs initiated a co-ordination 
committee in order to cope with the critique. And in March 2007 the Ministry of Social Affairs 
presented the executive order for benchmarking the social housing sector9. The executive order 
had a much higher similarity to the one on state construction and reflected a political 
negotiation that did not compromise the consistency of data maintained in a coherent 
governmental interpretation of the instrumental purposes and objectives of benchmarking. In 
this way, the inclusion of the social housing sector successfully maintained and strengthened 
the prognostic framing of benchmarking as normalizing governing technology and additionally 
                                                 
9   The executive order can be found at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=20821 
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did not compromise the utilization of benchmarking in providing socially constructive analyses 
of productivity, as the data was consistent for state and social housing building projects.  
BEC’s satisfaction with the inclusion of the social housing sector in the benchmarking initiative 
without compromising the preliminary institutionalization of benchmarking and still 
maintaining BEC as a benchmarking operator for social housing was clearly stated by the vice 
director of BEC in a newspaper article: 
“It is an important step for benchmarking that all large social housing building projects 
are now going to be evaluated in the future. For BEC this entails that our annually 
production is tripled from 400 evaluations to approximately 1200 evaluations a year.” 
(Peter Hesdorf, Licitationen, 2007b). 
A small compromise in the political negotiations was, however, an outcome of the inclusion of 
the social housing sector: 
“The data collection in social housing building projects is a little different than it has 
been on other building projects that have been evaluated by the centre. This is because 
the social housing sector already reports data that can be used for benchmarking. Such 
data will of course be used as much as possible to avoid duplication of work” (Peter 
Hesdorf, Licitationen, 2007b). 
As demonstrated, the inclusion of the social housing sector gave rise to political struggles and 
was not without implications. However, the modifications of the institutionalization were kept 
to a minimum as political struggles with actors from the social housing sector had to be 
managed and politically negotiated. As a result, the dissemination of the benchmarking 
initiative reflected a strengthening of disseminating benchmarking as a normalizing governing 
technology, providing increased transparency of contractors’ performances and spreading the 
utilization of track records as selection tool for state and social housing clients. In this way, the 
regulatory dissemination of benchmarking was strengthened, as the incentives for private 
companies to pursue good KPIs for enhanced competitive positions in future prequalifications 
were increased. 
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4.5.2 CONTRACTORS RESPOND TO BENCHMARKING 
In April 2004, shortly after the effectuation of the executive order for benchmarking in state 
building projects, benchmarking faced the first critique from the contractors. This critique was 
particularly interesting, as it revealed some of the pragmatism that was prevalent and 
considered necessary in order to institutionalize benchmarking in the construction industry. 
The critique was about the extent of the system and was raised by the two trade associations: 
Dansk Byggeri and Tekniq. On request from small- and medium-sized contractors, these two 
professional associations opposed the minimum limit for when contracts were to be included in 
the executive order. The critique was accordingly about the administrative burden of the 
benchmarking system (Erhvervsbladet, 2004a).  The administrative burden was exemplified by 
the contractor company, A/S Julius Nielsen & Søn, who clearly expressed an overall 
discontentedness of being subjected to benchmarking and the time consumption required in 
reporting to the benchmarking system:  
“If I as a general contractor use one hour to report information, 20 other companies 
conducting the individual trade contracts need to do so as well. This system has been 
fobbed off on us. Therefore I also wonder why we are also requested to pay DKK 
10,000 to BEC for the evaluation” (Jan Lindgaard, A/S Julius Nielsen & Søn, 
Erhvervsbladet, 2004b). 
The critique was a clear response to the regulatory advancement of the benchmarking system 
that contractors perceived as an unjust administrative burden. The critique was controversial, as 
BEC found it crucial for the acceptance of the system that the perception of the system as an 
administrative burden did not occur, as the system was designed on the premises of the market 
and was to benefit the participants (BEC, 2002). Thus this critique became an issue for EBST 
to handle since they were responsible for this regulatory advancement of the system through 
executive orders. Accordingly, EBST minimized the proportions of the executive order. The 
governmental demand for evaluation discarded companies with less than ten employees—
equaling 22.000 out of 26.400 construction companies (83%) on the Danish market 
(Erhvervsbladet, 2004c; Berlingske Tidendes Nyhedsmagasin, 2004).  
This example provides decisive insight into how the interests of private companies were taken 
into consideration and how the private market was provided a political position to gain 
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influence on the institutionalization by exploiting the ambition of achieving acceptance of 
benchmarking from private actors.  
During the first years of the operational phase of the benchmarking system three central events 
took place that constituted potential threats to the institutionalization of the benchmarking 
system. It will be demonstrated how these three events ended up partly influencing the 
configuration of the prognostic framings of benchmarking and partly motivated contractors to 
consolidate their interests in attempts to reject or delegitimize other actors’ attempts to promote 
prognostic framings of benchmarking. In the following, these three events will be unfolded 
together with a discussion of how political struggles entailed consequences for the 
institutionalization of benchmarking.  
The first event was constituted by a reaction from two professional associations that actively 
attempted to challenge the prognostic framing of benchmarking as normalizing governing 
technology by questioning whether benchmarking was actually used as a selection tool in 
prequalification processes. The second event was a reaction from a contractor who opposed 
benchmarking of some of their projects. It will be argued that this potentially threatened the 
applicability of the benchmarking system as a selection tool for clients and its ability to provide 
accurate transparency of performance. The third event was caused by BEC’s attempts to 
advance benchmarking as a socially constructive technology through analyses of the 
construction industry. The results from these analyses prompted actors from the private market 
to respond and question the conclusions of the analyses.  
DELEGITIMIZING BENCHMARKING AS A SELECTION TOOL FOR CLIENTS 
The prognostic framing of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology was 
conditional on a functioning interplay between the regulative dissemination strategy 
represented by the executive order and contracting companies’ normative conformity to the 
measures. As earlier described, it was a prerequisite that contractors perceived that track 
records were utilized in assessments of their performances. This prerequisite was, however, 
challenged as two professional associations represented in the board of directors of BEC, 
Danske Ark and Dansk Byggeri, criticized the benchmarking initiative in October 2006. The 
critique constituted a political struggle as the two actors characterized the benchmarking 
initiative as an unnecessary administrative burden for contracting companies since these 
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companies did not experience an equal engagement from clients to use the system in the 
prequalification process (Børsen, 2006). Danske Ark and Dansk Byggeri accordingly attempted 
to delegitimize the prognostic framing of benchmarking as a technology that provided clients a 
foundation for a more qualified selection of contractors based on their performances.  
The raised critique can be regarded as a politically motivated response to the institutional 
environment that benchmarking made contractors subjects to. Dansk Byggeri and Danske Ark 
attempted to reconfigure the prognostic framings of benchmarking by advancing arguments 
that delegitimized one of the central ambitions for benchmarking: qualifying clients in selecting 
contractors by providing them transparent information on the correlation between contractors’ 
price, quality, and performance.  
With an underlying interest in weakening this prognostic framing, the two associations 
attempted to establish a political discussion that questioned and could potentially threaten 
BEC’s and EBST’s attempts to institutionalize benchmarking as normalizing governing 
technology. By introducing these challenging perceptions of the benchmarking system, the 
prognostic framing was delegitimized as the diagnostic framing of clients’ needs for a 
technology that qualified their ability to select contractors was suppressed. The potential 
consequence of such delegitimization was a lack of incentive for contractors to accommodate 
with, pursue, and voluntarily request KPIs, as deviations from the structures had no economic 
consequences in future prequalifications. Such a scenario would eventually undermine a 
legitimization of benchmarking as a technology that accurately translated building projects into 
KPIs that could be used by clients to assess the performance of contractors.  
The concurrent preparation of the implementation of benchmarking in the social housing sector 
made the timing of the critique politically sensitive, as several actors from the social housing 
sector also criticized benchmarking for not functioning for contractor selection. The accusation 
of this lacking utilization of the track records in the prequalifications constituted a clear threat 
to the political ambition of conforming contractors to achieve good KPIs, as this relied on 
clients’ utilization of track records in their prequalifications to provide economic incentives for 
contractors to adjust their production and processes towards compliance with clients’ demands 
to KPI standards.  
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The delegitimization of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology was further 
strengthened when a governmental report on state-initiated development activities supported 
the critique of insufficient utilization of track records by clients. The report, “Assessment of 
construction political initiatives: PPP, Partnering and KPIs,” (da. Evaluering af statslige 
byggepolitiske initiativer: OPP, Partnering, Nøgletal) (EBST, 2006) contained an assessment of 
the benchmarking initiative. The conclusions drew on practitioners’ opinions of benchmarking 
and pointed to three overall characteristics of the preliminary utilizations and interpretations of 
the initiative. The effect of disseminating benchmarking by means of the executive order was 
considered a success, as the participating clients contributing to the study had a high degree of 
acquaintance with the benchmarking initiative through their systematic demands of KPIs from 
contractors. But this success of the regulative-determined dissemination was not followed by a 
similar degree of expedient utilization of the KPIs as a selection tool. On a scale from 1–5, the 
assessment of the positive effects that benchmarking was considered to cause was given a low 
1.8.  
The report supported and legitimized Dansk Byggeri’s and Danske Ark’s critique of the 
prognostic framing of benchmarking as selection tool for clients.  
 “One of the central implications of a successful implementation of the benchmarking 
system is that the system has not yet obtained status as a proper tool in the construction 
industry. One the one hand, clients only secure that contractor’s hand in KPIs, but they 
do not use these in the prequalification. One the other hand, contractors only secure that 
they have KPIs, but only to a very little extent do they use these internally in the 
company as evaluation tool” (EBST, 2006:30).  
The quotation reveals that the report engendered a decisive challenge for the institutionalization 
of the benchmarking system, as actors in the construction industry clearly deviated from the 
expected normalizing behavior that was to support benchmarking as a selection tool for clients: 
If actors did not support and reproduce the structures of the prognostic framing by acting in 
accordance to the rationales of the executive order, they simultaneously did not contribute to a 
stabilization of benchmarking as a legitimate selection tool for clients.  
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CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY AND ACCURACY OF BENCHMARKING  
Only one month after the critique from Dansk Byggeri and Danske Ark, benchmarking was yet 
again challenged. This time the critique was not raised by professional associations but by one 
of the largest contractors in Denmark, NCC. The conflict emerged as NCC refused to go 
through with benchmarking due to dissatisfaction with the number of defects registered by the 
client, the Prison Service (Horsens Folkeblad, 2006).  
“There is no reason for us to accomplish benchmarking of a building project if we have 
an arbitration case with the client. We consider the KPIs as a customer satisfaction 
survey, and what is the point in completing such one, if we already know that the client 
is dissatisfied with us?” (Morten Chrone, NCC (Ritzaus Bureau, 2006a). 
The deselection of benchmarking can be understood as a calculated action from NCC. NCC 
clearly did not agree upon the number of defects registered by the client. And by considering 
the consequences of bad KPIs in future prequalifications, NCC chose to make use of an 
administrative possibility to cancel benchmarking on projects where there were disagreements 
between the contractor and the client. But this administrative possibility entailed several 
complications for the functioning of the benchmarking system since such deselection could 
potentially destabilize several prognostic framings of benchmarking.  
NCC’s deselection of benchmarking would potentially have three implications for the 
benchmarking system if this was to become common practice for contractors to deselect 
benchmarking in case of prospects to bad KPIs. Firstly, NCC’s action was an indication of a 
consideration of the potential consequences of having bad track records in future 
prequalifications. But by deselecting benchmarking, NCC expressed a deviating normative 
behavior by undermining the moral or ethical sensibility in continuing the benchmarking 
process, despite disagreements with the Prison Service. By deselecting benchmarking, NCC 
simultaneously refused to conform their behavior in accordance with the rationales of 
benchmarking as providing legitimate reflection of their performances. Many deselections of 
benchmarking would eventually hinder the usefulness of the system’s ability to reflect 
contractors’ performance, as the KPIs would only represent performance capabilities from 
projects without bad performance. NCC’s deselection of benchmarking can accordingly be 
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regarded as an attempt to deviate from the institutional preconditions in which they were 
embedded through the structures of benchmarking as normalizing governing technology.  
Secondly, by undermining the legitimacy of benchmarking as a selection tool, NCC 
simultaneously eroded the data foundation for utilizing benchmarking as a technology 
providing truthful information about performance standards from which best practices and 
process insight could be derived, as this required objective comparisons of the full range of 
building projects being benchmarked. A lacking representation of projects with bad 
performance would engender a distorted picture of performance standards. This prognostic 
framing of benchmarking as a reflective development technology was further challenged as 
NCC expressed their conception of the benchmarking system as a customer satisfaction survey 
and thus implicitly opposing the system as a technology for contractors to identify weaknesses 
and providing knowledge to initiate changes in the striving for best practices.  
Thirdly, and related to a lack of representation of poor performances, the prognostic framing of 
benchmarking as a socially constructive technology was likewise challenged if the database did 
not contain the full range of building projects, and accordingly did not provide a truthful 
reflection of the industry as a whole.  
The possibility of deselecting benchmarking was accordingly a potential threat for the 
institutionalization of benchmarking. NCC’s deselection of benchmarking had entailed a 
political problem that needed to be attended to if benchmarking was to maintain legitimacy of 
its prognostic framings. The issue prompted actors with an interest in benchmarking to oppose 
contractors’ opportunity to deselect benchmarking, exemplified by a client, the Agency for 
Universities and Buildings (da. Universitets- og Bygningsstyrelsen, UBST), who also 
experienced that NCC opposed benchmarking on one of their building projects. 
“We insist on accomplishing benchmarking of the building project. The system cannot 
withstand that contractors simply refuse benchmarking because of some problems with 
the construction process. When contractors say ‘A’ they must say ‘B’ as well” (Lars Ole 
Hansen, UBST, Licitationen, 2007). 
The critique of the insufficient utilization of the track records for contractor selection and the 
consequences of continued deselections of benchmarking entailed other politically motivated 
actors to mobilize resources into legitimating the challenged prognostic framings of 
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benchmarking as normalizing governing technology. It will be demonstrated that the result of 
these political actions and negotiations was a stronger orientation towards a strengthening of 
the regulative dissemination of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology and a 
closer collaboration between certain actors in articulating this strategic orientation of the 
institutionalization.  
In order to cope with NCC’s deselection of benchmarking, the board of directors in BEC 
outlined new guidelines that prevented contractors to make use of the opportunity to deselect 
benchmarking in the future, and instead had to be benchmarked regardless of their discontent 
with the KPIs.  
“It has never been the idea that contractors could back out of benchmarking. There has 
been an administrative possibility for contractors to postpone benchmarking, but it has 
never been meant as an opportunity to refuse benchmarking of building projects with an 
unsatisfactory performance” (Curt Liliegreen, Licitationen, 2007). 
The clients, represented by Bygherreforeningen (en. The Danish Association of Construction 
Clients), engaged in the political struggle and supported Liliegreen by opposing NCC’s use of 
the opportunity for contractors to refuse benchmarking.  
“It is important that benchmarking is taken seriously because it is a very useful tool. 
Therefore it is important for us that contractors cannot deselect benchmarking. It 
constitutes a glorified picture of contractors’ performance if they do not report data from 
projects with bad KPI” (Henrik Bang, Bygherreforeningen, Licitationen, 2007a). 
Hitherto Bygherreforeningen had not been particularly active in the development of 
benchmarking and had not engaged in the preliminary political struggles that had taken place. 
However, the prospect of delegitimating benchmarking as a selection tool for clients prompted 
this actor to engage in the political struggles. According to Henrik Bang (interview), 
benchmarking had been discussed and criticized much in Bygherreforeningen’s early years 
(Bygherreforeningen was established in 1999). Particularly, private clients opposed 
benchmarking, as they considered it to be a governmental imposed and rigorous system that 
was hindering clients in making individual, rational choices in the prequalification of 
contractors. They found it offensive that clients were to be subjected to this coercive control of 
the prequalification process and even by a system that did not provide the information that 
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could be useful in selecting contractors (Interview, Henrik Bang). But over time the discussions 
in Bygherreforeningen about benchmarking became less intense and replaced with a more 
common acceptance of the system as an element in generating transparency of the market and 
legitimating clients’ decisions in the prequalification processes (Bygherreforeningen, 2009). 
From a political perspective, the timing of this declared support from a clients association was 
crucial for advancing benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology. By supporting and 
legitimating this prognostic framing from a client point of view, Bygherreforeningen 
neutralized the criticism raised partly by Dansk Byggeri and Danske Ark and partly the 
conclusions from the report on state initiatives, criticizing state clients for lacking utilization 
track records in their prequalifications.  
Throughout the development of the benchmarking system Dansk Byggeri had insisted on 
maintaining this opportunity of deselecting benchmarking for their member companies 
(Interview, Michael H. Nielsen). But as the practical consequences of this opportunity emerged, 
other actors were forced to react. The political negotiations resulted in a maintaining of the 
opportunity for contractors to deselect benchmarking but with the appertaining consequence 
that aborted benchmarking processes should clearly appear in the track record. This had the 
ulterior motive of removing much of the incentives to deselect benchmarking, as contractors 
with aborted benchmarking processes could risk negative assessments of their KPIs in case of 
clients interpreting such information negatively. Accordingly, the end result of the political 
negotiation favored the prognostic framing of benchmarking as normalizing governing 
technology, as the motivations for contractors to deviate from the normalizing behavior were 
greatly eliminated. 
The critique raised against benchmarking illuminated the diverse interests represented in BEC’s 
board of directors. It also revealed that BEC could not single-handedly manage the pressure put 
on the benchmarking initiative by actors who had political interests in changing the 
institutionalization. As a result of the political struggles, an alliance between BEC, 
Bygherreforeningen, and EBST was established as the development and utilization of 
benchmarking no longer had an undisputed support from the board members. These three 
actors joined forces in advancing benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology and 
maintained the ambition of changing the competition by providing transparency between price 
and quality through benchmarking.  
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
143
The continued governmental support to institutionalize benchmarking as a normalizing 
governing technology was further revealed in the governmental action plan, “Better and 
cheaper buildings” (da. Bedre og billigere byggeri) (Regeringen, 2007). The report used several 
analyses from BEC as support for claims of poor quality and low productivity in the 
construction industry. BEC and benchmarking were highly incorporated in the governmental 
strategy for the construction industry and characterized benchmarking as a driving force in 
encouraging companies to compete on quality performance and simultaneously provide the 
state clients with a better foundation for selecting collaborators on the basis of a combination of 
their price and performance on quality (Regeringen, 2007). In this way, the report was a clear 
contribution to the institutionalization of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology 
and reflected an undisputed governmental interest in benchmarking the construction industry 
for the objective of generating transparency of construction companies’ quality performances: 
“KPIs generate transparency of the quality that companies provide the client. KPIs 
facilitate a foundation for selecting those companies that are most suited to perform any 
given task” (Regeringen, 2007:52). 
The action plan once again appointed clients as the central driving forces in providing the 
incentives for companies to conform to KPI standards. This entailed that utilization of KPIs in 
prequalifications needed to be increased. But unlike the previous legal requirements that only 
prompted state clients to gather KPIs from contractors, the government advanced a much more 
aggressive utilization of the benchmarking system by making it mandatory for state clients to 
actively use KPIs from contractors as a selection criterion (Regeringen, 2007:54). With this 
change, the government attempted to cope and respond to the rising critique of state and social 
housing clients’ preliminary insufficiency in utilizing KPIs as a selection criterion.  
The action plan had three other important future prospects for benchmarking. Firstly, the 
benchmarking initiative was to be extended so that it, in the future, also included KPIs on 
consulting engineering companies and architectural companies. This system was not 
concretized in the report, as the development was to take place in consultation with BEC and 
actors from the industry (Regeringen, 2007:54). Secondly, a governmental request was that 
KPIs were to be published in order to provide transparency. Total transparency was required in 
order to facilitate the knowledge foundation for companies to compare themselves to their 
competitors.  
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“This will enable all clients (including private clients) to include KPIs in their selection 
of the most qualified companies” (Regeringen 2007:54). 
The timing of this political announcement must be seen in the light of the recent successful 
dissemination of the benchmarking system to the social housing sector since the number of 
construction companies with KPIs was considered to increase dramatically as a consequence of 
this inclusion of social housing building projects. This was considered a prerequisite for clients’ 
use of benchmarking in the prequalification process, as an increase of companies with KPIs 
would secure that bidding companies were not to be deselected because of lacking 
documentation requirements for KPIs (Regeringen, 2007). So far state clients had had 
difficulties in avoiding discrimination of bidding contractors that did not have KPIs. This 
preclusion for using benchmarking was now handled by the dissemination of the system to the 
social housing sector and by providing an opportunity for bidders to hand in “information 
corresponding the KPIs from BEC” (Regeringen, 2007:54). 
Thirdly, the report stated that state and social housing clients in the future would be subjected 
to benchmarking by a systematic benchmarking corresponding to the system for contractors, 
consulting engineers, and architects. “This [in regards of being measured] will generate an 
equal status of the participants of the building project” (Regeringen, 2007:54). In this way, the 
report prepared the ground for a high degree of coherence between the KPIs for the different 
participants of the project.  
Liliegreen recognized the future prospects of benchmarking outlined in the action plan and 
legitimized benchmarking and BEC through the politically initiated strengthening of 
benchmarking towards a normalizing governing technology: 
“Many have called for more active use of the KPIs in the prequalification process. Now 
it is an important element in the construction policy. There is a great difference between 
being obliged to demand KPIs and being obliged to actively use KPIs. I interpret it as a 
governmental vote of confidence that we in BEC, in collaboration with the parties in the 
construction industry, have succeeded in developing a well-functioning system and a 
foundation for further development of benchmarking” (Curt Liliegreen, Licitationen, 
2007c). 
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The above statements from the three actors (Bygherreforeningen, the government, and BEC), 
can be regarded as an uncontested promotion of benchmarking as a normalizing governing 
technology. The consolidation of these three actors was a necessary political response to 
opposing actors’ attempts to delegitimize the benchmarking initiative and also repositioned 
BEC as a legitimate actor in driving the future development activities of benchmarking. The 
consolidation indicated an objective of formulating a more coherent frame of benchmarking, 
resulting in a lower priority of articulating the benchmarking in a motivational framing that had 
equal support from all stakeholders. In the interview with Liliegreen, he supported the notion 
that a consolidation was necessary and that BEC could not manage the conflict without external 
support from stakeholders. 
“When I reflect on the course of events, then it shows how important it is that EBST 
engages in this critical discussion raised by the actors in the construction industry. An 
initiative as BEC cannot act independently and critically to the market interests on a 
longer run. That role is and always will be a matter for the authorities” (Interview, Curt 
Liliegreen). 
This statement, and the consolidation of interests, indicates that BEC’s political position did not 
stand the pressure when critiques of a more politically sensitive character arose from powerful 
political actors. The representation of diverse interests among the board members entailed that 
BEC to a larger extent was important in committing and engaging the professional associations 
and their members in benchmarking. To a lesser extend BEC could single-handedly legitimize 
the institutionalization of benchmarking.  
CHALLENGING THE APPLICABILITY OF BENCHMARKING AS A SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 
In 2006 another political struggle emerged, as private actors attempted to delegitimize BEC as 
a truthful provider of analyses of the construction industry.  
One of the original objectives of BEC, and a personal interest of Curt Liliegreen, was to utilize 
the data in the benchmarking system to generate analyses about the productivity development 
of the construction industry. The increasing number of projects in BEC’s database facilitated 
such knowledge production, and the reports were published on the BEC website. The releases 
of the analyses, however, gave rise to skepticism regarding the veracity of the data as actors 
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from the construction industry opposed the results as general reflections of the construction 
industry. The analyses demonstrated BEC’s political engagement in providing analyses of the 
construction industry that could have societal and political interests.  
Below, it will be demonstrated how BEC’s analyses entailed conflicting perceptions of 
benchmarking’s capacity to produce knowledge about the construction industry and 
accordingly challenged benchmarking as a socially constructive technology.  
BEC released several analyses of the data from the benchmarking system10. The development 
in building defects got massive interest from the media, the professional associations, and the 
authorities, as BEC in 2006 reported that the amount of non-critical defects had increased by 74 
% since 2005 and the amount of critical defects by 400% (Ritzaus Bureau, 2006; Berlingske 
Tidende, 2006; Dagbladenes Bureau, 2006). Further, the analyses accounted for a 100% 
increase in work accidents. In the communication of these results, Liliegreen utilized the 
analyses to comment on the overall development of the construction industry:  
“The financial boom has affected the performance of the construction industry and has 
resulted in an increase of defects and work accidents. Our data clearly reveal that the 
performances of these two areas are going badly and need to be attended to in the 
future” (Curt Liliegreen, Ritzaus Bureau, 2006). 
By utilizing the data from the benchmarking system to conduct and present analyses that 
accounted for an overall development of the construction industry’s performance capabilities, a 
discussion about benchmarking as a provider of general knowledge about the construction 
industry emerged. A response from Dansk Byggeri indicated a stance that challenged 
Liliegreen’s reliance on utilizing the data to comment on an overall tendency of the 
construction industry’s performance.  
“The analysis from BEC embraces large state building projects and does not directly 
reflect the performance of building projects of the private sector. We have not registered 
an increase of complaints to the Appeals Board of Construction (da. Byggeriets 
Ankenævn), therefore nothing indicates an increase of the amount of defects in private 
building projects” (Michael H. Nielsen, Dagbladenes Bureau, 2006). 
                                                 
10 The analyses can be found at: http://www.byggeevaluering.dk/nyheder/rapporter.aspx 
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With this statement, Dansk Byggeri charged the utilization of benchmarking as a socially 
constructive technology, as they did not recognize the data from the benchmarking system as a 
reliable knowledge foundation for conducting overall analyses of the construction industry. The 
exemplification of the misleading in BEC’s results by presenting diverging data from the 
Appeals Board of Construction, Dansk Byggeri, thus challenged benchmarking as a socially 
constructive technology and the legitimacy of BEC as a messenger of an overall development 
of defects. The utilization of benchmarking for this purpose did, as intended, succeed in 
establishing political discussions about the development of defects, but benchmarking 
simultaneously faced a legitimacy issue, as actors in the construction industry interpreted the 
conclusions and opposed the results. 
In June 2007 BEC once again published an analysis of the development of defects that showed 
a 22 times increase of defects in comparison with the previous year. The analysis was expanded 
by included several clients’ interpretations of this high increase in defect. “Contractors’ 
incompetency” was concluded to be the cause of the high amount of defects. Actors from the 
contractors’ side responded by claiming that the causes were to be found in problems with sub-
contractors, project changes during the construction work, and insufficient project material 
(Politiken, 2007).  
By taking a position that highly reflected the claims of clients, Liliegreen engaged in a political 
debate that exceeded the statistical functions of BEC:  
“There is an element of avoidance of responsibilities from contractors. But with the 
prevalent culture of construction you cannot expect that actors accept their 
responsibilities. But I would find it very refreshing if someone for once did so” (Curt 
Liliegreen, Politiken, 2007). 
Thus BEC became politically engaged in a discussion about the liability arrangement regarding 
the many registered defects. By engaging in the interpretation of the results, BEC actively 
mobilized the figures from the benchmarking system in a political discussion, which induced 
strong opposing positions in the construction industry and unfolded Liliegreen’s interest in 
promoting benchmarking as a socially constructive technology. The contractors came under 
further pressure as EBST put forward a critique of the construction industry based on the 
results from BEC. They did so by using the results to place a governmental criticism of the 
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number of defects in the construction industry and further to legitimize political interest in the 
governmental action plan, “Better and cheaper buildings” (Regeringen, 2007) (Jp.dk, 2007). In 
this case, EBST used the results from BEC as neutrally-produced, objective facts that could 
legitimate certain political ambitions and orientations for the construction industry by providing 
EBST a basis for making political decisions.  
The release of and following responses to the report resulted in a united front consisting of 
BEC, clients, and EBST that constituted a general accusation of contractors and their 
responsibility of the massive increase of building defects. Accordingly, contractors were forced 
to react to the accusations in order to justify their position in the construction industry and 
respond to the critique. Once again Dansk Byggeri did not accept the premises for the 
conclusions and argued that the data from BEC did not reflect the development of the private 
market and did not correspond with the development of defects from the Appeals Board of 
Construction or from the Danish Building Defects Fund, which indicated a decrease of defects 
compared to 2005 (Jp.dk, 2007; Licitationen, 2007d). These counter-reactions from Dansk 
Byggeri reveal how the benchmarking system was not yet considered as an undisputed 
technology providing insight about the construction industry that could serve as a legitimate 
basis for political decisions. 
Michael H. Nielsen from Dansk Byggeri had the following comment to Dansk Byggeri’s 
reaction to BEC’s analyses: 
“We felt that they had been paying a high price for establishing and supporting BEC. Is 
this the thanks we get? To be displayed as incompetent? At some point, I think that there 
was a discussion in the board about how these conclusions are to be debated in the board 
before they are published. And as I am informed—I was not a board member at that 
time—Curt did not fully understand that. In his view it is a front page and a significant 
legitimation of BEC as central actor. And that is a misinterpretation in relation to the 
stakeholders. He should have kept the information internal instead of pursuing 
headlines” (Interview, Michael H. Nielsen). 
Liliegreen’s ambition of providing the public general knowledge about the development in the 
construction industry accordingly entailed that BEC was not a neutral actor but instead 
attempted to be established as a platform from which political debates could originate.  
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“Liliegreen is an extremely talented analyst. He is very good in raising some issues very 
sharply. But is should not always be a goal to be in the media. The goal is to move an 
agenda, which I think he misread” (Interview, Michael H. Nielsen). 
The reactions to BEC’s analyses reveal how benchmarking as a socially constructive 
technology and the political involvement of BEC in construction political discussions gave rise 
to reactions that attempted to undermine the ambitions of institutionalizing benchmarking as a 
reliable knowledge foundation for analyses about the construction industry. 
4.5.3 CONSTRUCTING A BENCHMARKING SYSTEM FOR CONSULTING ENGINEERS AND 
ARCHITECTS 
A consistent vision was that benchmarking was to be expanded so that it also included 
consulting engineers and architects. Besides the obvious effect of generating a higher degree of 
transparency of the market, this dissemination of benchmarking was considered essential for 
the continued acceptance from contractors:  
“A requirement for contractors’ acceptance of the system was from the beginning the 
prospect of including consulting engineers and architects in benchmarking” (Interview, 
Liliegreen). 
“In order to secure acceptance from the contractors it was necessary to keep 
emphasizing that consulting engineers and architects also would be included. It would 
not be politically acceptable for contractors if consulting engineers and architects were 
excepted” (Interview, Liliegreen). 
The initial design of the system was affected by an underlying ambition of utilizing the data for 
the purpose of generating insight into the correlations between the information from the 
contractor system and those gathered from consulting engineers and architects in order to 
provide a data foundation that could be used for conducting detailed analyses of building 
projects. This objective reflected persistence in sustaining the benchmarking system as a 
socially constructive technology that could generate insight into the development of product 
performance on productivity, defects, customer satisfaction, time compliance and others. But 
likewise this objective reflected the interest in strengthening benchmarking in deriving 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
150
knowledge about the causal relations between these performance results and the more detailed 
process-related conditions and characteristics of the project.  
“It was evident that we hoped that the system for consulting engineers and architects 
could be used to elaborate on the figures from the contractor system. My engagement in 
the development of the system was not driven by the ambition of benchmarking 
consulting engineers and architects, but more by an academic interest in learning 
something from benchmarking” (Interview, Liliegreen). 
If these detailed causal relations were to be unfolded, it required that the system for consulting 
engineers and architects had to have correspondence to the system for contractors. Besides the 
obvious ambition of providing clients a tool for selecting consulting engineers and architects, 
the development of a system for consulting engineers and architects as well as this proposed 
orientation of the design reflected two underlying motives. Firstly, the inclusion of consulting 
engineers and architects broke with the hitherto one-sided focus on contractors’ performance. 
By including information of these actors in the benchmarking system, the responsibility of the 
product performance of the project was no longer exclusively placed on contractors but instead 
accounted for the more thorough analysis of the full range of participating actors in the project. 
Secondly, the correlation between the two systems secured some sort of fairness of the 
administrative burdens imposed on contractors, consulting engineers, architects and clients, 
respectively.  
Since 2004 a development of a benchmarking system for consulting engineers and architects 
was a central activity in BEC. Realdania funded the development of the system with 2m kroner, 
and as for the system for contractors, this system was to be constructed in collaboration with 
representatives from the stakeholders. F.R.I. and Danske Ark appointed member companies to 
participate in the development, and representatives from the client side and contractor side were 
represented in the group responsible for the system as well. The Realdania funding facilitated a 
remuneration of the representatives from the construction industry for their involvement in 
developing the new benchmarking system. During the initial development of the system, BEC 
continuously communicated the progress through newsletters and on BEC’s annual meetings. 
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In 2007 the prospects of completing and implementing a system for consulting engineers and 
architects became evident for the construction companies, as the authorities explicitly 
expressed their support to include consulting engineers and architects in the executive orders: 
“…Regarding KPIs for consulting engineers [and architects] EBST and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs will discuss the development of a benchmarking system with relevant 
parties from the consultants and the clients. This will take place during spring 2007.” 
(Økonomi- og Erhvervsministeriet, 2007)  
The system was developed with the aim of having a high degree of correspondence with the 
benchmarking system for contractors. The system for consulting engineers and architects was 
accordingly developed and approved by the board of directors in BEC before it was sent to 
review in EBST in 2007 before implementing it in the executive orders.  
The proposed system was, however, not received well by consulting engineering and 
architectural companies nor was it by the board members in the professional associations, 
F.R.I. and Danske Ark. The two associations accordingly rejected the proposed benchmarking 
system and thus delegitimized several of the ambitions for this expansion of the benchmarking 
initiative. 
But how could these associations reject a system that their own representatives had been 
participating in the development of? And what did their criticism concern?  
Prior to the initiation of developing the system, the associations, BEC, and the representatives 
for consulting engineers and architects made an agreement that entailed that the representatives 
did not necessarily reflect the interests for Danske Ark and F.R.I. The reactions arose as the 
members of the associations were confronted with the proposed system. Although the two 
professional associations had accepted the proposal and were continuously informed, it ended 
up with a political struggle since consulting engineering companies and architectural 
companies forced the associations to attend to their critique. 
In interviews with Curt Liliegreen, Henrik Garver (F.R.I.), and Christian Lerche (Danske Ark), 
they pointed to explanations for how the two professional associations apparently could be 
unaware of the content and political consequences of the benchmarking system that was 
developed: The board members and the member companies of the two associations had not 
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paid enough attention to the continuous reporting from BEC about the forming of the system. 
Also there was a lack of feedback from the work of their representatives in BEC to the board 
members in the associations and accordingly to their members.  
In a mutual hearing statement, Danske Ark and F.R.I. elaborated on their rejection of the 
suggested system (hearing statement Danske Ark and F.R.I.11). The two associations based 
their rejection on four areas of criticism which they considered to counteract what they found to 
be the cornerstones of benchmarking. Firstly, benchmarking had the purpose of promoting a 
competition that to a higher extent was driven by quality rather than price. Danske Ark and 
F.R.I. found that the suggested system had too much emphasis on information about the 
financial performance of consulting engineers and architects instead of information that 
reflected quality performance. This raised a concern of less innovative solutions since 
innovative solutions could end up influencing the price, thus the performance results, in the 
benchmarking system.  
Secondly, the ambition for companies to use benchmarking as a tool for improvement was not 
fulfilled since the information could be several years old when they were presented to the 
companies. Information of that age would not be useful to the companies since it would be too 
late to navigate after the results.  
Thirdly, in a value for money perspective, the organizations found that the lack of utilization of 
benchmarking for company improvement left little value for consulting engineers and 
architects when engaging in benchmarking. Further, clients’ utilization of benchmarking as a 
way to enhance a competition on quality was questioned since benchmarking results would not 
replace anything but would function as a supplementary element in the prequalification. This 
entailed that F.R.I. and Danske Ark considered benchmarking to be yet another administrative 
burden when bidding on building projects. Accordingly, the two organizations pointed out the 
mismatch between the benefit for their members and the prospective costs of DKK 10,000 per 
evaluation and the number of administrative hours that were required in the suggested system.  
Fourthly, the hearing statement addressed the “fairness” of the system. The suggested system 
entailed that foreign bidders were in a better competitive position since these were only 
requested to present references “comparable” to those of the benchmarking system. Foreign 
                                                 
11 The hearing statement can be requested from BEC. 
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bidders could strategically select to enclose references on successful projects, whereas Danish 
bidders would have to present an average of their benchmarked building projects. Further, the 
two organizations argued that the measures in the suggested system that constituted the 
performance of consulting engineers and architects did not necessarily reflect whether the 
project had been successful or not.  
The managing director of F.R.I., Lars Goldschmidt, emphasized that the attempts to construct a 
system that could correspond to the measures for contractors had resulted in a system that 
poorly reflected the criteria he found to characterize the performance of consulting engineers.  
 “A benchmarking system must fulfill four things: move competition from price to 
quality, be a tool for improvements, be just, and bring values that correspond with the 
cost it entails. When F.R.I. together with others recommend that this system is not to be 
put into operation and additionally have handed in one of the most critical hearing 
statements ever, it is because we do not consider the system to meet these requirements” 
(Lars Goldschmidt, Jyllands-Posten, 2007b). 
Danske Ark legitimized the rejection of the system through a critique of the preliminary results 
from benchmarking contractors.  
“Our association likes the idea of benchmarking and we have been supportive of the 
development of benchmarking. That being said, I am skeptical because I still lack to see 
the results of using the system. When I consider the system for contractors, I find these 
results doubtful.  
We need to reconsider the system in order to achieve the right proportions between 
outcome and resource consumption. Benchmarking must be used to qualify companies, 
and as I see it, there are two areas where this is not working: on clients’ satisfaction and 
on work environment, where companies are using different systems” (Christian Lerche, 
Licitationen, 2007o). 
With this statement, it was evident that Danske Ark had interests that deviated from those of 
BEC, EBST, and Bygherreforeningen. Danske Ark put forward an important political statement 
that reflected their interests in benchmarking and, simultaneously, a prognostic framing of 
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benchmarking that deviated from the one constructed about benchmarking as a normalizing 
governing technology.  
The expectation of using benchmarking to qualify companies was a clear presentation of the 
prognostic framing of benchmarking as reflective development technology. This objective had 
been suppressed during the implementation of benchmarking so far, as BEC, EBST, and 
Bygherreforening were necessitated to construct a more coherent framing of benchmarking as a 
regulatory instrument to get private companies to conform to certain quality requirements 
through sanctions.  
In his statement, Lerche further implicitly pointed to a contradictory element in the so far 
regulatory utilization of benchmarking. Benchmarking as normalizing governing technology 
could only find legitimacy through comprehensive use in the construction industry, but in order 
to disseminate the use of benchmarking, it must be cost-effective before it could be used widely 
in the construction industry. 
4.5.4 THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY REJECTS BENCHMARKING 
In October 2007 the professional associations’ discontent with the development of 
benchmarking reached a new height, as F.R.I., Danske Ark, Dansk Byggeri, 
ByggematerialeBranchen, and Tekniq, all represented in BEC’s board, in a mutual 
announcement rejected the preliminary institutionalization of benchmarking. One major 
criticism concerned the proportions (Licitationen, 2007i), the bureaucracy, and the opaqueness 
of the benchmarking system, entailing that the system could not be used for the intended 
purposes (Licitationen, 2007f). In this way, the professional associations constructed a political 
delegitimization of the institutionalization by pointing out that the institutionalization of 
benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology did not include interests of the private 
market. The criticism was accordingly a reaction to a constructed motivational framing, which 
did not accommodate the original incentives from the private market to support the 
benchmarking initiative. The critique was severe:  
“We have to start over and ensure that the construction industry is provided a reliable 
and useful tool and that the development is not to take place in BEC” (Mutual 
announcement from the five associations, Licitationen, 2007e). 
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This announcement was extremely powerful, as the joint forces of the large professional 
associations constituted a very strong platform to influence the institutionalization of 
benchmarking: If the members of these associations consequently deselected benchmarking in 
the future based on this prevailing discontent with the system, it would not only hinder the 
effects of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology, it would entail such a strong 
delegitimization of benchmarking that the institutionalization would erode.  
Despite these objections against the benchmarking system and the work of BEC, the 
associations still supported the vision of establishing a competition that was not reliant on price 
exclusively. The objections were, accordingly, not against benchmarking as a means to 
generate such effects but against the designed system: 
“An evaluation instrument must work as intended. This is not the case with the existing 
system [for contractors] nor with the proposed system for consulting engineers and 
architects. This is why we request a new and more efficient system” (Jens Klarskov, 
Dansk Byggeri, Jyllands-Posten, 2007). 
The same concern was raised by Danske Ark: 
“The existing system for contractors has not been able to establish a foundation for 
competition on other criteria than price. When a similar system for consulting engineers 
and architects, which we can see is unsuccessful, is to be implemented, then it will not 
benefit us either” (Christian Lerche, Licitationen, 2007i). 
These two statements reflect how the organizations attempted to delegitimize the existing 
prognostic framings of benchmarking by pointing out that they were insufficient in addressing 
the diagnostic framings as intended. By doing so, the associations simultaneously prepared the 
ground for a future motivational framing that could embrace all stakeholders: A less 
comprehensive system, that was transparent for the companies, could be used as an accurate 
selection tool by clients and, finally, was more applicable for utilizing benchmarking as a 
management tool internally in the private companies.  
“Contractors want to be assessed. But it is necessary to adjust the system in order to 
provide value for clients and to make benchmarking work as an internal management 
tool for the companies” (Flemming Preisler, Tekniq, Licitationen, 2007j). 
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In this way, Preisler reintroduced the objective of utilizing benchmarking as a reflective 
development technology, which had been neglected so far in favor of generating a more 
coherent understanding of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology. The 
accommodation to this prognostic framing was accordingly considered to be a prerequisite in 
order to construct a motivational framing that could be supported be the private market. 
The same intertwining of these two prognostic framings of benchmarking was revealed by 
Dansk Byggeri: 
“It is important to underscore that the existing system is not good enough. None of my 
6,500 members find it useful. It is exclusively a cost and an administrative burden for 
them. This is why we want a tool which clients, contractors, consulting engineers and 
architects can use in both the prequalification and during the execution of the project. 
Such a tool would secure that everyone in the construction industry has the possibility to 
learn from the evaluation process during the process and not several years later. 
Meanwhile we must consider the efforts that companies already are investing in 
evaluation systems” (Jens Klarskov, Licitationen, 2007g), 
Tekniq further actively delegitimized the existing prognostic framings of benchmarking, as the 
managing director pointed out the inexpediencies of one of the premises for institutionalizing 
benchmarking—a dissemination of benchmarking to the private sector: 
“The benchmarking system is insufficient, also when it comes to transparency and 
dissemination. The state is not the largest client and this entails that transparency and 
dissemination is not accelerating at a pace that makes it attractive to use KPIs. 
Accordingly, it is neither a competitive parameter nor an attractive internal management 
tool” (Flemming Preisler, Licitationen, 2007j). 
The five professional associations were clear in their requirements for developing a new 
benchmarking system: BEC was not to participate, and EBST was requested to sit at the end of 
the table during the discussions (Licitationen, 2007g; Licitationen, 2007h; Licitationen, 2007i; 
Licitationen, 2007j). 
The accusations against BEC entailed that Realdania and Bygherreforening felt it necessary to 
state that clients needed a selection tool and that, as long as the executive orders existed, BEC 
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would persist. However, both actors agreed on a modification of the existing system 
(Licitationen, 2007h). 
“State clients cannot go without a benchmarking system. But the existing system is too 
ambitious and too opaque. We need a system which all parties in the construction 
industry partake in” (Knud Erik Busk, Bygherreforeningen, Licitationen, 2007h). 
The mobilized forces against the prognostic framing of benchmarking constructed by BEC, 
Bygherreforeningen, and EBST threatened the platform from which benchmarking previously 
had found its legitimacy and political orientation during its preliminary institutionalization. 
Construction companies forced the five associations to achieve influence on the development 
and forming of benchmarking in order to reconfigure the framings in ways that sufficiently 
considered the interests of contractors, consulting engineers, and architects. 
The successful destabilization of benchmarking was a clear demonstration of the political 
power private companies in the construction industry were able to mobilize through their 
professional associations. The five associations constituted a plausible threat for a boycott of 
BEC and for a continuing rejection of benchmarking as a legitimate prescriptive and obligatory 
part of the construction industry. In order to achieve a continued institutionalization of 
benchmarking, it was necessary to construct alternative prognostic framings that could gain 
support from the powerful private actors.   
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4.6 RE-ORIENTATING THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
The previous chapter demonstrated how the institutionalization of benchmarking was being 
challenge and transformed as actors with different political interests interpreted the rising 
institution and caused political struggles about the further orientation of benchmarking. 
In this chapter it will be revealed how the institutionalization of benchmarking was modified as 
a consequence of the political struggles that were raised from the five professional associations 
and their member companies.  
The political pressure resulted in a replacement of the management in BEC and prompted that 
BEC was to transform towards less political involvement in the future and more market-
orientation in their communicating and dissemination of benchmarking. Additionally, the 
benchmarking system was simplified at the expense of the prognostic framing of benchmarking 
as a socially constructive technology from which analyses of societal interests could be derived 
in favor of a more operational and accepted system among practitioners. Accordingly, a new 
motivational framing that, to a larger extent, embraced all stakeholders was constructed. 
Benchmarking was accordingly politically negotiated in ways that were acceptable for the 
whole range of professional association and the authorities, and the politically negotiated 
benchmarking institution was stabilized around the perception of benchmarking as a 
normalizing governing technology, relying on a normative interpretation among construction 
companies that the track records were used by clients in their selection of collaborators in the 
prequalification.  
It will be demonstrated how the simplification of the benchmarking system combined with a 
increasing request for KPIs in prequalifications opened for other actors to engage in the 
benchmarking activities and resulted in the establishment of two new benchmarking 
operators12. These two benchmarking operators promoted benchmarking differently than BEC, 
and as a consequence, multiple interpretations of benchmarking’s instrumental purposes and 
overall objectives became present, as the benchmarking operators made use of different 
communication strategies to construct motivational framings that could gain support from the 
practitioners in the construction industry. This entailed implications of disseminating 
                                                 
12 A third benchmarking operator, “Funch Rådgivende Ingeniører Aps”, also entered the market. However. the 
company withdrew from the market after a short time.  
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benchmarking as a coherent development initiative for the construction industry with uniform 
instrumental purposes and overall objectives. As a result of the presence of three benchmarking 
operators with different interests in and perceptions of benchmarking, private construction 
companies assumed a decisive role in the institutionalization of benchmarking since their 
choice of benchmarking operator automatically would reflect which motivational framing they 
found to be most appealing and in their interest.  
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4.6.1 LEGITIMIZING BENCHMARKING THROUGH A REORGANIZATION OF BEC 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the rejection of the benchmarking system for 
contractors and the suggested benchmarking system for consulting engineers and architects was 
a clear demonstration of a general lack of acceptance of the prognostic framings of 
benchmarking that was propounded by BEC, the authorities, and Bygherreforeningen to that 
point. The mobilization of the five politically motivated actors resulted in a massive political 
pressure to accommodate the requirements from the private market. But despite the strong 
opposition of BEC, the professional associations maintained a mutual support for the centre as 
guarantor for conducting impartial and independent benchmarking activities (Licitationen, 
2007q)—but not unconditional. The high degree of political influence that BEC had had in the 
institutionalization until now was highly threatened due to disagreements among the board 
members concerning the future motivational framing, including the areas of responsibilities that 
the BEC was to attend to.  
Due to BEC’s political engagement in the construction political debates, benchmarking had 
become a political issue and messenger of politically sensitive conclusions on the construction 
industry that was not gaining unanimous support from the board of directors. BEC had 
successfully established a strong identity in the political debate but simultaneously made the 
centre a target for political struggles. The strong interplay between EBST, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs, and BEC also entailed a general perception of BEC as a carrier of governmental 
regulative interests more than as a representative of the construction industry’s interests. The 
development had constituted a contradictory aspect of BEC as both provider of analyses of 
societal interests and as neutral, impartial actor in the construction industry. 
Another main reason why the professional associations had successfully destabilized the 
prognostic framings of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology was due to the 
documented lack of demands for KPIs from clients and the missing widespread utilization of 
KPIs in their prequalification of bidders. In this way, the destabilization of the preconditions for 
the prognostic framing of benchmarking as providing transparency and a selection tool for 
clients provided openings for these opposing actors to gain influence in the institutionalization 
of benchmarking.  
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The political influence of BEC had until now been a necessity in providing a platform for the 
institutionalization of benchmarking that partly provided the centre sufficient legitimacy for 
developing a benchmarking system that was accepted by stakeholders and partly provided the 
centre the authority to enforce the system through executive orders from the authorities. This 
platform and regulatory legitimacy of BEC were provided by the very same associations that 
now were pressured by their members to restructure the political power that influenced the 
institutionalization of benchmarking. The conflicting interests among board members in BEC 
contributed to a destabilization of BEC as a legitimate producer and carrier of the 
institutionalization of benchmarking.  
A restabilization of benchmarking called for a re-orientation of benchmarking where BEC was 
deprived of some of the political influence that the centre had had so far in order for the 
associations to gain more influence in the future institutionalization of benchmarking. The 
harsh criticism raised by the five associations called for a high degree of compliance to the 
areas of criticism in order to regain a broad support from the professional associations and their 
member companies. In other words, for benchmarking to be successfully institutionalized, it 
was necessary that benchmarking achieved a renewed credibility from the stakeholders.  
The controversies thus contributed to an incorporation of several political interests and 
compromises in the future institutionalization of benchmarking. With the increased political 
focus on benchmarking, an immediate effect was derived: The respective managing directors of 
F.R.I. and Danske Ark replaced their nominated representatives from private companies as 
board members (Licitationen, 2007k ) in order to represent their members’ political interest in 
benchmarking. This purely political constellation of the board reflected a political signal from 
the professional associations of controlling and managing the decisions that were made in the 
centre in respect to their political interests.  
With a prospect of political negotiations being made, the board members revealed interests 
from which the compromises were to be made: 
“Companies find the benchmarking system expensive, difficult and not providing any 
useful feedback” (Jens Klarskov, Dansk Byggeri, Børsen, 2007). 
“Companies are using many resources on the system and simultaneously clients do not 
make use of them” (Niels Jørgen Hansen, Tekniq, Børsen, 2007). 
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As part of the discussions, other actors tried to promote the benchmarking initiative as a 
legitimate institution in the construction industry. BEC contributed to the legitimization of 
benchmarking by getting a number of large and experienced clients to unambiguously approve 
benchmarking as a part of their prequalification (Licitationen, 2007p). This politically 
motivated initiative reflected that the support of clients was considered to be of outmost 
importance for legitimizing the future existence of benchmarking  
Realdania also publicly expressed their support to benchmarking, and EBST showed a great 
willingness to accommodate the critique from the private actors and develop a new 
benchmarking system (Licitationen, 2007l). One demand was, on the other hand, insisted on: 
The data from the existing system had to be reused in case of a new system in order to secure 
that the gathered information was not wasted (Licitationen, 2007l). EBST, who was expected to 
be in charge of the political negotiations, sought to hang on to statements that supported a 
future institutionalization of benchmarking: 
“EBST is satisfied about the fact that no one expresses discontent with benchmarking in 
general. What is important is that we simplify the system, so that it is quick, easy and 
inexpensive and does not cost companies much trouble” (Finn Lauritzen, director of 
EBST, Licitationen, 2007l).  
These political statements and support for the benchmarking initiative reflected how these 
actors still insisted on a continuing institutionalization of benchmarking but also were willing 
to produce the modifications that were necessary in order to gain support from the opposing 
actors. The statement from Finn Lauritzen can be regarded as EBST’s attempt to construct an 
accommodating political platform for the future political struggles and negotiations between 
the different actors, with EBST as mediator. In this way, EBST was expressing a willingness to 
modify the prognostic framings of benchmarking in order to sustain a main objective of 
changing the competition in the construction industry, securing that the future competition in 
construction could be based on a higher degree of quality. Now the political challenge was to 
rescue BEC from abolishment by embarking on a new course that was acceptable for the 
companies in the construction industry. It was, accordingly, a question of reformulating BEC 
from being free and independent of interests in the construction industry to instead attend to the 
interests of private compromises and on constructing settlements that could find political 
resonance among the stakeholders. 
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4.6.2 REORGANIZING THE MANAGEMENT IN BEC 
The ambitions of Liliegreen showed to be incompatible with the interests that had been raised 
by the professional associations and construction companies. In October 2007 Curt Liliegreen 
left his position as managing director of BEC in a mutual agreement between him and the board 
of directors (Jyllands-Posten, 2007a). The press claimed the reason to be the massive critique 
that had been raised by the professional associations towards the two benchmarking systems 
developed with BEC as main coordinator and the public releases of the critical reports about 
the development of defects in construction (Jyllands-Posten, 2007a; Licitationen, 2007m).  
Gaining support for BEC from the professional associations and maintaining the centre as a 
legitimate benchmarking operator required a transformation of the center’s role into a more 
neutral position that did not act independently in future political discussions but found its 
legitimacy through a function as a reliable neutral operator of benchmarking representing the 
board members’ interests in benchmarking.  
With the removal of Liliegreen as managing director it was possible for the board of directors 
to inscribe BEC in a position where the managing director was not as politically intertwined in 
the discussions about the orientation of the institutionalization. This made it easier for the board 
to construct a new motivational framing for the stakeholders by transforming the prevalent 
prognostic framings of benchmarking. This transformation would accordingly reflect a 
compromise between the stakeholders and simultaneously symbolize BEC in a renewed version 
that to a higher extent focused on the administrative tasks of operating the benchmarking 
system and conducting analyses than a strong political actor in the institutionalization.  
Liliegreen’s replacement was found in BEC, as the board of directors appointed the, at the time, 
deputy director, Ebbe Lind Kristensen, as the new managing director of the centre. Deputy 
director, Peter Hesdorf, was additionally entitled “director.” The two directors were put in 
charge of transforming BEC into a trimmed and less bureaucratic company (Jyllands-Posten, 
2007a). The main focus areas were a) to make benchmarking operational; b) to stimulate a 
demand for benchmarking from the clients; c) to gain acceptance from the construction 
companies; and d) to balance the economy in the operation of the benchmark system. One year 
after his nomination, Kristensen resigned as managing director in favor of a job in a consulting 
engineering company. The board appointed Hesdorf the new managing director.  
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In an account for the point of departure that the transformation of the centre was to depart, 
Peter Hesdorf explained: 
“I find the lacking demand for KPIs to be an important aspect in the history of BEC. 
This was caused by the fact that nobody had told clients how they should use the KPIs” 
(Interview, Peter Hesdorf).  
“BEC’s task was to produce KPIs. It was not given that we also were responsible for 
explaining clients how they should use them. This responsibility could just as well have 
been the authorities’ or other actors’” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf).  
“When you deal with sensitive processes in construction like prequalification of 
collaborators, it is very easy to do something that breaches with the legal requirements 
for clients. This made it difficult for clients to use KPIs. At least it was easier not to, in 
order to be certain that they did not do anything wrong. This entailed that the system got 
off to a bad start. And over time this also entailed that several clients got the perception 
that the system was difficult and time-consuming” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf). 
“Until now we had been addressing many areas. We had many interests, and 
benchmarking was only one of them. […] It was downhill when Ebbe and I took over 
the centre in 2007. And it became even worse when our costumers thought that the 
centre was about to close down. […] Accordingly, we chose to focus on what was 
important: the functioning of the benchmarking system” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf).  
These quotations reveal the challenges that were considered most important to address in order 
to establish a stable platform for the future institutionalization. These challenges accordingly 
reflected an increased focus on pursuing a motivational framing that could be mutually agreed 
upon among stakeholders: changing the competition from price to quality. This mutually 
accepted motivational framing was revealed by the director of EBST: 
“It was my task to gather the stakeholders and identify the things we could agree upon: 
to change the competition in the construction industry towards quality instead of price. 
On this basis we made a deal about the system for consulting engineers and architects 
and the system for contractors. We agree that we need to lower the ambitions for both 
systems” (Finn Lauritzen, Licitationen, 2008a). 
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This strong focus on a coherent motivational framing was further revealed as Peter Hesdorf 
explained:  
“The main task for BEC is to generate transparency in the construction industry. This is 
definitive and it is a part of our articles of association. This is supported broadly in the 
construction industry. It is in the interests of clients to select the best bidders for their 
projects. And it is in the interests of the private companies that competition is on other 
criteria than price exclusively” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf).  
BEC found it to be a prerequisite for the future acceptance of benchmarking as a legitimate part 
of the construction industry that clients, to a higher degree, actively made use of benchmarking 
in the prequalification. Accordingly, BEC invested many resources in the coming years in 
communicating benchmarking to clients that was not subjected to the executive orders. BEC’s 
attempts to institutionalize benchmarking had a heavy basis in the centre’s ambition of 
producing transparency in the construction industry, which was not to be isolated to the 
domains of state and social housing building activities. BEC’s ambitions of transparency 
included a strategy of actively disseminating benchmarking to the private market and also the 
regional, and local authorities that was not subjected to the executive orders. This ambition was 
a break with the strategy that had been highly criticized by the construction companies that 
relied on a dissemination of benchmarking as a legal requirement.  
“We believe that in order for the benchmarking system to be successful it must cover the 
entire construction industry” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf). 
“We decided to focus on getting clients to use benchmarking. We did so in order to 
generate a demand for KPIs. Nobody will be interested in achieving KPIs if no one 
requests them” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf). 
With the purpose of disseminating benchmarking, BEC carried out a project in 2009 that aimed 
at getting clients from the 98 local authorities to demand track records from their bidders 
(Licitationen, 2009). The project was called “Local authorities as front-runners.”  
“It is free of charge for a client in local authorities to demand track records, and we 
encourage them to do so. We will also ask the clients to demand that benchmarking is 
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conducted in one or more of their building projects, which will increase our amount of 
data for the benefit of other clients” (Peter Hesdorf, Licitationen, 2009). 
“The purpose of the project is to disseminate the utilization of track records to local 
authorities. Additionally, we wish to know about the barriers that prevent local 
authorities from using the system.” (Peter Hesdorf, Licitationen, 2009a).  
The ambitions of disseminating benchmarking to clients, who were not subjected to the 
executive orders, necessitated a communication strategy that could reveal clients’ potential 
benefits from utilizing benchmarking in their prequalifications. BEC accordingly promoted 
benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology to the local authorities through 
examplifications: 
“It is natural that the employer asks for the candidate’s diploma. It is almost considered 
to be a poor management style not to if the company has advertised for a high position. 
For the same purpose, we want to show clients [from the local authorities] that they can 
request track records from their bidders, and we offer this service free of charge” (Peter 
Hesdorf, Licitationen, 2009b).  
BEC’s expectation of the normalizing effects of benchmarking was also expressed in the same 
newspaper article: 
“Additionally, clients can use the benchmarking system to demand KPIs from their 
building projects. This entails that the contractor, consulting engineer or architects know 
that they are being assessed on their performance, which provides them an incentive to 
provide a good service” (Peter Hesdorf, Licitationen, 2009b). 
In this way, BEC continued to disseminate benchmarking as a normalizing governing 
technology, in a communication strategy that to higher degree revealed the benefits that 
benchmarking could entail when used in clients’ prequalification. 
4.6.3 TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE BENCHMARKING SYSTEMS 
The political struggles described in the previous chapter entailed a strong request for 
simplifications of the two benchmarking systems. The compromise that was made regarding 
the benchmarking system for consulting engineers and architects was made with EBST as 
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mediator and with actors representing the consulting engineers and architects. Further, a 
consultant was hired to mediate between the parties. The result of this negotiation was a much 
less administrative-requiring system that best can be described as an evaluation of the customer 
satisfaction (Erhvervsbladet.dk, 2007). The system consisted of basic data about the building 
project and 15 subjective questions regarding the consulting engineer’s or architect’s 
performance during the project. The specific questions can be seen in appendix C (Note that 
BEC uses the term “consultant” as a common term for consulting engineers and architects).  
“The system consists entirely of subjective KPIs. The assessment is made by the 
customer and the procedure takes a maximum of ten minutes” (Appendix C). 
This statement reflects that the main concern about a too comprehensive system that did not 
provide the consulting engineers or architects with sufficient value was accommodated. The 
track records were maintained in order to sustain clients’ use of benchmarking in the 
prequalification. But the compromise entailed a downgrading of the original ambition of 
intertwining the benchmarking system for consulting engineers and architects to the system for 
contractors. This reflected an exploitation of the contradiction between the previous ambitions 
for benchmarking and the requirements for a future institutionalization. The ambition of having 
a high degree of intertwining between the two systems required a much heavier administrative 
burden and was thus contradictory to the ambition of having a system that was accepted by 
consulting engineers and architects due to its low resource consumption. A consequence was 
that the utilization of benchmarking as a socially constructive technology was given a lower 
priority (as this required maximum information about project characteristics and a high degree 
of intertwining between the two systems) in favor of a stronger support and acceptance from 
the companies subjected to benchmarking. Additionally, the simplification of the system for 
consulting engineers and architects entailed that the transparency was reduced to questions 
related to customer satisfaction. 
The reduced transparency and the de-legitimization of benchmarking as a socially constructive 
technology was further strengthened as the benchmarking system for contractors concurrently 
faced major modifications in order to meet the requirements put forward by contractors and 
their associations. The political negotiations resulted in a heavy reduction of 60% of the 
information that was required through the executive orders (Licitationen, 2007n).  
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The modifications of the system entailed that BEC could conduct the benchmarking activities 
for contractors without gathering information from their subcontractors and had four concrete 
outcomes that reflected the political considerations that were favored in the negotiations:  
- The information from already benchmarked projects could still be used.  
- Information from subcontractors was cut out. 
- Information about the company’s expenses was cut out. 
- KPI about work environment was changed from “accidents per million work hours” to 
“accidents per billion DKK.” (BEC, 2007) 
“The simplification has no consequences for clients who wish to use KPIs and track 
records in a prequalification of contractors. This is free of charge and the amount of 
KPIs are the same as until now […] BEC is content with the solution that has restored 
the order of the benchmarking system and the track records” (Ebbe Lind Kristensen, 
BEC, 2007).  
The simplification of the contractor system accordingly reflected a maintenance of utilizing 
benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology, as the simplification was considered not 
to compromise clients’ utilization of benchmarking in their prequalification of contractors.  
The simplification entailed that all registrations from subcontractors were taken out of the 
system and simultaneously that KPIs about productivity were no longer a part of the system. 
Another result of the simplification was that all registrations were now to be conducted by 
clients instead of both clients and contractors as done so far. In this way, the reporting burden 
was considerably reduced for construction companies.  
The prevalent expectations to how benchmarking could increase productivity in the 
construction industry were now based solely on the prognostic framing of benchmarking as a 
normalizing governing technology that provided clients with transparency of bidders 
performance and through sanctions provided incentives for companies to adjust their products 
and processes.  
How could such previously important ambitions for benchmarking be taken out? The answer 
was to be found in the more market-oriented approach of BEC: 
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“One of the original objectives with the system was to produce measures of 
productivity. This discussion about the productivity in the construction industry is 
ongoing and therefore there was a request for some concrete and valid figures about 
productivity. But this was cut in the simplification of the system. It was a matter of give-
and-take at that time. I just find it worth mentioning that measuring productivity was 
acknowledged, but the output did not commensurate with the efforts ” (Interview, Peter 
Hesdorf). 
“The development of the benchmarking systems is a consequence of taking actors’ 
different interests into account. We in BEC wish to provide a system that generates the 
transparency needed in the construction industry. The transparency is not a reflection of 
BEC’s or my personal interpretation of transparency” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf).  
These statements reveal the new position and focus of BEC as an actor that had ambitions of 
acting neutral and operating a benchmarking system that reflected mutually agreed interests of 
stakeholders. Accordingly, the statements reveal how BEC withdrew from political discussions 
that had previously been main interests to the centre in favor of meeting the expectations to a 
centre that operated on the basis of a more market-oriented strategy. Particularly, BEC’s 
approach to generating transparency on the premises of the construction industry reflected a 
high degree of deviation from the high ambitions of former managing director, Curt Liliegreen, 
who sought to generate a maximum of transparency for the purpose of utilizing benchmarking 
as a socially constructive technology. 
The simplification entailed that the KPIs about efficiency and productivity no longer were part 
of the system. This was originally one of the cornerstones in benchmarking: to address and 
shed light on the fundamental problem of the construction industry—low productivity, which 
required measurements of productivity. The exclusion of the efficiency and productivity 
measures must be regarded as a result of opposing actors’ capability to propound powerful 
counter-arguments demonstrating the inexpediencies of the efficiency and productivity 
measures in a cost-benefit consideration (e.g., Interview, Jesper Rasmussen; Karsten Gullach). 
Accordingly, the exclusion of the measures was a necessary sacrifice in the political 
negotiations of providing renewed credibility to the institutionalization of benchmarking. The 
exclusion of the efficiency and productivity measures simultaneously reflected the political 
requirements for a less politically influential role of BEC, as BEC no longer would be able to 
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use benchmarking for producing analyses of societal interest of the productivity development 
of the construction industry. The main focus on benchmarking was how to make the system 
operational and integrated into the industry.  
With this new strategic focus of BEC, the previous legitimization of benchmarking as a legal 
requirement was no longer part of BEC’s dissemination strategy. Accordingly, it was required 
that the authorities expressed their support for this regulatory dissemination of benchmarking in 
order to maintain BEC as a neutral benchmarking operator, separated from the legal 
requirements. In a press release (Licitationen, 2007n), the authorities accounted for a strong 
political support to a continued institutionalization of benchmarking as an important provider of 
transparency and as a means to change the competition from price towards quality. The press 
release announced that the Minister of Trade and Industry would participate in BEC’s coming 
annual meeting and make clear that benchmarking would continue to be a central part of the 
future construction policy and, further, that the amount of defects was a political focus area in 
the ambition of providing better and less expensive buildings (Mester Tidende, 2008; 
Licitationen, 2008b; Licitationen, 2008c).  
“We are very content with the participation of the minister at our annual meeting. We 
perceive it as a vote of confidence and a support to the centre and the associations 
responsible for the new system to contractors and the new system to consulting 
engineers and architects” (Ebbe Lind Kristensen, Licitationen, 2007n). 
The strategy of the annual meeting seemed distinct: The two new benchmarking systems where 
to be presented, and benchmarking had to be communicated in a way that was more attractive 
to those subjected to benchmarking: contractors, consulting engineers, and architects. The 
contents of the annual meeting reflected an unfolding of BEC’s new role, where the traditional 
focus on the development of defects and productivity was deselected for the benefit of putting 
the two benchmarking systems in the spotlight and communicating the practical functioning 
and legitimacy of benchmarking the construction industry. Simultaneously, the authorities 
revealed a strong interest in benchmarking and further made clear that they were responsible 
for regulative requirements to benchmarking. This responsibility was exemplified, as the 
director of EBST, Finn Lauritzen, became the vice chairman of the board in BEC (Licitationen, 
2008), and thus reflecting to a higher extend than previously that the political issues of 
benchmarking that had a base in the content of the executive orders was a matter for EBST and 
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the Ministry of Social Affairs rather than for BEC. In this way, the authorities removed some of 
the pressure that had previously been put on BEC as carrier of the legislations.  
4.6.4 COMPETITION – BÜLOW MANAGEMENT 
In 2010, shortly after announcing that the 1000th contractor company had enrolled in the 
benchmarking system and that BEC was continuing work on communicating and disseminating 
benchmarking as a simple and attractive initiative for the market to partake in (BEC, 2010a), a 
new actor emerged. 
A competitor to BEC was presented in a newspaper article (Børsen, 2010). The story was 
presented as a pleasant piece of news for proponents of Liberalism and market economy, as 
BEC was perceived as having a monopoly on conducting benchmarking and criticized for 
inflated prices (Børsen, 2010).   
The new benchmarking operator was a consulting company called Bülow Management that 
already had activities within the construction industry and collaborated with Dansk Byggeri in 
network groups called “Business Excellence Network” addressing management and 
organizational development in construction.  
Through these groups Bülow became acquainted with the benchmarking initiative and was 
presented to some of the critique areas contractors had with the system. Bülow introduced a 
concept called “The Index for KPIs and Clients in Construction” (da. Byggeriets Nøgletals- og 
Kundeindeks, BNKI), which were based on the same KPIs as in the executive orders and 
provided companies the KPIs for bidding on projects where track records were required. BNKI 
additionally supplemented the track records with analyses of the data. The concept was 
developed in collaboration with six contractor companies (Appendix D – in Danish). 
“The idea behind BNKI is to incorporate a more customer oriented approach in the 
construction industry and hereby an increased possibility for companies to compete on 
quality rather than price. Our entrance to the market [of benchmarking operators] 
generates an interesting situation on a market that has until now not had any 
competition. We expect that we in the future will see more benchmarking operators, 
which will only improve the market further” (Troels Støvring, Bülow Management, 
Børsen, 2010). 
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BEC and Dansk Byggeri responded positively to the prospect of competition: 
“We welcome Bülow and see positively on competition. It is only good when the 
companies have more options” (Peter Hesdorf, BEC, Børsen, 2010). 
“We are proponents of the market and welcome the new initiative. But of course on the 
premise that Bülow meets the demands from the government” (Michael H. Nielsen, 
Dansk Byggeri, Børsen, 2010). 
Simultaneously, Michael H. Nielsen from Dansk Byggeri reflected on the insufficiencies and 
weaknesses of BEC and presented an underlying expectation to the future marketing of 
benchmarking that Bülow Management was likely to find legitimacy and support from: 
“BEC was probably too ambitious from the beginning with too comprehensive and 
detailed benchmarking. This is better now [after the simplification of the system]” 
(Michael H. Nielsen, Dansk Byggeri, Børsen, 2010).  
The development of the institutionalization had generated openings for entrances of new 
benchmarking operators: the simplification of the benchmarking system had generated a more 
economically lucrative market for others to conduct and benefit from benchmarking due to the 
reduced work in conducting benchmarking, a greater demand for KPIs from clients was 
recorded, and a considerable rise in the number of social housing projects resulted in prospects 
of future increased requirements for benchmarking. The results of political negotiations (that 
emerged through an exploitation of the contradictions between having a comprehensive system 
that provided socially constructive analyses and having a benchmarking system with an 
administrative burden that could be accepted by the private market) entailed an opening for 
new actors to enter the market of benchmarking operators. This opening was also provided, as 
the authorities had taken over the responsibility for the regulatory dissemination of 
benchmarking. Accordingly, this new distribution of roles in the institutionalization of 
benchmarking made it possible for new benchmarking operators to formulate benchmarking in 
prognostic framings that fulfilled the legal requirements of the executive orders but did not 
necessarily subscribe to the same motivational framing as BEC. In this way, the benchmarking 
operators were able to construct their own interpretations and sale strategies of how 
benchmarking could gain the highest support as a normalizing governing technology among the 
construction companies purchasing benchmarking products and services.  
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These exploitations of benchmarking operators’ possibility to construct new motivational 
framings became evident with the entrance of Bülow Management. The benchmarking operator 
reformulated the motivational framing for engaging in benchmarking (as normalizing 
governing technology) by designing products and services that, to a greater degree, reflected a 
focus on the construction companies instead of the clients.  
Bülow Management was encouraged to attend to this focus by Dansk Byggeri and their 
member companies: 
“He [Michael H. Nielsen] thinks that many construction companies have been skeptical 
towards the BEC. High prices, lacking effects and too much bureaucracy have been 
areas of criticism” (Børsen, 2010).  
This was further followed up in an interview with a contractor in the same newspaper article: 
“The monopoly has possibly pervaded the behavior of BEC. Director Peder Buus from 
Buus Totalbyg in Bjerringbro is at any rate not satisfied with the attitude [of BEC], and 
has therefore chosen BNKI [as benchmarking operator]. 
‘We have not been in agreement of how to run things. They [BEC] have acted as if they 
were the only ones who had had a saying. Additionally they have been arrogant in the 
way they approach companies through the letters they have been sending’” (Peder Buus, 
Buus Totalbyg, Børsen, 2010).  
This newspaper article reveals how Bülow Management was able to exploit the dissatisfaction 
with BEC by propounding alternative prognostic framings of benchmarking for the companies 
in the construction industry which were expected to be more appealing to these actors. 
Bülow Management’s exploitation of these dissatisfactions appeared during the interview with 
Troels Støvring (Bülow Management), who revealed an exploitation of two main contradictions 
in the institutionalization of benchmarking, providing a legitimate platform from which Bülow 
Management could engage in benchmarking and develop BNKI:  
Støvring explained how the dissemination of benchmarking was being hindered by the prices of 
BEC:  
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“[T]he price for benchmarking was too high, and the market needed a different price 
structure for benchmarking” (Interview, Troels Støvring). 
With this critique, Bülow drew on an already criticized contradiction in the benchmarking 
institutions, pointing to a lack of correspondence between of the resources and prices for 
benchmarking and the output that was provided the companies that were purchasing the 
benchmarking products and services. This entailed that, when BNKI was introduced, it was 
along with a price structure that was lower than the one of BEC. The new fees ranged from 
7,000 DKK for a contract less than 15m DKK, 9,000 DKK for a contract on more than 15m 
DKK, and a fixed price at 4,000 DKK for benchmarking for consulting engineers and architects 
(Appendix D). This new competition on price for conducting benchmarking soon set a 
precedent of prices for benchmarking, as BEC also adjusted their prices in this same period.  
The second contradiction exploited by Bülow Management was based on the dissatisfaction 
with benchmarking among some contractors, consulting engineers, and architects. Bülow 
Management attempted to disseminate benchmarking to these actors in ways that would reflect 
more local and market competitive advantages that could be derived from benchmarking. The 
aim was to generate new perceptions and utilizations of benchmarking among construction 
companies, which enabled them to bid on building projects where track records were required 
and simultaneously could benefit these companies by deriving improvements of their products 
and services. This strategy was considered to have potential, as Bülow Management had 
already identified interests and openings for such managerial utilization of benchmarking. 
“Several of the big companies had an internal evaluation culture, which the BNKI 
concept fitted into. The companies have in several years worked with customer 
satisfaction on the individual projects. BNKI offered an opportunity to continue this 
work and streamline it across the organization” (Interview, Troels Støvring). 
“And this was how we entered the market: to develop the system on the premises of 
contractors, consulting engineers, and architects” (Interview, Troels Støvring). 
Bülow Management’s point of origin to their constructing of a motivational framing appealing 
to construction companies is revealed in the below statements:  
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“Incentives to increase quality are generated when a contractor needs to focus on KPIs, 
because he knows that in the end he will be assessed one these. In this way the system is 
a method to increase quality of the buildings and that price is not the only quality in the 
prequalification. This objective is very noble, and the system has been based on this 
purpose so far. But how do you meet this purpose?” (Interview, Troels Støvring)  
“This system has two values. The first value is that you are able to bid on building 
projects, where KPIs are requested. The second value is the opportunity for companies 
to identify areas of improvement, which can help in an optimization of your company. 
Since we are a consulting company, you are probably not surprised that we are focusing 
on the latter value” (Interview, Troels Støvring). 
“The contractors, consulting engineers, and architects felt that their interests were 
neglected in the system. The system was a system between the benchmarking operator 
and the clients. This left a major group of people in the middle who were being 
measured and simultaneously were paying for the system. So our focus was to bring 
these people into focus and tell them how they could benefit from the system…We 
needed to tell them about the importance of a good track record and how they could 
achieve such. We needed to show them how benchmarking could be used as a 
competitive resource and resource for marketing” (Interview, Troels Støvring). 
BNKI was accordingly developed as two products: one product that consisted of a track record, 
in order to satisfy the executive orders and to bid on building projects where KPIs were 
required, and the second product was more of a consultancy service, where recommendations 
were given based on the achieved and historical KPIs and supplementing information that 
Bülow Management gathered from involved actors.  
“We cannot give recommendations based on qualitative data exclusively. We need 
qualitative data in order to understand the quantitative data. Otherwise we risk 
recommending something wrong…Our focus is on the internal utilization of the KPIs: 
What can companies use benchmarking for?…This is about why the client says what he 
says. What are the reasons to say as he does? What can the company learn from this? 
What can the company do different next time? This is what the BNKI report does. It 
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was to motivate contractors, consulting engineers, and architects to value benchmarking as a 
productive element in improving their performance. In this way, Bülow Management attempted 
to construct a prognostic framing that exploited the contradictions of the institutionalization of 
benchmarking. However, the reflective development technology propounded by Bülow 
Management was different from that of the Task Force and Project House since it had higher 
similarities to “internal benchmarking,” where the companies are provided insight into their 
own performances and provided with knowledge of how their products and services can be 
improved in order to meet the demands from their clients. This internal perspective on process 
improvements was separated from the original prognostic framing of benchmarking as 
reflective development technology since it did not include a comparison of processes across 
companies to identify best practices but instead took a point of departure in the performances 
and processes of the individual company. In this way, Bülow Management constructed a 
prognostic framing that drew on the construction companies’ interests in both attaining a better 
competitive advantage in future prequalifications and their interests in improving and 
optimizing their products and services. 
The above accounts for Bülow Management’s identification of contradictions in the 
institutionalization of benchmarking and how they exploited these contradictions as 
institutional openings for the company to be perceived as an alternative to BEC. However, an 
intriguing position emerged, as Støvring reflected on the co-existence of the prognostic 
framings and explicitly acknowledged the focus on clients and disseminating benchmarking as 
a selection tool. His acknowledgement of the client focus was based on an awareness of clients’ 
utilization of benchmarking as a prerequisite for achieving market penetration of benchmarking 
and providing construction companies incentives to engage in benchmarking. 
“It is a good thing that the authorities require benchmarking. If it wasn’t a legal 
requirement, this platform for using benchmarking wouldn’t exist. Benchmarking could 
not be initiated without the governmental requirements. Our entrance on the market 
derives from the possibility that was generated to do so. We could not have done it ten 
years ago” (Interview, Troels Støvring). 
In this way, despite their focus on constructing a prognostic and motivational framing that 
appealed to the construction companies, Bülow Management was aware that the institutional 
legitimacy of benchmarking relied on the utilization of track records by clients, and therefore 
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found this focus on clients an essential element in the dissemination of benchmarking. BNKI 
accordingly did not seek to delegitimize the function of benchmarking as a selection tool for 
clients nor was it considered to carry or support this utilization. Bülow Management had 
exploited that other actors were attending to this dissemination strategy and focus on clients, 
which had created openings for other benchmarking operators to construct motivational 
framings supporting the interests of contractors, consulting engineers, and architects. 
4.6.5 BYGGERIETS NØGLETAL APS 
Another benchmarking operator entered the market soon after Bülow Management. This time it 
was a result of a joint initiative among small and medium sized construction companies who 
had interests in getting engaged in the future benchmarking activities. Byggeriets Nøgletal 
separated from both BEC and Bülow Management by promoting their service as the being 
stripped down to delivering a product that fulfilled the executives’ orders for bidding on state 
and social housing building projects. This clear focus appeared in a newspaper article (Mester 
Tidende 13.05.2012) and on their website. When choosing Byggeriets Nøgletal to conduct 
benchmarking contractors, consulting engineers and architects would receive a product that met 
the legal requirements and provided the needed track records that permitted them to bid on 
future projects requiring KPIs.  
By cutting off any additional service, Byggeriets Nøgletal was able to offer prices much lower 
than BEC and Bülow, ranging from 500 DKK to 2,500 DKK depending on the size of the 
building project. On their web site, under an example of a fact sheet, Byggeriets Nøgletal 
wrote:  
“Make your biddings more competitive. Reduce the cost to your benchmarking operator. 
Choose Byggeriets Nøgletal aps.”14 
In this way, Byggeriets Nøgletal was aiming at those companies that were interested in an 
inexpensive delivery of KPIs and identified an economic opportunity to engage as a 
benchmarking operator. The company promoted a motivational framing appealing to 
construction companies that perceived track records as a necessity to bid on building projects 
                                                 
14 http://www.byggerietsnoegletal.dk/ - Accessed 29-08-2012 
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where track records were required but, other than that, did not have any interests in 
benchmarking. Byggeriets Nøgletal accordingly exploited the market’s increasing requirements 
for track records and acceptance of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology. 
What separates this motivational framing from BEC and Bülow Management is that Byggeriets 
Nøgletal did not actively communicate benchmarking in ways that could further strengthen the 
institutionalization of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology improving 
building products by providing incentive for construction companies to pursue good KPIs. In 
this way, this benchmarking operator did not actively draw on the diagnostic framing of 
changing the competition from price to quality but instead exploited a contradiction between 
the increasingly acceptance of this framing in the construction industry and those construction 
companies that were solely considering track records to be a necessity for bidding on building 
projects where track records were required.  
4.6.6 BEC AS AN IMPARTIAL BENCHMARKING OPERATOR IN A COMPETITIVE 
MARKET 
The competitor’s influenced the strategies of BEC in different ways by strengthening the 
ambitions of a more market-oriented BEC. This was caused both by the new competition of 
attracting customers to buy their benchmarking products and services but also because it 
indirectly provided the centre opportunities to develop a more market-oriented prognostic 
framing of benchmarking since the Ministry of Social Affairs and Dansk Byggeri withdrew 
from BEC’s board of directors and instead appointed representatives from respective clients for 
social housing and contractor companies. EBST also withdrew from BEC’s board of directors 
and did not appoint another representative. This withdrawal was rooted in these actors’ 
calculated political considerations of avoiding accusations of distortion of competition on this 
newly emerged market for benchmarking operators. An important condition that could also 
have influenced the decision of withdrawal was that the simplification of the benchmarking 
systems had made benchmarking a less controversial political issue for the board members to 
handle since the simplification was a political compromise between the political actors who 
were represented in BEC’s board of directors. Further, it was from the birth of the centre a 
strong ambition among the initiators that BEC was not to be the only benchmarking operator in 
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the market, so this changed constellation of the board members was probably already planned 
by the authorities and Dansk Byggeri.  
The entrance of competitors entailed that BEC was no longer, to the same extent, to be exposed 
to major political discussions where the authorities and professional associations in 
consultation could influence, monitor, and control the future prognostic framings of 
benchmarking. It could be perceived as an unfair competitive advantage for BEC if the centre 
was continually having a strong influence in constructing the prognostic framings of 
benchmarking in collaboration with the most politically influential actors of the construction 
industry. Instead, the board of directors and the managing director were to attend to the purpose 
of establishing and supporting a strategy that strengthened BEC as a competitive operator of 
benchmarking and simultaneously fulfilled the visions of the centre.  
The changed constellation of the board members had an important impact on BEC’s future 
strategic ambitions since it created better opportunities for the centre to focus less on the 
political struggles between actors with diverse interests in benchmarking in favor of focusing 
more on the requests from the market for BEC to communicate and disseminate benchmarking 
in a practical and local context that was more appealing to companies in the construction 
industry. According to Hesdorf, this orientation was further boosted by the competition: 
“The fact that we now find ourselves in a competition situation has forced us to be even 
more accurate about what our customers can expect from BEC. We have always had this 
focus, but now we need to be even more accurate, because when, for instance, a 
contractor needs KPIs he automatically chooses the benchmarking operator where he is 
provided the best service. This has forced us to be more accurate about the customer 
service we provide” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf).  
“Today we position ourselves and communicate BEC as a provider of a service. In the 
same way companies choose accountants, they now choose their benchmarking 
operator. They choose the operator based on their prices and their abilities to provide 
services among other criteria” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf). 
Additionally, Hesdorf pointed out that the competition entailed that BEC could step out of the 
widespread perception of BEC as the authorities’ right-hand man: 
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“The competition has paradoxically helped us, since we are no longer in a situation 
where we are the only company offering a benchmarking service. Some people have 
called it monopoly, which is wrong, because it has never been a monopoly—anybody 
could sell this service” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf). 
BEC maintained the centre’s ambition of generating market transparency, which required a 
continued focus on disseminating benchmarking to the clients that were not subjected to the 
executive orders. This focus outlined the future strategic decisions that were made by BEC: If 
contractors, consulting engineers, and architects were to actively request benchmarking, they 
had to be provided sufficient incentives for defraying these expenses. According to BEC, the 
incentives were to be found through an increased demand for KPIs in prequalifications.  
“It is evident that [so far] the legal requirements have been a massive driver for 
companies to voluntarily request benchmarking. But I think that this tendency is 
changing. Some companies are voluntarily requesting benchmarking for the purpose of 
marketing. They know that this is going to be important [in future prequalifications]—
not only in state and social housing building projects. They see in the tender documents 
that other kinds of clients are requiring KPIs” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf). 
Besides this increased focus on increasing clients’ utilization and demands for benchmarking in 
the prequalification, BEC further developed a product that facilitated companies’ internal 
utilization of benchmarking as a management tool, which reflected an interest in the prognostic 
framing of benchmarking as a reflective development technology in the term of “internal 
benchmarking.”  
“Benchmarking must be used internally in the contractor, consulting engineering or 
architect company. What we can do to promote this is to deliver some methods and tools 
that can facilitate such utilization. E.g., we deliver a report15 about the KPIs that can be 
used by the management of the companies to understand their market position. But 
reading this report does not necessarily mean that it is used internally in the management 
of the company. This requires an active decision by the management to do so. But now 
we have reached to a point where, A: companies’ KPIs matter. They are important and 
                                                 
15 An example of the report can be found at: 
 http://www.byggeevaluering.dk/media/29096/noegleralsrapport_ent_demo_2012.pdf - Accessed 20-10-2012 
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they cannot be neglected. And B: We deliver some tools that facilitate an internal 
utilization of the KPIs in the company. The prerequisites are in place, which they 
weren’t when we started in 2004. So I do not think that we could successfully have sold 
them as internal management tool at that time” (Interview, Peter Hesdorf). 
The competition of attracting customers had caused the benchmarking operators to be highly 
aware of the importance of constructing motivational framings that could appeal to the market. 
Characteristic for all three benchmarking operators is that they all draw on benchmarking as a 
normalizing governing technology in some way or another but also that they have different 
perceptions of the strategies of how to most successfully or legitimately carry and support this 
institutionalization.  
4.6.7 COMPETITION ENTAILS IMPLICATIONS FOR PRODUCING COHERENT FRAMINGS 
As described above, the existence of three benchmarking operators entailed that the 
benchmarking operators were attempting to institutionalize benchmarking as a normalizing 
governing technology in different ways by propounding diverse instrumental purposes and 
overall objectives of benchmarking to their customers (contractors, consulting engineers, and 
architects). The competition revealed how the executive orders could facilitate a coexistence of 
different prognostic and motivational framings without deviating from the legal requirements. 
The diverse promotion and interpretations of benchmarking propounded by the three 
benchmarking operators produced a coexistence of different diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational framings that contractors, consulting engineers, and architects could choose from 
when selecting their benchmarking operator. As a consequence, these practitioners from the 
construction industry were given a newly risen opportunity to influence the orientation of the 
institutionalization from which benchmarking was to find its legitimacy. Accordingly, a 
decision made several years ago entailing that construction companies were to be imposed the 
expenses of benchmarking was suddenly showing to be a very important aspect in the future 
formulation of framings and thus institutionalization of benchmarking.  
The benchmarking operators’ attempts to influence the institutionalization by propounding 
different initiatives in their respective prognostic framings were further challenged by the other 
benchmarking operators, thus entailing implications for a production of coherent 
institutionalization. Such implications became clear as BEC attempted to promote their 
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ambitions for institutionalizing benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology by means 
of two strategic initiatives: publications of KPIs and Bygge Rating. These initiatives were 
challenged by Byggeriets Nøgletal and Bülow Management as their ambitions for the 
institutionalization were not in line with the objectives of the two initiatives. In the following, 
the implications will be briefly accounted for. For a more detailed exposition of the 
development and struggles between the benchmarking operators, see appendix E. 
Despite the challenges of operating on a market with competitors who had different objectives 
for benchmarking, BEC did not deviate from their ambition of generating transparency of the 
construction industry. The ambition of publishing all KPIs from the benchmarking system was, 
however, not supported by the two other benchmarking operators. Originally, Bülow 
Management prepared the ground for total transparency of the KPIs (see Appendix D), but 
pressures from their costumers caused a cancellation of this ambition (Interview Troels 
Støvring). As a result, the publication strategy revealed contradictions between the ambition of 
driving companies to request benchmarking on a voluntary basis with interests in performance 
improvements and the ambition of generating total transparency of the market for the benefit of 
clients. As a result, the publication initiative resulted in a transparency consisting of BEC only 
publishing KPIs from building projects subjected to the executive order and building projects 
where construction companies had voluntarily chosen to publish their KPIs from private 
projects. Additionally, EBST and the Danish Building Defect Fund published the KPIs from, 
respectively, state and social housing building projects. This publication was realized prior to 
BEC’s publication of KPIs. In this way, the original ambition of total transparency was highly 
reduced, as the publication of KPIs was limited to building projects subjected to the executive 
orders and building projects where construction companies voluntarily had chosen to support 
BEC’s ambition of transparency. 
Another attempt from BEC to promote their prognostic framing of benchmarking as a 
normalizing governing technology was also influenced by Bülow Management and Byggeriets 
Nøgletal.  
“Bygge Rating” was presented in 2011 at BEC’s annual meeting and had the purpose of 
making it easier for clients to assess their bidder’s performance by providing a supplement to 
the track records that could facilitate the use of track records for selection of collaborators 
(Byggeri.dk, 2011).  
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“This is a ‘light’ version [of the track records] that facilitates the communication about 
companies’ KPIs. Bygge Rating will be ideal when comparing several companies” 
(Peter Hesdorf, Byggeri.dk, 2011). 
 “For us it is about increasing the utilization of benchmarking, and we consider that 
Bygge Rating is an efficient way” (Peter Hesdorf, Erhvervsbladet.dk, 2011). 
Bygge Rating was developed in collaboration with clients and also representatives from 
contractors, consulting engineers and architects and professional associations16 (Interview Peter 
Hesdorf). The system was very illustrative, showing the performance of the companies by 
grading the different KPIs from A to E. BEC placed “Bygge Rating” on the front page of the 
track records, and the initiative was intended to strengthen clients in their selection of 
collaborators and entail that benchmarking would be increasingly accepted and requested by 
clients as a valued selection tool. 
 
Figure 5: Example of Bygge Rating for contractors. Showing from left to right: appliance with time, 
building defects, work accident, and client satisfaction. 
BEC attempted to disseminate Bygge Rating to the other benchmarking operators by making 
the system open source. But Bülow Management was not interested in this simplification of the 
KPIs and found it contradictory to their focus on contractors, consulting engineers, and 
architects. 
The challenges for promoting Bygge Rating as a legitimate tool for clients’ selection of bidders 
became further challenged, as Byggeriets Nøgletal chose to develop their own rating system 
from an interest of providing construction companies an opportunity to use their KPIs for 
marketing.  
                                                 
16 http://www.byggeevaluering.dk/noegletal/bygge-rating.aspx - accessed 22-10-2012 
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“Even though you may have achieved good track records, it can still be difficult to 
promote your performance in brochures, advertisements or on your web page. 
For this purpose we calculate your KPIs into a smiley—also called Bygge Rating by 
others.”17 
Byggeriets Nøgletal accordingly introduced “smiley” as a way for companies to communicate 
their performance in a different way. 
 
Figure 6: Example of alternative rating system from Byggeriets Nøgletal’s website 
The alternative rating system accordingly entailed that the KPIs were not calculated into 
consistent ratings, as the criteria for the ratings were different from those of BEC, and the 
visual presentation of the ratings were not absolutely comparable. 
The dissemination of Bygge Rating to the clients was accordingly reduced to the track records 
from BEC. BEC attempted to cope with this issue by developing an online converter of KPIs to 
ratings.  
The two above attempts by BEC to strengthen the institutionalization in the direction of their 
ambitions reveal how Bülow Management and Byggeriets Nøgletal were hindering BEC in 
pursuing ambitions of a more transparent market and attempts to disseminate benchmarking to 
clients as a simple selection tool to be used in prequalifications. As a consequence of a market 
with several benchmarking operators with different interests in the orientation of the 
institutionalization, political struggles emerged as one benchmarking operator attempt to 
strengthen the institutionalization in an orientation which is not commonly shared by the three 
benchmarking operators. It had accordingly become even more difficult for benchmarking 
                                                 
17 www.byggerietsnoegletal.dk/Smiley - Accessed 13-08-2012 
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operators to construct consistent framings of benchmarking that could determine the orientation 
of the institutionalization.  
 
  
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
187
4.7 INTERPRETATIONS OF BENCHMARKING AMONG PRACTITIONERS 
The last chapter demonstrated how benchmarking had been politically negotiated in ways that 
were acceptable for the whole range of professional association and the authorities. In favor of 
an institutionalization towards more market-oriented instrumental purposes and overall 
objectives for benchmarking pointing in a direction of changing the competition from price to 
quality, the transparency and the ambition of utilizing benchmarking as a socially constructive 
technology had been given lower priorities. The politically negotiated benchmarking institution 
was stabilized around the perception of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology 
and relied on a normative interpretation among construction companies that the track records 
were used by clients in their selection of collaborators in the prequalification.  
As a result of the simplification and this more market appealing configuration of 
benchmarking, new benchmarking operators emerged and challenged BEC in its position to 
influence and communicate benchmarking uniformly. As a consequence, multiple 
interpretations of benchmarking’s instrumental purposes and overall objectives became 
present, as the benchmarking operators made use of different communication strategies to 
construct motivational framings that could gain support from the practitioners in the 
construction industry. This entailed that the institutionalization of benchmarking to a much 
greater degree was left in the hands of the contractors, consulting engineers, architects, and 
clients since their choice of benchmarking operator automatically would reflect which 
motivational framing they found to be most appealing and to consider their interest.  
In this way, the political struggles of the institutionalization were no longer to be found 
between the professional associations and the authorities but instead were between the 
benchmarking operators and the practitioners. The decreased involvement of the professional 
association and the authorities had resulted in a new political situation, where the practitioners 
had become the all-important actors that could politically orientate and coerce the 
benchmarking operators to design their services to accommodate their requirements for how 
benchmarking best could support their interpretations and expectations to a normalizing 
governing technology. 
The last part of the analysis seeks to uncover how benchmarking is understood and interpreted 
among the practitioners in the construction industry. It is important to point out that the 
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empirical foundation is not sufficiently extensive to reflect a common interpretation of 
benchmarking among the practitioners in the Danish construction industry. However, the aim 
of the part of the analysis is not to come up with conclusive observations of the construction 
industry as a whole but rather to reveal how benchmarking can be interpreted and derive 
practical effects when practitioners incorporate the benchmarking institution in their 
experienced reality.  
This part, of the analysis, accordingly reveals how (a sample of) practitioners are conforming 
to the benchmarking institution and how benchmarking is transformed in practice. Further, 
through the exposition of different kind of practitioners’ interpretations of benchmarking, the 
analysis will focus attention on the interplay between and different interpretations among 
practitioners that benchmarking gives rise to. Such knowledge is highly important in order to 
understand the institutional contradictions between the politically negotiated benchmarking 
institution and the practical unfolding of benchmarking, which can potentially result in future 
political struggles and affect the institutionalization.  
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4.7.1 CONTRACTING COMPANIES 
My interviews with the contractors revealed a high degree of enrollment in the prognostic 
framing of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology. It became clear that the 
contractors I talked to mainly answered my questions about their perceptions of the 
benchmarking initiative in a way that reflected their engagement in attaining good KPIs with 
the purpose of being in a better position in prequalifications.  
The interviews revealed that benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology had 
penetrated the strategies of the companies as a legitimate element in how the contractors 
perceived the accomplishment of achieving both good performance on their building projects 
and also how benchmarking could entail economic benefits in the form of better competitive 
positions in future prequalifications. In this way, benchmarking had succeeded in attaining 
some degree of awareness in the strategic decisions made to engender a more solid competitive 
position. Some aspects of benchmarking were, however, criticized to counteract the utilization 
of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology, these being publications of KPIs, 
clients’ utilization of KPIs in prequalifications, KPIs on work accidents, and building defects as 
a legitimate measure for quality.   
INDICATIONS OF A NORMALIZING CONFORMITY TO BENCHMARKING AS NORMALIZING GOVERNING 
TECHNOLOGY 
Contractor A18 was supportive of the idea of changing the competition of the market towards 
quality performance but did not yet experience that benchmarking had been given much 
emphasis in the prequalifications.  
“I have experienced that a lot of clients require KPIs for their prequalifications, but I 
question how much this information is used” (Interview, Contractor A). 
This indicates that even though the contractor was questioning the utilization of benchmarking 
by clients, and thus the sanctions bad KPIs would entail, the raising requirements for track 
records seemed to make an impression. Despite his skepticism, the respondent revealed that the 
company was conforming to benchmarking as a selection tool. He explained how the company 
had made a strategic decision of a continuing registration of building projects that were not 
                                                 
18 All interview persons were anonymized 
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necessarily subjected to the executive orders for the purpose of having a track record that 
reflected an accurate picture of the company’s performance: 
“Our motive to benchmark a certain number of building projects is based on our interest 
in having a track record that is fair. If you have seven or eight building projects in your 
track record and one of them went poorly, it will affect your overall track record. […] 
We do not want our track record to be influenced by one discontent client. We make 
much use of the track record in prequalifications” (Interview, Contractor A). 
This statement is interesting as it both reflects how the company’s strategic decisions are based 
on the ambition of being rightfully assessed by clients in the prequalifications and, 
simultaneously, how the legal requirements of benchmarking are perceived to be insufficient in 
attaining such a track record. The company’s engagement in benchmarking indicates a 
normalizing effect of benchmarking, as the company’s assessment of the consequences of 
having a track record that was not perceived to reflect an accurate picture of the company’s 
performance counterbalanced for the cost of conducting benchmarking voluntarily on a number 
of building projects. In this way, benchmarking had attained legitimacy as a strategic element 
in the considerations of the company’s bidding position.  
Contractor A was additionally expressing another self-imposed normalizing behavior, as the 
company had chosen to be observant of whether the track record consisted of KPIs from a wide 
range of different types of building projects. 
“It is important for us that we have relevant KPIs in relation to the building projects that 
we bid on. For example, it is not sufficient to provide KPIs from a parking garage if we 
are to bid on housing building project” (Interview, Contractor A).  
Proponents of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology would be excited about 
such self-imposed initiatives since they reflect how this contractor has chosen to transcend the 
requirements of the executive orders through a strategic consideration of the consequences of 
potential deselections in the prequalifications.  
Contractor A additionally expressed satisfaction with a Bülow Management tool for measuring 
the building process during execution of the project. This indicates that Bülow Management 
had been able to successfully develop a product that could support this contractor’s building 
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processes in ways that the company found prudent in relation to their interpretations of 
benchmarking.  
“[Bülow Management’s products] are providing value in the building process. This 
generates values here and now instead of only using KPIs for your next bid” (Contractor 
A). 
Contractor B also revealed some indication of normalizing effects of benchmarking: 
“A contractor will lean over backwards on building projects that are being 
benchmarked, no doubt about that […] When you know that benchmarking entails 
consequences [in the prequalification], you automatically please your client more than 
usually. […] I think that the product and the process are better in building projects that 
are subjected to benchmarking. And in the end that is the main issue” (Contractor B). 
Another contractor, Contractor D, was skeptic of the representativity of track records for large 
contractors who have track records that embrace a larger amount of building projects: 
“Fundamentally I do not think that many contractors are interested in the benchmarking 
initiative. If we could choose, it would not exist. But since it is here, we need to keep a 
firm hold of the system, because clients use this to compare us with our competitors. 
There is a strong probability that large contractors can be punished due to their KPIs, 
because when you have a track record that consists of many building projects, it is 
difficult to achieve a good track record” (Interview, Contractor D). 
Again this contractor revealed a high awareness and consideration of the consequences 
benchmarking could entail as a normalizing governing technology.  
The contractor revealed that their engagement in benchmarking had been increased as a result 
of the added requirements for KPIs in tender documents: 
“Earlier, no clients required track records even though they were obliged to do so 
according to the executive orders. I think that benchmarking started to penetrate the 
market when the social housing sector was included in the initiative. I think that KPIs 
are increasingly provided more attention concurrently with clients’ requirements for 
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KPIs. We have also seen private clients require KPIs in their tender documents” 
(Interview, Contractor D). 
Asked about whether the company managed building projects that are subjected to 
benchmarking differently than other building projects, the respondent’s reply indicated a clear 
conformity to benchmarking: 
“We contact the project manager on benchmarking projects. Partly in the beginning of 
the project but particularly prior to the handing over process to secure that, for example, 
defects registered during the building project are not registered. […] The information to 
the project managers consists of what the person needs to be aware of in regard to the 
registration. We also encourage the project manager to go into a dialog with the client 
about what is to be registered and what is not to be registered. […] We have experienced 
a lacking knowledge about the correlations between the input and the output of the 
system. […] In the beginning of a large building project we have a start-up workshop 
with the client where we also talk about the KPIs, because we find it important that we 
match our expectations throughout the building process. In this way we attempt to find 
out what is important to the client and what he values highly. […] This matching of 
expectations has shown some good effects” (Interview, Contractor D). 
“We have to behave well. And of course there is an element of learning in all this. The 
construction industry has been characterized by bad quality performances and lacking 
compliances with time schedule in many years without anybody having been able to 
turn this around. […] So in some way benchmarking is an obvious opportunity to have 
something that is persistent and generating changes that have effects. Sometimes we 
need such ambitious initiatives in order to take the problems seriously. Benchmarking 
has entailed that we are taking time compliance and defects seriously in this company 
(Interview, Contractor D). 
Contractor D additionally explained that their focus on matching expectations with their clients 
were not reduced to projects that were subjected to benchmarking but also applied in other 
building and construction projects.  
“Today it is commonly recognized that we have to treat our clients properly; not only on 
benchmarking projects, but in general. No doubt that benchmarking has been a lever to 
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this focus on a better dialog with the client. This is positive because it is something that 
the market has been missing” (Interview, Contractor D). 
Contractor C also revealed that benchmarking had effects on their building projects and that the 
track record was considered to be an important element in their marketing. According to the 
contractor, benchmarking had created an increased focus on time compliance and the amount of 
defects.  
“I believe that benchmarking has had influence on our focus on time compliance and 
defects” (Interview, Contractor C). 
“On larger building projects, we have meetings with the client because, if the building 
process is going poorly and we have not had any contact with the client, the consulting 
engineering company will blame us for the problems. Therefore we find it reasonable 
that we have meetings with the client and tell him our version” (Interview, Contractor 
C). 
“One positive effect of benchmarking is that we have an extra focus on handing over the 
building with the least amount of defects if the project is subjected to benchmarking. 
This has had an influence on the entire organization, and today we seek to correct 
defects faster and earlier than previously” (Interview, Contractor C). 
The above statements from the four contractors clearly indicate that the contractors interviewed 
for this study are actively conforming their product and services to benchmarking as a 
normalizing governing technology. The experienced prospect to be assessed on their track 
records has prompted these four actors to provide benchmarking different degrees of awareness 
in building projects subjected to benchmarking. It is intriguing to note how differently these 
companies are conforming to benchmarking and transforming the institution to practices, all 
from the same motivation of avoiding deselection in future prequalification where they are 
assessed on their performances. The interviews reveal that the contractor’s self-imposed 
conformity to benchmarking is based on calculated expectations of being assessed by clients on 
their KPIs. It is, however, interesting to note that, in addition to these expectations, several of 
the contractors recognized that benchmarking was supporting other managerial interests in the 
companies by strengthening the communication with clients and increasing the focus on time 
compliance and defects. The contractors’ interpretations of benchmarking as a normalizing 
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governing technology had prompted several of the contractors to be reflective of how to 
conform their products and services in ways that could secure better performances on their 
building projects. This indicates an experienced necessity to utilize benchmarking as a 
reflective development technology to gain insight into the individual companies’ possibilities to 
improve their performances and develop their product and services to attain good and 
consistent KPIs in their track records. 
BENCHMARKING AS A REFLECTIVE DEVELOPMENT TECHNOLOGY 
Of the four contractors I talked to none used benchmarking as a technology to extract 
knowledge about other companies’ practices for the purpose of achieving a competitive 
advantage. None of the four contractors expressed an interest in gaining insight into their 
competitors’ processes. As mentioned above, the improvement initiatives were manifested at a 
local and company internal level.  
“Benchmarking is a selection tool for the clients, and maybe it works for this purpose. 
But when benchmarking was introduced there were two purposes for the initiative. It 
should be a tool for clients to select their collaborators, so it was not only price but also 
competences that determined who was chosen. We fully support this purpose. The 
second purpose was that benchmarking should be a tool for contractors to compare 
themselves with other contractors for the purpose of improvements. I have not heard 
about any contractor who uses benchmarking for this purpose” (Interview, Contractor 
A). 
Two of the four contractors used their own evaluation system to assess their performances, 
which had similarities to the characteristics of internal benchmarking, where the comparisons 
of projects were conducted between the projects in the company.  
“Our own benchmarking system is much more comprehensive [than the benchmarking 
system for the Danish construction industry]. It contains all our data on work accidents, 
building defects, customer satisfaction, etc. We have far more confidence in our own 
system. So when we discuss and assess our company’s development, we do not use the 
benchmarking system [for the Danish construction industry]. We note that our track 
record is good, but when we assess out internal development of how we achieve better 
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customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, work accident, and quality products, we 
use our own reliable data” (Interview, Contractor A). 
“On projects that exceed 3m kroner, we send out a questionnaire to the client containing 
eight questions: “Have we delivered the product on time?”; “Has the collaboration been 
satisfactory?”; “Do you want to use our company again?” etc. All our internal 
assessments of our performance have these responses as key issues. Customer 
satisfaction is central for our company” (Interview, Contractor A). 
Contractor B also had their own system to assess their development and to plan their strategic 
orientation and improvement initiatives from, as they found the benchmarking system 
insufficient for providing knowledge about their internal improvements potential.  
“Even though we are conducting a building project that is submitted to benchmarking, 
we simultaneously conduct our own evaluation of the project. We do so because we find 
the four parameters [in the benchmarking system] too limited to extract knowledge 
about what we find to be important information about the project” (Interview, 
Contractor B). 
These statements indicate that the original ambition for benchmarking as a reflective 
development technology had not found legitimacy among the four contractors. If the 
institutionalization at some point in the future is to be orientated in this direction, it is 
interesting to note that several of the contractors already make use of internal evaluation 
systems. 
LACKING UTILIZATION OF KPIS IN PREQUALIFICATIONS  
Despite the indications of conforming behavior, one main issue was raised by the full range of 
contractors I talked to, as they all questioned whether benchmarking was as an important 
element in the prequalification of contractors as it was supposed to be. This must be considered 
to constitute a high threat for institutionalizing benchmarking as a normalizing governing 
technology (and the strengths of this argument had already been revealed in 2007 where 
benchmarking was radically transformed), as the contractors’ conforming behavior and their 
incentives to adjust their products and services to the KPIs in the benchmarking system was 
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based on their interpretation and calculated expectation of clients’ utilization of track records in 
prequalifications. 
“Fundamentally, it is a good idea that clients request other parameters than price. But 
benchmarking is just a little part of these other parameters: If price counts 60%, it leaves 
40% for other things. These 40% consist of, for example, quality control, environmental 
management, plans of logistics, economical self-certification forms, etc. Accordingly, 
only a couple of percents are left for the track record” (Interview, Contractor B). 
Another contractor also indicated a lacking experience of clients’ utilization of track records in 
prequalifications: 
“We rarely experience that KPIs are used. It is very seldom that they are explicit criteria 
in a prequalification and are attached importance to by clients” (Interview, Contractor 
B). 
Asked about this adversarial relationship between the conformity to KPIs and the lacking 
utilization of KPIs in prequalification, Contractor B revealed one of the central prerequisites for 
institutionalizing benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology: 
“KPIs are used in some occasions. I will not refuse that clients glance at the track 
records, but it is not obvious how they are assessed in the prequalification. […] The best 
thing for benchmarking would be if it was requested more by clients” (Interview, 
Contractor B). 
“It is commonly known that benchmarking is thought to qualify clients in selecting 
collaborators. But I wish that clients will tell us what they need […] If clients told us: 
‘This is important for us,’ then we would all follow suit. But since somebody who has 
difficulties in understanding the value of the system is making the decisions, 
benchmarking becomes rather artificial. No doubt that benchmarking is providing some 
value because building projects are improved, but benchmarking is just not used as 
intended” (Interview, Contractor B). 
Contractor C also did not recognize a widespread utilization of benchmarking in the 
prequalifications: 
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“Overall, we have not experienced that we have been chosen in a prequalification based 
on our track record. We have submitted our track records in some of our biddings, but 
we have not experienced tender documents that required some minimum performance 
requirements. […] Whether we have been selected or deselected based on our KPIs, we 
do not know” (Interview, Contractor C). 
“Some clients take track records seriously in the prequalification, but usually it is the bid 
with the lowest price that is selected. […] We experience prequalifications where price 
only counts 50–60 % but still it is the lowest bid that is selected. But at some point it 
will yet again be prevalent to distinguish oneself on other than price, and meanwhile we 
have been practicing” (Interview, Contractor C). 
Despite their lack of experiences of getting credit for their KPIs in prequalifications, the 
contractors have still chosen to incorporate benchmarking in their strategy to attain a potential 
competitive advantage in prequalifications. However, the commonly experienced perception of 
a lacking utilization of track records in clients’ selection of contractors must be understood as a 
potential institutional treat to benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology. 
KPIS  REDUCE INCENTIVES FOR CONFORMITY 
Although the contractors were conforming to benchmarking, despite their lacking experiences 
of getting credit for their KPIs in prequalifications, the contractors expressed discontent with 
two of the KPIs in the track record: KPIs on work accidents and KPIs on building defects. If 
the four contractors are reflecting a widespread perception in their profession, the opposition to 
the KPIs can potentially threaten the legitimacy of benchmarking as a normalizing governing 
technology, as such critiques of the benchmarking system reflect an experienced lack of 
correlation between the figures and the perception of the KPIs as reflecting valid performance 
capabilities. If contractors do not consider the benchmarking system to be adequately reflecting 
their performances, it can potentially reduce the experienced rationale of conforming to the 
KPIs.  
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KPIS ON WORK ACCIDENTS 
The KPIs on work accidents were not perceived to provide an adequate reflection of the 
contractors’ working environment nor were they perceived to be a just reflection of the 
performance that clients could expect from their collaborators.  
The following statements reveal the contractors’ opposition to the KPIs on work accidents. 
“If you compare our company to other large contractors, you will find that our KPIs on 
work accidents are not fair. We have one of the best work environments in the market 
because we do so much in this area. But if we compare our track record with our 
competitors, we are below average. This shows that something is wrong with these 
measures. When asked about this mismatch, the benchmarking operator replied that 
90% of all building projects have no work accidents. And that is simply not correct. Ask 
the Danish Working Environment Authority, ask anybody. We claim that if they want to 
stick with these KPIs on work accidents, then it is very inexpedient that it is the 
contractors who report the accidents. There is no control with these figures, and there 
are no consequences of reporting incorrect information. The statistics do not match, and 
the Danish Working Environment Authority agrees. We have to come up with another 
definition, a broader definition” (Interview, Contractor A). 
“I have yet to hear about anyone who has confidence in these KPIs. Especially small 
contractors are vulnerable, as one single and maybe even unjust registration of an 
accident can result in very bad KPIs on work accidents” (Interview, Contractor A). 
“I am responsible for the working environment in our company. When we went through 
our KPIs on work accidents, we had an accident registered because one of our 
employees had dropped a cup of coffee, which caused a burn on his foot because he did 
not wear safety shoes. As a consequence, he had to stay home for a couple of days, 
which entailed that we were no longer an A-company and were unable to be so for three 
years. Other companies would probably not have registered that accident. So where is 
the limit? When do you report and when do you not? This single accident entails that 
we, for the next three years, will appear as a B-company instead of an A-company” 
(Interview, Contractor B) 
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“If one of our men cuts his finger in a small company, the accident will not be reported. 
But we report these accidents because we have very structured procedures. In this way, 
we appear as bad performers on working environments just because we have a high 
focus on an area that is being reported into the system” (Interview, Contractor D) 
“We have to change the KPIs on work accidents. These measures are not valid. As a 
contractor, you are to report your own work accidents. […] You report the accidents that 
entail at least one day absent, but you do not report whether it is a serious accident or 
not. […] I do not believe that there is one company that has not had creative accounting 
when reporting work accidents to the system. It is impossible to avoid work accidents 
when you conduct a building project for 80m DKK. […] If you compare the KPIs from 
the benchmarking system to those from the Danish Working Environment Authority, 
you will notice that much fewer accidents are reported to the benchmarking system. This 
means that the KPIs are not valid, and in that case, they cannot be used as a competitive 
parameter” (Interview, Contractor C). 
KPIS ON BUILDING DEFECTS 
The KPIs on building defects were also causing some criticism among the contractors who did 
not find the KPIs representative of their overall quality performance. 
“The customer satisfaction is providing a reasonable reflection of our performance, but 
building defects is a strange way to measure the quality of a building. And out of the ten 
KPIs, six are on building defects. […] In reality, building defects are always corrected 
somehow. The idea is to produce a product of high quality. That is the long-term 
ambition. The building may stand in 100 years, and therefore it would be prudent to 
measure on some of these long-term quality parameters, such as ingress protection, 
indoor climate conditions, air quality, environmental conditions, etc. You could choose 
to have indicators that measure the quality of the product rather than, for example, the 
amount of building defects. Such indicators are much more attractive than building 
defects that are quickly corrected anyway” (Interview, Contractor A). 
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“You are an A-company19 if you have no registered building defects. But if you have 
been registered for one single paint blob, you are no longer an A-company, and you 
cannot be an A-company for the next three years. The rating system does not pay regard 
to the proportions of the defects as all defects are registered as equally important. That 
we find very demotivating because partly it is very subjective how building defects are 
registered and partly it does not reflect whether the client is discontented with the 
registered defects” (Interview, Contractor B). 
Contractor C revealed how they managed the registration of defects, by being highly engaged 
in the registration process of building defects: 
“The client consultants have difficulties with the different categories of building defects. 
That is why we go through the building defects together with the client consultant. […] 
We talk to the client consultant about the defects before the handing over process and 
also have a pre-handing over process. In this way, we nip building defects in the bud” 
(Interview, Contractor C). 
“My experience is that contractors find ways to hand in building projects without 
building defects, even if there have been some. And that is for the purpose of cheating 
the system. They come up with those kinds of solutions because the system is 
demotivating. And when a system is perceived as demotivating. I consider it 
unsuccessful” (Interview, Contractor B).  
4.7.2 CONSULTING ENGINEERING COMPANIES 
As the case for the four contractors, the two interviewed directors of consulting engineer 
companies were mainly talking from a perception of benchmarking as a normalizing governing 
technology, and they perceived KPIs as a prerequisite to bid on building projects where track 
records were required in prequalifications. Consulting Engineer A expressed the following 
interpretation of benchmarking: 
“Benchmarking is a part of bidding on public and public-funded construction projects. 
We are not able to bid if we do not have KPIs. It almost equals a certification scheme. 
                                                 
19 According to the Bygge Rating system 
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But it is fair that clients require quality. In some way it sorts out the bad apples: those 
with low prices who cannot deliver a quality product. That is an advantage for us 
because we cannot compete on prices with the smaller companies. This is why we 
applause initiatives that put emphasis on quality performance in a prequalification. Too 
many clients are prone to choose on the basis of price without knowing what end 
product to expect. […] Our business philosophy makes it necessary that clients assess on 
our quality performance and not our prices” (Interview, Consulting Engineer A). 
The consulting engineer accordingly expressed satisfaction with the instrumental purposes and 
objectives of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology that provides clients 
additional selection criteria in their prequalifications of bidders. He, contrary to the four 
contractors, highly considered that the track records were utilized by clients: 
 “We are certain that the track records are used by the clients in the prequalifications. I 
do not know how much they are used, but I believe that they are used. Otherwise we 
would not make such efforts of conducting benchmarking” (Interview, Consulting 
Engineer A). 
The company had accordingly conformed to these expectations of the utilization of track 
records as a selection tool for clients: 
“We have an employee that ensures that we have a certain number of building projects 
with KPIs. She makes sure that we have a reasonable renewal of projects in our track 
record and that we have a reasonable spectrum of building projects” (Interview, 
Consulting Engineer A). 
This indicates the same strategic conformity to benchmarking as normalizing governing 
technology as Contractor A, who had ensured a broad range of different types of projects with 
the ambition of being rightfully assessed by clients in the prequalifications and being in 
possession of a track record that included relevant building projects for future tasks.  
Asked about why client satisfaction is a rational measure for consulting engineering 
companies’ performance, the director responded: 
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“Client satisfaction is what drives our business. Satisfied customers will use us again. 
And if the client finds our performance insufficient, it will appear in his satisfaction 
assessment of us” (Interview, Consulting Engineer A). 
Paradoxically, Consulting Engineer A did not make much use of track records when the 
company was assessing quality in the prequalification in the position of client consultant.  
“As client consultant for a public client, we do not put much importance on the rating. 
We assess quality in a different way. […] If we use the rating, it may count for 5% of 
the overall quality performance” (Interview, Consulting Engineer A). 
This statement is very interesting in relation to understanding the correlations between the 
conformity to benchmarking, which is based on an expectation of being assessed on the track 
records and the same consulting engineers’ low emphasis on track records in prequalifications. 
The statement indicates that the director did not consider the track record to be providing 
sufficient insight into bidders’ quality performances but still incorporated benchmarking in the 
companies’ strategic considerations of being in a good competitive position. Asked about this 
dilemma, the director had no clear response, as he had not personally participated in the 
company’s prequalifications of bidders. 
However, the interview with Consulting Engineer B revealed something that could be a 
response to this discrepancy between utilizing benchmarking as a selection tool and the 
rationale in conforming to benchmarking: 
“Fundamentally, we think that the service and products we provide are too complex to 
be reduced to an A, B, C, or D, as if they were a refrigerator. I call the rating system ‘the 
refrigerator model,’ and it is about simplifying something very complex to some single 
letter. It may make sense for a private consumer or first-time clients to see whether a 
consulting engineer has an A, B, or C, but more experienced clients know us. They 
know how we have performed in previous projects. They look into our references and 
see whether we have conducted corresponding projects. They also assess lots of reports 
that are technically complicated. All this, some think, can be summarized and reduced: 
‘This is a B’” (Interview, Consulting Engineer B). 
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In this way, Consulting Engineer B argued that the KPIs were not providing sufficient insight 
into the quality performances of consulting engineering companies, but simultaneously he 
considered the track records to be utilized by those clients who were not very professional. The 
statement accordingly reveals that it is likely that the prospects of bidding on building projects 
where the clients are not very professional are providing sufficient incentives for consulting 
engineers to pursue good KPIs. Asked about how track records could gain more influence in 
professional clients’ prequalifications of consulting engineers, Consulting Engineer B replied: 
“The clients ought to figure out which questions are most sufficient to reflect their 
overall satisfaction with their consulting engineers. […] It might be that the budget was 
exceeded and that there have been some mistakes, but the pivotal question is whether 
the client is satisfied or not. […] It makes sense to make a rating system with an overall 
assessment of the KPIs, but this system is for the unprofessional client, first-time clients. 
The higher the professionalism the less sense does it make to simplify the services and 
performances” (Interview, Consulting Engineer B). 
Consulting Engineer B revealed an interesting conformity to benchmarking that relied on 
strategic considerations of how the company could qualify themselves in the prequalifications 
with track records that were not conducted by a benchmarking operator: 
“We have a new project model where we divide our projects into three categories, 1, 2, 
and 3 dependent on the size and complexity of the projects. On category 2 and 3 we 
conduct an evaluation. We do not use BEC to conduct this evaluation, but we use the 
same classification as in the benchmarking system. It is the same questions and 
weighting strategy. Based on these, we calculate our KPIs and produce a fact sheet that 
resembles the one from BEC, which we use in prequalifications. […] This is a much 
cheaper way to do it. […] The critical client may question the validity of KPIs that we 
produce ourselves, but we have yet to see how they react” (Interview, Consulting 
Engineer B). 
 “Despite our criticism, we still voluntarily conduct benchmarking on our largest and 
most complicated projects because we get the best references on these types of projects. 
We therefore also conduct benchmarking on private building projects in order to be in a 
better position in prequalifications where benchmarking is required. The system is here 
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to stay, and in that case we must try to get the best out of it” (Interview, Consulting 
Engineer B). 
The interviewed directors of the two consulting engineering companies accordingly revealed 
that they, in different ways, had implemented benchmarking in their company from a 
perception of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology, with an overall aim of 
attaining good track records that could be used in future prequalifications. However, the two 
directors additionally expressed skepticism of whether the track records were trustful 
reflections of their quality performances and accordingly questioned benchmarking’s 
applicability as a selection tool of consulting engineers.  
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4.7.3 CLIENTS  
The three clients interviewed for this study revealed very different interpretations of and 
positions on benchmarking. Characteristic for the three clients is that they operated in different 
sectors of the construction industry: the private sector, the state construction sector, and the 
social housing sector. 
Client A, the private client, found benchmarking insufficient in reflecting construction 
companies’ performances:  
“I believe that building projects are way too complex to be simplified to some few KPIs. 
There are so many underlying elements in a building project that will never appear in 
such objective criteria” (Interview, Client A).  
In this way, Client A did not consider track records to be an adequate selection tool for clients. 
His statements and position to benchmarking solely addressed how this utilization of 
benchmarking was an insufficient and invalid foundation to choose collaborators from.  
“I believe that the validity of the KPIs is so doubtful that it is totally unfair that clients 
assess their bidders on these. The track records only contain a very little number of the 
building projects that companies conduct and are therefore not representative for their 
performances. Any professional client, public or private, ought to have sufficient insight 
into the market to make decisions based on their knowledge. I, a client, cannot do so; he 
does not deserve to be called ‘professional.’ The public client ought to be so 
professional that they did not need a benchmarking system” (Interview, Client A). 
Accordingly, Client A isolated the instrumental purposes and overall purposes for 
benchmarking to a selection tool for clients, thus not considering the effects of benchmarking 
as a normalizing governing technology that could derive an improved product and services 
from collaborators, as they interpret and conform to the KPIs in the benchmarking system. This 
indicates a perception of benchmarking as a technology that counteracts the client’s qualified 
selection of collaborators. 
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Client B from the state construction sector was also consequently considering benchmarking as 
a selection tool for clients. However, contrary to Client A, he was enthusiastic of 
benchmarking’s ability to provide insight in bidders’ performances: 
“Benchmarking was originally introduced as something that could improve productivity 
in the construction industry, or something like that. But I also think that benchmarking 
can help clients to separate the sheep from the goats. […] Now clients have these track 
records from the bidders, and they can see if the companies have had bad KPIs on client 
satisfaction and other quality criteria. In this way, I think that benchmarking provides 
clients a good foundation to choose their collaborators from” (Interview, Client B). 
“Benchmarking provides an objective instrument to avoid , for example, corruption. It 
helps clients to select those companies that are best in their profession” (Interview, 
Client B). 
Client B gave an example of an experience he had with the utilization of benchmarking as a 
selection tool. The example clearly demonstrates how the track records can be interpreted in 
many different ways to assess bidders’ performances. Further, the example indicates the 
widespread perception of clients’ inconsistent and opaque utilization of KPIs in 
prequalifications.  
“Recently I participated in a prequalification where track records were used. […] The 
end users [responsible for choosing collaborators] did not make an overall assessment of 
the KPIs. They only assessed the KPIs on customer satisfaction. They did not want to 
collaborate with companies with bad KPIs on customer satisfaction and did not care 
about the rest of the KPIs. I find no problems with this disposition because they used the 
track records to assess what they found to be of greatest importance. You are allowed to 
attach importance to the KPIs as you like. And they made it perfectly clear that they had 
had too many experiences with companies that were not willing to collaborate. And 
roughly speaking, they were not interested in the number of defects and work accidents 
and so on. […] They did not consider the utilization of track records as an obligation 
but, on the contrary, as something which they could use to assess the bidders” 
(Interview, Client B). 
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Client C, from the social housing sector, who was obliged to require track records in their 
prequalifications, expressed a more reflective interpretation of the benchmarking initiative but 
reported that the company did not actively use the track records as selection criteria of their 
bidders. He gave the following account for this lacking utilization: 
“KPIs might be useful, but I must admit that we do not use them much. In a 
prequalification, they count for maybe five percent. […] We do not provide much value 
to the compliance with time schedule, and building defects we get from Danish Building 
Defects Fund” (Interview, Client C) 
“If you are going to build a complex building, KPIs are of less importance because you 
need some more documentation for the bidders’ performances on that kind of building 
projects. On less complex building projects, KPIs might be useful as a reflection of 
some sort of performance” (Interview, Client C). 
“The building defects that are registered by the Danish Building Defects Fund are those 
of a more serious character that have some importance for the building. […] I question 
whether it is appropriate to equate quality of buildings to the amount of building defects 
registered at the handing over process. But that is what many clients do because building 
defects are what they can see when the building is handed over. Many clients do not 
have a focus on whether the buildings are dense and solid. Therefore they assess on the 
performance of minor building defects. I believe that the focus on building defects is 
rather exaggerated” (Interview, Client C). 
Asked about the applicability of KPIs on time compliance as quality criteria, Client C 
responded: 
“Of course, compliance with time schedule is important, but we just never consider it a 
problem since our projects are mostly handed over on time. It is very seldom that time is 
an issue and that it exceeds more than what we consider to be fair” (Interview, Client C). 
He, however, recognized that the KPIs on customer satisfaction could be useful as indications 
of quality performances: 
“The subjective KPIs on collaboration and whether clients will use the company again is 
OK and can be ascribed some value. But we must also remember that these KPIs are 
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assessed subjectively and depend on the peoples from the company” (Interview, Client 
C). 
Not surprisingly, Client C found the track records for consulting engineers and architects, 
strictly reflecting customer satisfaction, to be of higher value as a selection criteria than the 
track records for contractors: 
“I find the KPIs for consulting engineers and architects more useful because the 
questions that are the foundation for their grades reflect their performance better than, 
for example, contractors’ building defects” (Interview, Client C).  
“So far we have experienced that consulting engineers have had a focus on the 
evaluation. But we have not experienced that contractors have had a focus on achieving 
good KPIs. So for them I do not think that the system has had a repressive effect. So far, 
they have only perceived benchmarking to be inconvenient and expensive” (Interview, 
Client C). 
These statements indicate that the client experienced benchmarking to have effects on 
consulting engineers’ and architects’ conformity and interpretation of benchmarking as a 
normalizing governing technology. This indicates that the client, contrary to Client A, 
recognized that benchmarking could derive improved products and services from their 
collaborators, as benchmarking was providing incentives for construction companies to 
accommodate the client’s demands. However, the statements also reveal a questioning of 
whether benchmarking improved the building processes by contractors’ conformity and striving 
for good KPIs.  
Client C revealed an even higher degree of reflectivity, as he, unsolicited, considered how 
benchmarking could attain greater effects on the local building project and prompt construction 
companies to pursue and conform to KPIs: 
“I wonder why we are obliged to require KPIs in our prequalification, when nobody has 
made considerations and determinations about how we shall assess them. Of course, this 
entails that we have some degree of freedom to assess them or not. But I find it strange 
that nobody demands how KPIs must be assessed” (Interview, Client C). 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
209
“If we had some legal requirements for how to use KPIs in the prequalification and how 
much clients should value them, I think that it would entail that our collaborators would 
have an increased focus on achieving good KPIs. I think that this would increase the 
performances on building projects. Even though I do not wish it to be so, I think that the 
only way for this system to advance is to force people to use it and attach importance to 
it” (Interview, Client C).  
In this way, Client C hit the nail on the head with his recommendation by addressing the 
persistent issue that had been raised by many actors (including the contractors and consulting 
engineers interviewed for this study) throughout the institutionalization of benchmarking. The 
inconsistencies and uncertainties of clients’ assessment and utilization of track records 
counteracted the construction companies’ incentives to engage in benchmarking on a higher 
strategic level. He continued with considerations of why benchmarking had yet not greatly 
motivated construction companies to adjust their products and services to the aim of achieving 
good KPIs: 
“I think that some companies are frustrated about having good KPIs without getting 
credit for it. It is not because I call for a set of rules for how clients must use KPIs, but I 
just wonder why nobody has sat down and decided how clients shall use benchmarking. 
What weight are clients to put on KPIs? How must they be assessed?” (Interview, Client 
C) 
He concluded with the following recommendations to the further institutionalization of 
benchmarking: 
“The benchmarking system is applicable and operational, but it needs to be entrenched 
and to be used properly so it becomes a management tool that is used during the 
building process with the purpose of attaining better quality. Otherwise it just ends up 
being something that the authorities once insisted on. If benchmarking was modified in 
this direction, I think it would work much better” (Interview, Client C).  
“I am willing to compromise some of my usual prequalification procedures and use 
KPIs more actively if I know that this will get me a better building process” (Interview, 
Client C). 
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This exposition of the interview with Client C is particularly interesting for this study, as it 
elucidates how the client was fully aware of the potential positive effects of benchmarking as 
generating improvements on a local level in the individual building project, but simultaneously 
the client did not consider his company to be responsible for driving this prerequisite for the 
institutionalization of benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology.  
4.7.4 THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF BENCHMARKING AMONG PRACTITIONERS 
The above exposition of contractors,’ consultant engineers,’ and clients’ interpretation and 
normative conformity to benchmarking have uncovered important insight into how 
benchmarking seems to be institutionalized among the practitioners interviewed for this study.  
There are clear indications that benchmarking among the contractors and consulting engineers 
has obtained institutional legitimacy on a local level in building projects, as a normalizing 
governing technology, that induces that contractors and consulting engineers are adjusting their 
products and services to an expectation of clients’ use of KPIs when selecting collaborators in 
future building projects. The interviews reflect that benchmarking creates incentives for 
construction companies to improve building products and services in their striving for good 
KPIs. However, the KPIs on defects and work accidents in the contractor benchmarking system 
are highly questioned by the contractors interviewed for this study. If the interviews represent a 
general perception among contractors, the KPIs are likely to constitute the foundation for future 
political struggles. If benchmarking is to be institutionalized further among contractors, it 
seems prudent to design the KPIs in ways that can support these local effects of benchmarking 
and ultimately improve the performances in building projects. 
The interviews also reveal how the three clients interpreted benchmarking differently and that 
there is a clear discrepancy between construction companies’ interpretation of benchmarking 
and the clients’ interpretations of benchmarking. Two of the clients exclusively regarded 
benchmarking as a selection tool for clients to select collaborators from, and thus not 
considering the effects benchmarking engenders on the individual building project as 
construction companies conform their products and services to the KPIs in the benchmarking 
system. Accordingly, the interviews indicate that the people interviewed for this study have 
diverse interpretations of the instrumental purposes and overall objectives for benchmarking.  
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Contrary to the two other clients, the client from the social housing sector revealed an insight 
into benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology in line with the interpretations 
identified among the contractors and consulting engineers. The client did not, however, utilize 
or support this interpretation in practice by actively utilizing benchmarking to create incentives 
for construction companies to pursue good KPIs. He indicated that a more consistent and 
transparent utilization of benchmarking in the prequalification could create greater incentives 
for the construction companies to conform to benchmarking as a normalizing governing 
technology but did not personally contribute to this development.  
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5 DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Throughout this study I have accounted for how a thorough understanding of the benchmarking 
initiative must be understood through the historical development the institution has undergone. 
I have done so by unfolding the development of benchmarking through an analytical framework 
based on contemporary institutional theory. In this way, I have made extensive use of the 
concept of “framings” to describe how actors’ political engagement in the institutionalization 
of benchmarking can be understood as exploitations contradictions in the institutionalization 
and constructions of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framings. The concept of 
framings has helped me manage and unfold the political struggles between actors, and I have 
demonstrated how the three types of framings provide insight into how political positions can 
be understood and how they can help understand the political struggles and negotiations that 
take place during institutionalization of new structures. The study has revealed how actors 
have created and exploited diagnostic framings of the Danish construction industry to 
delegitimize existing arrangements and provide openings for institutional change and 
introducing new structures. The diagnostic framings have been accompanied by alternative 
arrangements that the actors are seeking to introduce through the prognostic framing. The 
prognostic framings accordingly have been functioning as the solution to the diagnostic 
framing and reflecting what is considered as alternative structures to existing institutions. The 
prognostic framings have simultaneously created the foundation for motivating actors to 
engage and support the new structures. These motivations have been communicated in ways so 
that the new structures could attain institutional legitimacy from potential allies. This has been 
done more explicitly through the motivational framing, which has shown to be an important 
strategic element in political struggles.  
By means of the analytical framework, this study has accordingly accounted for the formation 
processes and phases of consolidation that have strengthened, transformed, threatened, and 
constituted the institutionalization of benchmarking. With a point of departure in my three 
research questions, this chapter concludes and discusses the institutionalization of 
benchmarking in the Danish construction industry.  
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5.1 HOW AND FOR WHAT PURPOSES HAS BENCHMARKING ORIGINALLY BEEN 
INTRODUCED AS A SOLUTION TO POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE DANISH 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY? 
An inevitable element in a study of institutionalization is to understand the foundation from 
which the institution originally arose. Institutions do not emerge from nothing but find their 
legitimacy from an institutional context. This first research question seeks to cover the 
institutional context from which benchmarking originated and how benchmarking was 
considered to be a legitimate construction political initiative in the Danish construction 
industry. The research question accordingly addresses how the institutional environment of the 
construction policy provided a foundation from which benchmarking should find legitimacy. 
In my thesis, I have accounted for how benchmarking originated from changes in the political 
climate that started in the late 1960s and positioned quality and productivity high on the 
construction political agenda. Openings for introducing benchmarking were created, as the 
institutional environment for developing the construction policy was changing through the 
1990s. The changes were caused by an establishment of a diagnostic framing, characterizing 
the Danish construction industry as insufficient in competing in an international market. The 
broad political acceptance of this diagnostic framing entailed an institutional environment of 
the development of the construction policy that was highly influenced by the inclusion of the 
Agency for Trade and Industry and private actors. Accordingly, political development 
programs that unfolded during the 1990s were conducted in a close collaboration between 
public and private actors. This collaboration was accordingly based on a mutual interest of 
addressing the issue of competing internationally, and the future development initiatives were 
to be constructed in this newly established political environment, as joint collaboration between 
all actors of the construction industry became dominating throughout the 1990s.  
The construction political activities of the 1990s resulted in a series of development programs 
that objectified the construction industry as an important economical national resource area that 
was pressured by foreign competition and needed to be made more competitive through 
strategic development initiatives. The construction industry was to a greater extent than 
previously considered to be of great economical importance for society.  
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A persistent political ambition was to change the competition in the construction industry 
towards quality performance instead of price exclusively. The changes of the political climate 
called for clients, both private and public, to act as change agents and to become the driving 
forces in the creation of institutional changes. The lack of demand-driven development of the 
construction industry was accordingly a central diagnostic framing that had to be addressed, 
and clients needed to be better equipped in articulating their demands and choosing the best 
collaborators. Through the 1990s clients were being articulated as key elements in generating 
changes that could drive the construction industry towards a closer and more efficient 
collaboration and interplay between the public sector, the construction companies, and the 
clients. The conception was that the competitive position of the construction industry would be 
enhanced as clients provided economical incentives for contractors, architects, consulting 
engineers, and suppliers to initiate changes by placing qualified demands on the quality of the 
buildings.  
Benchmarking was introduced as a possible solution to address the problems of the Danish 
construction industry in an international market. Benchmarking accordingly gained its 
legitimacy from changes in the political climate, as it became a necessity to construct a 
prognostic framing that could provide transparency of the products and services of the market 
and qualify clients in making demands to the private companies. Benchmarking was 
subsequently suggested as a key element in the construction political Task Force of 2000 and 
widely incorporated in one of the development programs, Project House. Benchmarking was 
presented as a technology that could: qualify clients in their new position as demanding 
costumers, regulate the market, create a better transparency of the products and services from 
construction companies, and provide construction companies with a statistical foundation for 
attaining insight into their own and competitors performances.  
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5.2 HOW HAVE POLITICAL STRUGGLES AND NEGOTIATIONS AFFECTED THE 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF BENCHMARKING? 
This study has supported the contemporary literature in institutional theory on actors’ important 
role in institutional change processes. The case study has clearly demonstrated how the 
institutionalization of benchmarking has been a result of the interactions between actors with 
political interests in the institutionalization, and how benchmarking has entailed an arena of 
political struggles and negotiations between actors who have been politically motivated to 
influence and transform benchmarking.  
The institutionalization of benchmarking has revealed an institutional transformation of 
benchmarking from being strictly regulatory disseminated to being normatively accepted as the 
institutionalization was politically negotiated and mutually accepted and has ended up having 
effects in a more or less cultural-cognitive conception among practitioners in the construction 
industry. This indicates that, despite a transformation from the original political intentions for 
benchmarking, the political struggles and negotiations have resulted in an increased 
institutionalization of benchmarking.  
Throughout the historical development of benchmarking, different actors with diverse interests 
in benchmarking have shown to be capable of creating radical transformations of 
benchmarking’s instrumental purposes and overall objectives. The study accordingly supports 
and contributes to the contemporary literature on actors and agency by revealing how new 
institutions are exposed to political struggles as actors see prospects for strengthening their 
interests. Further, the study reveals how the institutionalization is shaped by political 
negotiations, as new alliances between political actors are made and create new coalitions of 
interests that constitute an institutional pressure to transform the institutionalization. Actors 
have shown to be the focal point in the institutionalization of benchmarking. By exploiting 
contradictions within the institutionalization of benchmarking, they have strategically 
constructed new prognostic and motivational framings that could challenge those not in their 
political interests, and in this way, cause a continuous transformation of benchmarking. Even 
though the following quotation has already been presented in the theory, it seems appropriate to 
bring it up once again, as it elegantly captures a central point in this study of the 
institutionalization of benchmarking:  
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“For institutionalization to occur successfully and for adaptation to take place—never 
linearly, but always with a certain degree of unpredictability—change must pass through 
various levels (macro and micro) and must involve different types of actors 
(supranational, national, sub-national, local, etc.)” (Lippi, 2000:459).  
With this quotation in mind, I will briefly account for how actors have engaged in political 
struggles that have influenced the institutionalization of benchmarking and transformed the 
initiative into something much different than its original design. After this historical account, I 
will discuss on a more general level how benchmarking is a social construction and a result of 
actors’ political engagement in the institutionalization. 
As it became evident that benchmarking was to be a central element in the construction policy, 
actors engaged in the institutionalization with the aim of attaining influence on the initiative. 
By propounding different and even divergent prognostic framings of benchmarking, actors 
attempted to destabilize prevalent instrumental purposes and overall objectives for 
benchmarking in order to advance their political interests in the initiative.  
The application of the analytical framework on the many identified ambitions for 
benchmarking and the wide incorporation of benchmarking in the construction political 
activities, clarified that benchmarking relied on broad and incoherent prognostic framings. All 
prognostic framings had an anchoring in the ambition of creating more transparency in the 
construction industry, but the unclear identity and many political ambitions for benchmarking 
led to early ambiguities and diverse interpretations of the new technology on this early state of 
its development. The analysis demonstrated that benchmarking was originally articulated 
through three incoherent prognostic framings seeking to address a broad diagnostic framing of 
the construction industry as lacking international competiveness. Briefly summarized, 
benchmarking was characterized as three independent prognostic framings: Firstly, 
benchmarking was articulated as a “normalizing governing technology” that functioned as a 
tool for clients to qualify their selection of collaborators. This prognostic framing reflects 
underlying interest of utilizing benchmarking to exercise regulative power to those construction 
companies who are underperforming according to the established success criteria. The intention 
was that the production of new “market standards” would cause the private market to conform 
to the performance criteria. 
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Secondly, benchmarking was articulated as a “socially constructive technology”, reflecting 
benchmarking in a prognostic framing, where the ambitions were to gain insight into 
performances areas of the construction industry. Societal gains were expected in the form of 
more qualified demands to construction companies and more qualified basis for political 
decisions.  
Thirdly, benchmarking was articulated as a “reflective development technology”, with the 
ambition of identifying and communicating best practices in the construction industry and in 
this was create a learning platform from which construction companies could be inspired to 
share knowledge on how to improve services and product through benchmarking activities. An 
overview over the three prognostic framings of benchmarking are provided below on table 6. 
The table shows how each of the three prognostic framings of benchmarking are responses to 1. 
Different diagnostic framings, reflecting the problem benchmarking are considered to address. 
2. The institutional pillars the prognostic framings are basing their institutional legitimacy on 
(these being regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive). 3. The expected utilization of the 
KPIs produced from benchmarking. 4. And finally the expected benefits from each of the 
prognostic framings.  
 Prognostic framing 
Benchmarking as socially 
constructive technology 
Benchmarking as 
normalizing governing 
technology 
Benchmarking as reflective 
development technology 
Response to 
diagnostic framing 
Lacking transparency and 
knowledge of the 
performance of the 
construction industry 
Inexpedient competition on 
price; clients are not utilizing 
their influences in developing 
the construction industry 
Companies are not 
sufficiently motivated 
initiating changes of the 
product and services 
Institutional pillar Normative Regulative Cultural-cognitive 
Utilization Judgment and decision-
oriented 
Judgment-oriented Improvement-oriented 
Expected benefits Provides basis for political 
decisions, explicit success 
criteria, target setting and 
overall performance 
development  
Provides basis for selection of 
companies, regulates, 
controls, monitors  
Provides learning of best 
practices, mutual benefits to 
participants, continuous 
improvement of processes 
Table 6: Overview of the three prognostic framings of benchmarking  
It is argued that the many prognostic framings of benchmarking from the two development 
programs, the Task Force and Project House, constituted a broad motivational framing that in 
different ways appealed to a wide range of actors with different political and strategic interests 
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in the benchmarking initiative. The motivational framing secured political acceptance from 
people who engaged in the development activities of Project House. The prognostic framings of 
benchmarking were by no means unambiguous and thus attempted to incorporate many 
different interests. As a result, benchmarking was articulated in ways that could cope broadly 
with the diagnostic framing of the construction industry as lacking international competiveness 
and simultaneously include many different interests. These indefinite instrumental purposes 
and overall objectives for benchmarking would show to provide openings for future political 
struggles as the coexisting prognostic framings of benchmarking permitted actors to both 
engage in the development of benchmarking with different purposes and also possibilities to 
exploit contradictions of the benchmarking initiative. 
The first political struggle occurred in 2001 as private actors in attained ownership of the 
Evaluation Centre, suggested in the Task Force report and Project House. The preliminary, but 
yet unclear, prognostic framings of benchmarking were considered to be of sufficient political 
interest to prompt these private actors to attain control over the centre, which was nominated as 
a central place from which benchmarking was to be concretized and operated from. The Task 
Force report and Project House had accordingly succeeded in articulating the Evaluation Centre 
and benchmarking as important elements in the future development activities of the 
construction industry. This made the centre attractive for private actors to engage in and attain 
ownership of. The motive for establishing BEC on private hands was bilateral, as an official 
announcement articulated this private initiative as the construction industry’s reaction to the 
productivity and quality critisim during the past eight years, but other underlying motives were 
present, as indications pointed out that the establishment of BEC had a basis in a widespread 
skepticism among private actors of a ministerial determination and development of the 
activities of the Evaluation Centre. The reaction from private actors was accordingly reflective 
of political and strategic considerations of attaining control of the new structures that were to 
be propounded through benchmarking.  
The successful establishment of the Evaluation Centre on private actors’ hand was the first 
demonstration of how the inclusion of private actors in the political development activities of 
the construction industry had facilitated new possibilities for the private market to have a 
legitimate co-ownership and contributory influence on the development and formulation of the 
construction political initiatives, including benchmarking. The political motives for establishing 
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the Benchmark Centre for the Danish Construction Sector (da. Byggeriets Evaluerings Center, 
BEC) did not at first cause a radical transformation in benchmarking, as it was evident that 
BEC adopted the incoherent coexisting prognostic framings of benchmarking from the Task 
Force report and Project House. It was emphasized by the stakeholders that the centre was 
reliant on a common recognition of the centre as a legitimate development place for a future 
benchmarking system and that the centre had to be independent of private interests, these being 
company groups, professional associations, companies, or the state. In this way, despite the 
private actors’ engagement in the centre, BEC was intended to be provided an independent 
political position from which benchmarking was to be developed and operated from. The 
political position of BEC was further strengthened as the closure of the strong Ministry of 
Housing in 2001 entailed that the construction policy was to be formulated primarily by the far 
more market- and competition-oriented Agency for Trade and Industry in the newly established 
Danish Enterprise and Housing Authority (da. Erhvervs- og Boligstyrelsen—later Erhvers- og 
Bygningsstyrelsen, EBST) under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The Agency for Trade 
and Industry had already, in the 1990s, revealed an interest in including private actors in the 
construction political activities and emphazied BEC as a succesful example of a joint 
partnership between public and private actors and in this way proved that BEC could occupy a 
legitimate central political position in the construction industry. These changes in the political 
climate accordingly provided BEC with a possibility to exploite the deconstruction of the 
existing construction political environment and legitimize the centre’s ambitions of making 
benchmarking an important political element in future construction political development 
activities. 
The entrance of EBST in the development of benchmarking strengthened of one of the 
prognostic framings of benchmarking, hence entailing that the coexisting prognostic framings 
were no longer considered equally in the institutionalization. In collaboration, BEC and EBST 
attempted to drive the institutionalization towards an interpretation of benchmarking as a 
normalizing governing technology that, through publication of KPIs and utilization of 
benchmarking as a selection tool for clients, could generate a more transparent and competitive 
market. By making benchmarking a legislative requirement and facilitating the political 
position of BEC, these two actors attempted to attain ownership of the institutionalization of 
benchmarking. This initial reconfiguration of benchmarking revealed how EBST and BEC 
utilized their social positions in the construction industry and consolidated interests in order to 
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construct a more coherent and uniform interpretation of benchmarking—and simultaneously 
deprioritizing other actors’ political ambitions in favor of this regulative dissemination strategy. 
The basis for the future institutionalization of benchmarking was accordingly based on a 
coercive production and utilization of KPIs in state building projects. In the following years 
BEC’s communication strategy reflected this regulatory dissemination of benchmarking by 
attempting to construct a common perception among contractors that KPIs were a necessity in 
order to bid on state building projects and, in this way, communicated benchmarking as a 
regulative incentive for contractors.  
After the effectuation of the legislative dissemination of benchmarking, the social housing 
sector was included in the benchmarking initiative. This inclusion of the social housing sector 
was a clear and traditional prerequisite for disseminating construction political activities to the 
construction industry, as the social housing sector embraced many more building activities than 
initiated by state clients. The inclusion of the social housing sector entailed that benchmarking 
got an even higher degree of legitimacy for the prognostic framing of benchmarking as a 
normalizing governing technology, as this was also in the interests of the actors from the social 
housing sector. 
The attempts to institutionalize benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology was, 
however, not without implications, as several actors were not supportive of this increasingly 
common perception of benchmarking as a purely regulatory initiative that had the ambition of 
coercing private companies to conduct benchmarking and qualify clients in their selection of 
collaborators. The private companies and their professional associations accordingly exploited 
that clients were not using benchmarking in their prequalifications and that the benchmarking 
initiative was not providing sufficient value for money for the private companies. In this way, 
these actors attempted to destabilize one of the central foundations the regulative dissemination 
strategy relied upon for its institutional legitimacy. The contractors used their political 
influence by forcing their professional associations to raise their critique areas towards BEC 
and the authorities. Whereas the suggested benchmarking initiative had until now been 
officially supported by the board of directors in BEC for the purpose of propounding BEC and 
benchmarking as a legitimate private initiatives, the board members of BEC began to reveal 
diverging prognostic framings of benchmarking, as the initiative was attempted to be 
concretized around a more specified regulative orientation. The objection from contractors 
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drove the professional associations of BEC’s board of directors to carry their member interests 
into the discussions of the strategic orientation of BEC, entailing a contradiction between the 
ambition of sustaining BEC as independent of private interests and simultaneously representing 
the mutually agreed upon interests of the construction industry.  
These accusations of clients’ lacking utilization of KPIs induced that the Danish Association 
for Construction Clients chose to support the authorities and BEC in the political struggle by 
expressing their interests in using benchmarking as a selection tool in the prequalification. It 
became evident that political struggles and consolidation of actors emerged as opposing 
interests in benchmarking became present. The diverse interests in the institutionalization 
revealed how actors were consolidating their interests and creating two strong political 
oppositions in order to be in as strong a position as possible to attain influence on the 
institutionalization.  
The opposition against BEC, the Danish Association for Construction Clients, and the 
authorities got its momentum as consulting engineers and architects were prospected to be 
subjected to the benchmarking initiative. Again actors from architectural and consulting 
engineering companies facilitated their political influence by bringing their requirements and 
criticism into the board of BEC through their respective professional associations. The 
mobilized political forces against the prognostic framing of benchmarking, constructed by BEC 
and supported by the Danish Association for Construction Clients and the authorities, 
threatened the platform from which benchmarking had until now based its legitimacy and 
political orientation on. Member companies forced the five associations in BEC’s board of 
directors to achieve influence on the development and forming of benchmarking in order to 
reconfigure the prognostic framings in ways that were, to a greater extent, considering the 
interests of contractors, consulting engineers, and architects. 
The political struggles reflected awareness that this regulative function of benchmarking as a 
transparency generating selection tool for clients could only obtain legitimacy through the 
normative acceptance of this exercise of regulating power. As the functionality and legitimacy 
of benchmarking relied on support from private construction companies, it was revealed how 
these actors had the ability to influence the institutionalization of benchmarking and thus 
became important actors who needed to be taken into account in order to sustain an 
institutionalization of benchmarking in the construction industry.  
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The private companies and the professional associations successfully destabilized the 
institutionalization of benchmarking and clearly demonstrated the political forces they were 
able to mobilize. In order to achieve the needed influence on the future institutionalization, it 
was necessary to provide alternative prognostic framings that could delegitimize the framings 
being challenged and simultaneously mobilize sufficient support from other powerful actors by 
providing a motivational framing that all could subscribe themselves into. 
The political pressure from the professional associations and construction companies resulted 
in a replacement of the management in BEC and prompted that BEC was now to be less 
political and more market-oriented in their strategy of communicating and disseminating 
benchmarking. Additionally, the benchmarking system was highly reduced at the expense of a 
prognostic framing of benchmarking as a socially constructive technology that could generate 
overall insight into the development of the construction industry in favor of a more operational 
and accepted system among private companies.  
A simplification of the benchmarking system and a rising request for benchmarking took place 
and opened up the possibility for other actors to engage in the benchmarking activities, which 
resulted in an emergence of two new benchmarking operators. These two benchmarking 
operators promoted benchmarking differently than BEC, which once again resulted in 
coexisting prognostic framings and implications of disseminating benchmarking as a coherent 
development initiative for the construction industry.  
As a result of the existence of three benchmarking operators with different interests in and 
perceptions of benchmarking, the private companies were provided an even more decisive role 
in the institutionalization since their choice of benchmarking operator would strengthen the 
prognostic framings promoted by the benchmarking operator of choice. Since benchmarking 
has found a politically accepted configuration among the professional associations and the 
authorities, these interpretations of benchmarking that are likely to impact the future 
institutionalization are to be found among the practitioners (contractors, consulting engineers, 
architects, and clients). Therefore the final chapter of the analysis uncovers how (a sample of) 
these actors interpret and conform to the contemporary benchmarking institution. 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
223
The above exposition of contractors’, consultant engineers’, and clients’ interpretation and 
normative conformity to benchmarking have uncovered important insight into how 
benchmarking seems to be institutionalized among the practitioners interviewed for this study.  
There are clear indications that benchmarking, among the contractors and consulting engineers, 
has obtained institutional legitimacy on a local level in building projects, as a normalizing 
governing technology that induces that contractors and consulting engineers to adjust their 
products and services to an expectation of clients’ use of KPIs when selecting collaborators in 
future building projects. The analysis reflects that benchmarking creates incentives for 
construction companies to improve building products and services in their striving for good 
KPIs. However, the KPIs on defects and work accidents in the contractor benchmarking system 
are highly questioned by the contractors interviewed for this study. If the interviews are 
representing a general perception among contractors, the KPIs are likely to constitute the 
foundation for future political struggles. If benchmarking is to be institutionalized further 
among contractors, it seems prudent to design the KPIs in ways that can support these local 
effects of benchmarking and ultimately improve the performances in building projects. 
The interviews also reveal how three clients interpreted benchmarking differently and that there 
is a clear discrepancy between construction companies’ interpretation of benchmarking and the 
clients’ interpretations of benchmarking. Two of the clients exclusively regarded benchmarking 
as a selection tool for clients to select collaborators from and thus did not consider the effects 
benchmarking engender on the individual building project as construction companies conform 
their products and services to the KPIs in the benchmarking system. Accordingly, the 
interviews indicate that the people interviewed for this study have diverse interpretations of the 
instrumental purposes and overall objectives for benchmarking.  
Contrary to the two other clients, the client from the social housing sector revealed an insight 
into benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology in line with the interpretations 
identified among the contractors and consulting engineers. The client did, however, not utilize 
or support this interpretation in practice by actively utilizing benchmarking to create incentives 
for construction companies to pursue good KPIs. He indicated that a more consistent and 
transparent utilization of benchmarking in the prequalification could create higher incentives 
for the construction companies to conform to benchmarking as a normalizing governing 
technology but did not personally contribute to this development.  
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The study indicates that benchmarking today has found its pragmatic legitimacy from a 
mutually accepted political motivation to change the competition from price to quality. This 
motivation has been present since the initial ambitions for benchmarking and has survived the 
full range of political struggles and negotiation. This overall objective has shown to be 
persistently supported by all actors from the micro level to the macro level. The final chapter of 
the analysis indicates that benchmarking has gained acceptance among construction companies 
as a normalizing governing technology. The interviews with contractors and consulting 
engineers indicate an interest in improving their performances in building projects and that it is 
within the political objective of changing the competition in construction from price to quality 
that causes contractors and consulting engineers to conform to benchmarking by adjusting their 
strategies, products, and services with the aim of attaining good KPIs. These conformities to 
the institution are exclusively based on the companies’ interpretation of potential sanctions that 
insufficient KPIs could entail. The effects of the benchmarking institution and its ability to 
generate changes on the local building project is accordingly still highly reliant on the 
executive orders and the dissemination of benchmarking as selection tool for clients. Without 
such driving forces, the legitimate and politically negotiated platform for benchmarking would 
erode, as the incentives for construction companies to pursue good KPIs would become absent. 
The case study shows how prognostic framings, over time, have been constructed and 
strengthened or deconstructed and weakened by actors with political interests in attaining 
influence on the instrumental purposes and objectives of benchmarking. Actors’ abilities to 
exploit contradictions within the benchmarking institution and propound legitimate visions 
have shown to be the most important factors in orientating the institutionalization. The review 
of the historical development of benchmarking reveals how the institutionalization has not been 
stable but instead characterized and shaped by politically motivated actors who have attempted 
to facilitate the multiple interpretations and political ambitions for benchmarking from the Task 
Force and Project House. The original broad motivational framing from these two development 
programs showed that benchmarking was a carrier of contradictions, and the coexisting 
prognostic framings created opportunities for agency, thus political struggles and negotiations, 
as the prognostic framings generated contradictions that provided actors openings of generating 
changes of the institutionalization. As actors have been exposed to the contradictions between 
the instrumental purposes and objectives represented by the coexisting prognostic framings, 
they have engaged in and accomplished transformations of the institutionalization. The 
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development of benchmarking has been a result of the political interests that have emerged 
throughout the institutionalization, and the case study shows that these interests have been 
generated concurrently with the establishment of the benchmarking institution. The interests of 
political motivated actors that have affected the institutionalization have accordingly been 
neither stable nor always present; new interests have emerged concurrently with actors have 
perceived that the benchmarking institution has counteracted their political interests. In this 
continuous production of political interests benchmarking has transformed, as actors have 
strategically exploited the contradictions of benchmarking with the aim of creating sufficient 
political pressure and transformed the institutionalization in the direction of the most influential 
actors. The institutionalization of benchmarking has accordingly been shaped by political 
struggles and negotiations between actors in the construction industry, which have resulted in 
transformations of benchmarking from being an institution that was carrier of many different 
political aims for the construction industry to an initiative that has much more concrete and 
defined objectives. In this way, the institutionalization of benchmarking is best described as a 
consolidation of the interests of those actors who have been most successful in forcing through 
their political interests. Their success in the political negotiations has shown to be contingent 
on the actors’ ability to construct alternative prognostic framings of benchmarking and through 
these formulate new and more politically powerful or appealing motivational framings for the 
institutionalization of benchmarking. The result is that benchmarking is transformed into an 
institution that represents an accommodation of the strongest political orientations, which do 
not fulfill the original intensions but meet the demands that could be agreed upon by the 
politically motivated actors throughout its institutionalization.  
This study has unfolded how benchmarking has caused strategic activities and political 
struggles as tensions and contradictory interests have prompted actors to become reflective of 
the structures they were prospected to be subjected to by the rising institution. The 
institutionalization has been a highly political process and has over time been characterized by: 
1) periods of political attempts to generate stability; 2) periods of political intervention by 
actors with strategic interests in destabilizing the institutionalization; and 3) periods of 
consolidation. As a result of this political process, benchmarking has transformed radically 
from its original design, and is still struggling with diverse interpretations of the overall 
ambitions for the change agenda it seeks to address. 
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The analysis has accounted for how actors have played a vital role in the institutionalization of 
benchmarking and how they do not only reproduce structures but also how they become 
reflective of their institutional environment and have the possibility to change the structures 
they are subjected to. The case study reveals that, when actors have experienced contradictions 
between the structures being institutionalized and their political interests, they have critically 
interpreted the motivational and prognostic framings of benchmarking, with the purpose of 
identifying contradictions within the benchmarking institution. In this way, it is shown how 
actors have facilitated their social positions to either support the institutionalization by 
reproducing the structures of benchmarking or obstruct the critical reproduction of 
benchmarking by propounding alternative orientations for benchmarking and, in this way, 
threaten the political platform from which benchmarking finds its institutional legitimacy.  
However, the case study reveals that even though the actors who have attempted to influence 
the institutionalization have shown to be reflective individuals that interpret their institutional 
environment and initiate political struggles, the changes of the institutionalization are not 
necessarily commensurable with the intentions of the political struggles. This indicates the 
highly complex political processes of institutionalization, as the institutionalization is never 
linear or reflective of a single actor’s interests. Institutions are, when all comes to all, political 
constructions that are always open for political struggles and, accordingly, transformations or 
even closure.  
The case study has shown how the institutionalization of benchmarking has taken the form of a 
series of political struggles and negotiations, where actors have attempted to attain influence 
and ownership. During its lifespan, benchmarking has been a highly political topic and has 
mobilized many actors with political interests in attaining influence on the institutionalization. 
The inclusion of many actors in the institutionalization has resulted in a high degree of 
pragmatism where benchmarking has never been stable. Instead, benchmarking has emerged 
from a foundation of an inconsistent design of its instrumental purposes and overall objectives, 
where the development and forming of benchmarking has been very flexible and open for 
interpretations. This case study may most importantly conclude that benchmarking has found 
its legitimacy through political negotiations. It is these negotiations that create and brings 
identity and legitimacy to new institutions; however, the case study is an imminent example of 
how benchmarking is not formed in ways that meet or represent the interests of a single actor or 
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group of actors but rather is a result of where benchmarking most effectively could find its 
pragmatic legitimacy. 
Many of the original intentions for the instrumental purposes and objectives for benchmarking 
have been neglected in the contemporary political struggles, which reveal how the interactions 
between actors with political interests in benchmarking have been institutionalized. 
Benchmarking has developed in an orientation, where the political struggles are no longer 
reflecting a questioning of the legitimacy for the existence of benchmarking but instead the 
struggles of defining and forming its prognostic framing. This indicates that benchmarking has 
successfully constructed social relations between actors to an extent where the political outset 
for benchmarking is no longer an issue. Even though benchmarking is yet not unambiguous and 
unchallenged, benchmarking has entailed sedimentation of the political social relations that 
have been produced due to benchmarking. This indicates a normalization of the politically 
constructed institutional environment, where the interactions and negotiations between the 
actors have been settled.  
The professional associations have, throughout the case study, shown to be of great importance 
for the institutionalization of benchmarking. With their capacity to collectively represent a 
profession professional associations have acted as powerful actors in providing political 
support or oppositions to the institutionalization. They have acted authoritatively in political 
struggles, and the study illuminates how professional associations have been provided a strong 
political position (and facilitated this position in the institutionalization), partly prompted by 
the changes in the political climate towards inclusion of these associations in political 
development activities, and partly prompted by establishing BEC on private hands. In this way, 
professional associations, BEC, and the authorities have acted as equal actors in negotiating, 
shaping, and redefining the social construction of benchmarking. The associations have, 
throughout the institutionalization of benchmarking, shown capable of constructing opposing 
prognostic and motivational framings that could resonate with the interests of potential allies 
and, in this way, destabilize the institutionalization in such proportions that entailed that both 
BEC, the Danish Association for Construction Clients, and the authorities were forced to 
reconstruct the institutionalization in order to achieve a sufficient degree of legitimacy of 
benchmarking as development initiative. In order for benchmarking to take on the required 
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degree of legitimacy, it has been a political struggle to determine the instrumental purposes and 
overall objectives for benchmarking.  
The institutionalization of benchmarking has taken place as a learning mechanism, where 
benchmarking was originally introduced as a carrier of multiple political ambitions and 
objectives. But as actors have become conscious about its political and practical implications 
the institutionalization began to be influenced by political interest and the institutionalization 
began to slide into a more reflective phase. The case study (and the contemporary institutional 
theory) tells us that institutionalizations of new structures are highly political and can therefore 
have indefinite courses of development that cannot be captured and controlled by the political 
origins that laid the foundation to their creation. The establishment and political objectives for 
new institutions are accordingly only to be perceived as the initiation of institutionalization 
processes and new institutions and not as a rational design that reflects the institution in its 
negotiated form. Institutionalization processes are therefore best understood as politically 
conditioned courses of developments of new institutions and the result of sometimes difficult 
political choices between different legitimate orientations of the institutionalization. When all 
comes to all, institutionalizations of new structures are formed by political struggles and 
negotiations that entail the inclusion and institutionalization of some prognostic framings and 
exclusion or suppression of others. In this way institutions cannot be reduced to individual 
political requirements or objectives, but must instead be understood as the negotiated result 
from which the institution has achieved the highest pragmatic legitimacy and, accordingly, its 
highest attainable degree of institutionalization. 
5.3 HOW HAS THE STUDY CONTRIBUTED WITH RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO 
INSTITUTIONALIZE NEW STRUCTURES IN THE DANISH CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY? 
The institutionalization of benchmarking has shown to be a good example of the mechanisms 
that unfold when attempting to institutionalize a political initiative in the Danish construction 
industry. From the findings of the case study, this research question seeks to provide 
recommendations on how to institutionalize new structures in the Danish construction industry. 
It will be discussed how the institutionalization of benchmarking can contribute to general 
insight into how construction political development initiatives are shaped in negotiations 
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between actors with contributory influence in the development of the construction industry. In 
this way, this research question discusses how the means-end relationships of rising institutions 
are transforming as a consequence of the interplay between political motivated actors in the 
Danish construction industry. 
The three coexisting prognostic framings of benchmarking have been the root to several 
political struggles and negotiations and have been the foundation to transformations of the 
benchmarking initiative. It has shown to be a persistent dilemma for the institutionalization that 
benchmarking has been attempted to be institutionalized as a technology that could 
accommodate all three prognostic framings, which have caused difficulties in constructing a 
stable and common interpretation of benchmarking. The original design constituted a wide 
institutional framework under which the institutionalization of benchmarking has unfolded.  
The transformations of benchmarking can be regarded as actors’ political successes and 
failures, and an obvious (and easy) conclusion is to point out how the institutionalization of 
benchmarking has been problematic because of the ambiguities in the original design; many of 
the political struggles that have unfolded over time could have been avoided with a more 
coherent and strict design. If the contemporary benchmarking institution is compared to the 
original ambitions for benchmarking in the Task Force, Project House, and original 
expectations in BEC, it is a legitimate conclusion that the institutionalization has failed and not 
achieved its original instrumental purposes and overall objectives.  
But does it make sense to assess an institution on such success criteria? My answer is “no.” It 
would be incorrect to conclude that the development of benchmarking is a political failure 
because of the compromising of the original political ambitions. The benchmarking institution 
that exists today is simply the result of reflective and politically motivated actors’ 
interpretations of the institutional purposes that benchmarking most profitably can fulfill. The 
benchmarking institution reflects the results of the political compromises that have been 
necessary to secure and maintain a continuous strengthening of the institutionalization, and the 
requirements for institutionalizing benchmarking in the Danish construction industry have been 
radical transformations of the initiative. Yes, benchmarking has changed radically, and yes, the 
benchmarking initiative has lost some of its original ambitions. But this is a consequence of the 
reality under which benchmarking has unfolded and the conditions under which new 
institutions are to be developed in the Danish construction industry. I therefore choose not to be 
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critical of inclusion of private actors and the resulting institutional environment of the 
construction industry, nor do I choose to present conclusions on how the original design of 
benchmarking could have been constructed more appropriately. Instead, I find the greatest 
contribution to be concerning how this study can contribute to recommendations of how it is 
possible to politically navigate and design new institutions for the Danish construction industry. 
In the following, I will unfold how my recommendations are contradicting the above 
conclusion about the inexpediencies of the original design of benchmarking by claiming that, 
with an ambition of institutionalizing benchmarking in the Danish construction industry, the 
ambiguities in the original design of benchmarking has shown to be a positive precondition.  
I have demonstrated how the point of origin for the institutionalization of benchmarking has 
generated uncertainties of the instrumental purposes and overall objectives for benchmarking. 
Although nothing indicates that it has been an intentional political decision, the original design 
has facilitated benchmarking to be a carrier of a flexible political agenda that has provided 
possibilities for politically motivated actors to strategically engage and promote different 
institutional interpretations of benchmarking and thus negotiate how the institution is best 
shaped in order to gain support from the whole range of politically motivated actors engaged in 
the institutionalization. In this way, the institution has been adjusted to the political 
requirements of those actors who have been allocated a contributory influence in the 
institutionalization of benchmarking. The transformations of benchmarking must therefore be 
understood as a consequence of an institutionalization process that has had multiple, not 
necessarily consistent, political intentions. During the institutionalization, benchmarking has 
redefined political intentions and means-end relationships as the institution has adapted and 
responded to institutional pressures from the construction industry, and as a consequence, some 
of the initial intentions have been lost. 
If we accept the theoretical view that institutionalization processes are highly political and 
changing over time, we simultaneously accept that institutionalizations are in constant risk of 
being challenged or rejected by politically motivated actors. With such preconditions for 
institutionalization processes, there is, as the case with this case study, always a risk of ending 
up with institutionalized structures that do not necessarily reflect the original political 
intentions for the institution. These uncertainties of institutionalization processes have shown to 
be particularly suitable for the Danish construction industry, as the institutional environment 
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for developing construction political activities consist of multiple actors who all provided a 
contributory influence on both the design and the institutionalization of new political 
institutions. In this way, institutionalization processes in the Danish construction industry are 
particularly exposed to political struggles, challenges, and rejections.  
The study has shown how actors have become politically motivated and able to challenge and 
transform benchmarking but also that the actors have not been interested in or able to achieve a 
total abolishment of benchmarking as an institution in the construction industry. The 
transformations of benchmarking have occurred as new interests have emerged and as actors 
have enforced their political interests by strategically constructing alternative orientations of 
the institutionalization within the original design of benchmarking and the three prognostic 
framings that benchmarking was carrying. The relatively loose design from the Task Force and 
Project House, with unspecified and ambiguous means-end relationships, has accordingly both 
facilitated political struggles that may have been avoided but also shown to be setting a 
framework for the political struggles and negotiations unfolding during the institutionalization 
of benchmarking. The potential consequences of a more uncompromising political foundation 
for benchmarking and the risk of total rejection of the institution would have been greater, as 
opposing actors of the institutionalization would not be provided the same opportunity to 
construct and propound alternative interpretations of benchmarking from its original design to 
promote politically legitimate arguments for a reorientation. If benchmarking had been based 
on a detailed and less politically negotiable design, benchmarking would not be in as strong a 
position to regain political legitimacy by orientating the institutionalization towards alternative 
and politically negotiated solutions when the political pressures against the institutionalization 
became sufficiently strong.  
Structures that are institutionalized with a vague or indefinite means-end relationship, due to a 
broad motivational framing and several (inconsistent) prognostic framings, will be much more 
robust to withstand political struggles and negotiations during the institutionalization. However, 
such structures will also automatically entail an increased risk for radical transformations, as 
actors are provided an explicit and politically constructed framework for navigating, framing, 
and expressing new and opposing political positions by propounding legitimate political 
arguments for a reorientation of the institutionalization. The practical consequences of such 
indefinite and politically negotiable foundations for institutionalization processes is that the 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
232
established institution will not necessarily reflect the initially intended political ambition, but in 
return, it will be in a form that represents the pragmatic legitimacy which actors participating in 
the institutionalization can agree upon. In this way, the institution has a greater possibility to 
gain the greatest possible institutional legitimacy, but of course, at the expense of a linear 
correspondence between original political objectives for the institution and its effects in its 
institutionalized and political negotiated form (a correspondence which theorists of 
contemporary institutional theory find illusive).  
The study has shown that institutionalization is something that can change shape over time and 
develop in phases as new political interests emerge and actors become politically motivated to 
transform the institution. The issue is accordingly how to design new institutions that can cope 
with the construction political environment in the Danish construction industry and survive 
their institutionalization. The study indicates that, with an overall political aim of generating 
changes in the Danish construction industry by destabilizing existing institutions and providing 
openings for new institutions, it seems prudent to design new institutions to cope with 
transformations and political pressures. This is especially appropriate when dealing with a 
political environment such as the Danish construction industry, where new structures are 
difficult to institutionalize with a persistent end-means relationship. The question of whether 
new institutions for the construction industry ought to be loosely designed is accordingly not as 
relevant as the question of how institutions can be strategically designed to gain support from 
actors with political interests in the institutionalization process and provide a political 
framework for actors to negotiate the institutional form.  
The answers to the first research question reveal how the construction political climate had 
been transformed from a ministerial initiation of change programs to a high degree of inclusion 
of private actors. The answers to the second research question reveal that this transformation in 
the construction political climate has generated implications for initiating and institutionalizing 
change agendas in the Danish construction industry. Institutionalizations processes in the 
Danish construction industry (and other organizational fields that count a high number of 
politically motivated actors in institutionalization processes) are not to be understood as 
something that is designed once and for all. Designers and carriers of new institutions in such 
fields can accordingly profitably consider institutionalization processes to be rather 
unpredictable and uncertain. In line with this recommendation, designers and carriers of new 
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institutions in the Danish construction industry must recognize, understand and treat 
institutionalization processes as conditioned of political processes where the development is 
contingent on the political struggles and negotiations that take place between politically 
motivated actors. This point is also highly relevant when understanding and preparing for the 
political counterstrategies that are likely to emerge during institutionalization processes. It is 
accordingly crucial that designers of political institutions for the Danish construction industry 
recognize that institutions are not given once and for all, and that political interests that can 
transform the rising institution are something that emerges and must be handled continuously in 
the institutionalization process.  
But how is it possible to design an institution to cope with and benefit from these conditions?  
First and foremost, the institution needs to be politically flexible in its instrumental purposes 
and objectives in order to survive radical transformations without losing its overall aim of 
generating changes in the organizational field it is implemented in. So instead of having a 
stable and predefined institution as the ultimate goal, the institution must be understood and 
designed as something that can retain connections to the overall change agenda and 
simultaneously handle political struggles and transformations. In order to secure that the 
established institution ultimately supports and generates desirable institutional changes, it is a 
requirement that all prognostic framings propounded in the original design are rooted in an 
overall change agenda and simultaneously sufficient wide and robust to attain institutional 
legitimacy from all actors with an interest in the institutionalization. Only in this way is it 
possible to ensure that the final politically negotiated institution, in the end, in some way 
address the change agenda that laid the basis for its establishment. The issue is accordingly to 
strategically design new institutions in ways that prepare the ground for an involvement of 
political actors and reflective development. 
The above recommendation entails an increased focus on a new institution’s ability to infiltrate 
the institutional environment and generate changes by challenging existing inexpedient 
institutions. However, designers of institutions need to be open-minded, reflective, and engaged 
in the institutionalization processes and less focus on measurable effects of the institution. The 
consequences of understanding institutionalization processes as something that is highly 
political and changes means-end relationships over time imply that the effects of institutions 
cannot be measured against some historically predefined political objectives. The effects of 
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new institutions are instead to be assessed on their ability to generate changes in 
institutionalized perceptions and behaviors in the organizational field they are implemented in 
and, further, the changes of political positions they give rise to.  
In regards to benchmarking, carriers of the institutionalization (such as BEC and other 
politically motivated actors with an interest in shaping the institution) need to be highly 
conscious of how the institution is affecting and challenging existing institutional conditions. If 
an institution is not stable and is in a continuous transformation process, it is essential for 
carriers of rising institutions to be aware of how the institution is experienced and interpreted in 
the Danish construction industry in order to either strategically strengthen or weaken the 
prevalent orientation of the institutionalization. Since benchmarking has found a politically 
accepted configuration among the professional associations and the authorities, these 
experiences and interpretations of benchmarking that are likely to impact the future 
institutionalization are to be found among the practitioners (contractors, consulting engineers, 
architects, and clients).  
Disseminating benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology that can generate 
desirable effects on a local building project level will make it relevant to bring the KPIs in the 
benchmarking systems up for discussion, as these no longer are intended to fulfill the wide 
range of political ambitions for benchmarking but are instead intended to support 
benchmarking as a normalizing governing technology that unfolds between clients and 
construction companies and meets clients’ demands as a selection tool of collaborators.  
Another recommendation is that carriers of the institutionalization of benchmarking can 
profitably strengthen their political interests by conducting analyses or creating learning forums 
that provide insight into practitioners’ interpretations of benchmarking and how they conform 
to its structures in practice. Through such initiatives, carriers of the institutionalization will gain 
essential knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the institution and accordingly be 
provided with important insight into the openings for impacting the future institution. From 
such openings, they can strategically design new prognostic framings of benchmarking that can 
find the highest possible legitimacy among the strategically important practitioners in an 
appealing motivational framing.  
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Introductory in this paragraph I outlined that I would not be critical to the inclusion of private 
actors or the institutional environment for generating changes in the Danish construction 
industry through political development initiatives. My final recommendations are therefore on 
how future attempts to generate changes through political development initiatives can profit 
from a rethinking of roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in institutionalization 
processes in the Danish construction industry. The development of benchmarking demonstrates 
how private actors have pursued own interests in the institutionalization and created strong 
oppositions to actors insisting on benchmarking to develop in another direction. The political 
struggles and negotiations presented and analyzed in this thesis reflect discussions about 
benchmarking that to a high degree was disconnected from the original overall change agenda 
of increasing the transparency in construction. Such conditions for institutionalization 
processes are hindering an expedient development of new political initiatives since it entails an 
impending risk of ending up with institutionalized structures that are disconnected from the 
overall change agenda. It is therefore argued that if future political development initiatives are 
to continue the inclusion of private actors as participating actors in both the design and 
institutionalization, and simultaneously secure an expedient orientation of the 
institutionalization, private actors have to commit themselves to engage in political struggles 
and negotiations with a primary reference and respect to the change agenda, rather than 
attending to local interests of their member companies.  
In the same way, as the private actors need to rethink their own role and display more 
responsibility to the overall change agenda, the authorities also need to reconsider how they are 
to exercise their power and facilitate their influence. The case study demonstrates a rather low 
involvement of the authorities in the political struggles and negotiations. The analysis shows 
that the authorities have influenced the institutionalization through the executive orders and the 
as mediator in political struggles. This conclusion is therefore not to be perceived as a 
characterization of the authorities as non-existing in the institutionalization of benchmarking. 
Instead this is a call for the authorities to be more reflective on their role in policy development 
in public-private collaborations in construction. Despite the opportunity to guide the 
institutionalization through the executive orders and clear declaration of interests, the 
authorities have to a great extend entrusted the private actors to orientate the 
institutionalization. In order to secure a well-balanced institutionalization considering both 
private and public actors’ interests, the authorities ought to engage at least on equal terms in the 
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political struggles and negotiations that take place. This entails that the authorities, as other 
actors, have to articulate a clear vision for benchmarking. This study shows that the loosely 
expressions of interests from the authorities are being exploited in diverse ways by the 
benchmarking operators, without contradicting the executive orders. The case study also shows 
that the authorities are not expressing any interests in supporting or rejecting any of the 
orientations of the benchmarking operators. Therefore it is natural to emphasize the 
discrepancies between the powerful position of the authorities and their restraint of engaging in 
and formulating clear visions for benchmarking and the change agenda this political initiated 
development initiative is expected to address.  
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7.1 APPENDIX A 
LIST OF INTERVIEW PERSONS 
Bent Frank, former director of Forsvarets Bygningstjeneste 
Bent Madsen, director of BL – Did not approve transcription and the interview has not been 
included in the thesis 
Christian Lerche, director of Danske Ark and board member of BEC 
Curt Liliegreen, former director of BEC 
Gunde Odgaard, director of BAT-kartellet and board member of BEC 
Henrik Bang, director of Bygherreforeningen 
Henrik Garver, director of F.R.I. and board member of BEC 
Ib Steen Olsen, former Head of Division in By- og Boligministeriet and EBST 
Jacob Ravn Thomsen, former chief consultant of Konstruktørforeningen 
Jan Eske Schmidt, vice director of TEKNIQ 
Jesper Rasmussen, former vice director of EBST 
Jørgen Nue Møller, chairman of the board in BEC 
Karsten Gullach, chief consultant in Ministeriet for By, Bolig og Landdistrikter 
Lars Ole Hansen, chairman of the board in Bygherreforeningen and vice chairman of BEC 
Michael H. Nielsen, vice director of Dansk Byggeri 
Niels Haldor Bertelsen, senior researcher in SBi 
Peter Hesdorf, director of BEC 
Troels Støvring, consultant in Bülow Management 
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Anomized interviews: 
Four contractors from different companies  
Two directors of different consulting engineering companies 
One director of a private client company 
One director of from a social housing client company  
One former director from a state construction client company 
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7.5 APPENDIX E 
PUBLICATION OF KPIS 
Based on the governmental ambition of publishing all KPIs from state and social housing 
building projects, BEC initiated a project with the purpose of publishing all their customers 
KPIs, also from building projects that was not subjected to the executive orders. But Bülow 
Management and Byggeriets Nøgletal were not supportive of this publication strategy. The 
progress of publication revealed contradictions between the ambition of driving companies to 
request benchmarking on a voluntary basis with an interests in performance improvements and 
the ambition of generating total transparency of the market for the benefit of clients.  
The initial attempts to publish KPIs were launched as EBST in 2010 announced that KPIs from 
contractors, consulting engineers and architects were going to be published on their web page. 
The social housing sector would also publish KPIs from their building projects on the Danish 
Building Defect Fund’s web page (553). Publication of KPIs had already in 2008 been given 
much attention by EBST, who found the publication of KPIs decisive for benchmarking to 
generate transparency (336). And as described earlier, the publication of KPIs was also a high 
priority of the social housing sector.  
The division of KPIs on two different websites provided an obvious opportunity for BEC to 
collect their KPIs from state and social housing projects in one database, from which clients 
could have access to KPIs from both sectors. With an anchor in an overall ambition of 
generating transparency of the market, BEC further announced that all KPIs in BEC’s database 
would be public available, including building projects that were not subjected to the legal 
requirements. This ambition was accordingly part of the strategy of getting clients to use KPIs 
more actively by getting access to a large data base of the performances of potential 
collaborators.  
“Many clients requested that KPIs eventually would be something that could be 
accessed on a web page […] I consider this to be contributing to a dissemination of 
benchmarking. If KPIs are difficult to obtain, the motivation for clients to use them will 
automatically decrease.” (Interview Hesdorf) 
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The interviews conducted for this study reflected that the professional associations were not 
supportive of a publication of the members’ KPIs, and considered it a way to criticize their 
members in public. These view point emerged as the member companies of the professional 
associations interpreted and responded to the ‘Bygge Rating’ initiative. Neither Bülow 
Management of Byggeriets Nøgletal chose to follow BEC’s ambition of publishing all 
registered KPIs. In this way they put pressure on BEC with a prospect of losing costumers that 
did not have an interest in making their KPIs from building projects not subjected to the 
executive order available for the public. In his account for why Bülow Management did not 
support this total transparency ambition, Støvring stated: 
“First of all you will remove the incentive to conduct benchmarking on a voluntary 
basis, because the companies become exposed for a risk that they fundamentally do not 
have an interest in.” (Interview Troels Støvring) 
With this point of departure, Støvring explained that construction companies’ voluntary 
engagement in benchmarking, is chosen with an interest in achieving a better building process, 
not with an interest in making the KPIs public available.  
“I think that it is fine to publish KPIs from state and social housing building projects. 
But benchmarking that you choose of your own free will is done because you see a 
value in it. Therefore it must be a choice for the companies whether they want to publish 
their KPIs.” 
This statement clearly reveals how Bülow Management were counteracting BEC’s attempts to 
disseminate benchmarking by facilitating the use of track records, despite the benchmarking 
operators’ clear recognition of the correlation between the penetration of track records as 
selection tool for clients and the incentives for construction companies to strive for good KPIs. 
As a result of the widespread dissatisfaction with publishing KPIs from building projects that 
were not subjected to the legal requirements, BEC changed their approach to generating 
transparency of the market. They did so by offering their customers an opportunity to deselect 
publications of their KPIs on BEC’s web page. 
“Companies can choose to present their KPIs on our web site, if they wish to use them 
for the purpose of marketing. We support this utilization of KPIs if our customers 
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request it. I see this opportunity as a natural element in generating increased 
transparency of the market.” (Interview Hesdorf) 
Asked about how this ambition of transparency was influenced by the reluctance of the two 
other benchmarking operators, Hesdorf responded: 
“It means that there is not a mutual strategy for the KPIs: Are they to be public available 
or not? But these are the conditions, and it entails that some companies can chose to 
make their KPIs publicly available, while others can chose not to. […] I think that it is 
going to be a slow process, but I imagine the day that you are able to find KPIs from any 
construction company. That day you will have something that is operational, which have 
been missing so far.” (Interview Hesdorf) 
As a result of the political struggles of publishing KPIs, BEC provided a database consisting of 
KPIs from state and social housing building projects and additionally KPIs from those 
companies who voluntarily had chosen to lay out all their KPIs, including from building 
projects that were not subjected to the legal requirements. People with an interest in the 
performance of contractors, consulting engineers and architects were provided a tool where 
they could type in performance criteria for potential bidders, and construction companies were 
provided an opportunity to compare their performance with their competitors (593). 
EBST and the Ministry of Social Affairs respectively made their own less searchable data bases 
that did not provide an opportunity to identify those companies with the best KPIs. These 
databases consisted of an overview of the companies that had KPIs from respectively state 
building projects or social housing building projects. The publication of KPIs accordingly 
became less ambitious than BEC originally intended.  
BYGGE RATING 
Another attempt from BEC to promote their prognostic framing of benchmarking as 
normalizing governing technology was also influenced by Bülow Management and Byggeriets 
Nøgletal.  
‘Bygge Rating’ was presented in 2011 at BEC’s annual meeting and had the purpose of making 
it easier for clients to assess their bidder’s performance, by providing a supplement to the track 
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records that could facilitate the use of track records for selection of collaborators. (Byggeri.dk, 
2011).  
‘Bygge Rating’ was presented in 2011 at BEC’s annual meeting which had the purpose of 
making it easier for clients to assess their bidder’s performance (593).  
“This is a ‘light’ version [of the track records] that facilitates the communication about 
companies’ KPIs. Bygge Rating will be ideal when comparing several companies” 
(Hesdorf, 593) 
Bygge Rating was considered to be a supplement to the track records, providing clients a better 
overview of their bidders’ performances. 
“For us it is about increasing the utilization of benchmarking, and we consider that 
Bygge Rating is an efficient way” (Hesdorf, 601) 
The system was very illustratively showing the performance of the companies, by grading the 
different KPIs from A to E. 
 
Figure 7: Example of Bygge Rating for contractors. Showing from left to right: appliance with time, 
building defects, work accident and client satisfaction. 
The development and launch of Bygge Rating was according to Hesdorf based on a request 
from clients about a more simple use of benchmarking (601).  
“It is especially clients that have raised the request of supplementing the track records 
with a more a rating that is easier to understand and could help putting the KPIs in 
perspective. Based on these request from a large study in 2010 we made a suggestion of 
a rating system.” (Interview Hesdorf) 
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The development and launch of Bygge Rating was a reflection of BEC’s ambition of generating 
more transparency and disseminating benchmarking through an increased request for track 
records from clients.  
“The rating system is a part of the strategy of disseminating benchmarking and 
generating more transparency. The system has made it easier to understand what the 
KPIs mean. We recognized that it was a problem [for some clients] to understand the 
KPIs from their bidders. By communicating them by means of letters and colors this is 
now easier. And if can provide more transparency then it is definitely in the centre’s 
interests to follow this path” (Interview Hesdorf) 
BEC attempted to disseminate Bygge Rating to the other benchmarking operators by making 
the system open source. But Bülow Management was not interested in this simplification of the 
track records, and found it to contradict their focus on contractors, consulting engineers and 
architects. 
“Bygge Rating is focused on facilitating clients’ interpretation of KPIs. […] Firstly, you 
need to consider the data quality, because it is still an issue to get consistent registrations 
from all building projects. It you have a precondition saying that data is not always 
perfect, then [the idea of] Bygge Rating starts to disintegrate. 
Secondly, Bygge Rating is based on quartiles, and when using with percents, it can 
entail that the some of the classifications of the letters [in Bygge Rating] can be very 
broad while others are very narrow. And very little differences can separate an A-
company and a B-company. The client will never see through this. He bases his 
selection on the letters. This is why we oppose the rating system. […] We think that the 
system is over simplifying KPIs.” (Interview Troels Støvring)  
Støvring however advocated for transparency as a way to increase the performance in the 
construction industry, but found that Bygge Rating was hindering the transparency shifting 
focus from the KPIs to the letters. 
The challenges for promoting Bygge Rating as legitimate tool for clients’ selection of bidders 
did not stop here, as Byggeriets Nøgletal chose to develop their own rating system, when the 
APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
295
benchmarking operator ascertained that construction companies had started to promote their 
Bygge Rating on their web pages: 
 
Figure 8: Example of a company’s promotion of Bygge Rating20 
This opportunity of promoting performances was in the interests of Byggeriets Nøgletal, who 
accordingly introduced ‘smiley’ as a way for companies to communicate their performance in a 
different way. 
 
Figure 9: Example of alternative rating system from Byggeriets Nøgletal’s web page 
 
                                                 
20 http://www.ankerhansen.dk/?type=nyhed&id=70&popup= - Accessed 29-10-2012 
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Byggeriets Nøgletal promoted their ‘Smiley’ indisputably as a marketing tool. This was 
revealed on their web page:  
“Even though you may have achieved good track records, it can still be difficult 
to promote your performance in brochures, advertisements or on your web page. 
For this purpose we calculate your KPIs into a smiley – called Bygge Rating by 
others.” (From www.byggerietsnoegletal.dk/Smiley) 
The alternative rating system accordingly entailed that the KPIs were not calculated into 
consistent ratings, as the criteria for the ratings were different from those of BEC, and as the 
visual presentation of the ratings were not absolute comparable. 
The dissemination of ‘Bygge Rating’ to the clients was accordingly reduced to the track records 
from BEC. BEC attempted to cope with this issue, by developing an online converter of KPIs 
to ratings.  
 
The two above attempts by BEC to strengthen the institutionalization in the direction of their 
ambitions reveal how Bülow Management and Byggeriets Nøgletal were hindering BEC in 
pursuing ambitions of a more transparent market and to disseminate benchmarking to clients as 
a simple selection tool to be used in prequalifications. As a consequence of a market with 
several benchmarking operators with different interests in the orientation of the 
institutionalization, political struggles emerged as one benchmarking operator attempt to 
strengthen the institutionalization in an orientation which is not commonly shared by the three 
benchmarking operators. It had accordingly become even more difficult for benchmarking 
operators to construct consistent framings of benchmarking that could determine the orientation 
of the institutionalization.  
